IRAN

Khosro QASHQAI

Tribal leader



(PRE-1964)

Khosro Khan Qashqai is the youngest and most virulently anti-Government of the four paramount khans--all brothers--of the Qashqai tribe. Although his oldest brother, Naser, is the tribal chief, Khosro was for many years the war leader and commands considerable respect among his tribesmen. He has three strong passions: a bitter hatred of the Shah, a strong loyalty to his tribe and family, and an ambition to replace the Pahlavi family as rulers of Iran. These motivations outweigh any other friendships or alliances he may form. He has often professed friendship to the US, but has not hesitated to attack US policy in Iran. He once referred to the Shah as an American puppet who is plundering the nation's wealth.

Since 1954, when Khosro and two of his brothers were exiled, he has been involved in innumerable plots and rumors of tribal uprisings. He is closely connected with the National Front (NF) organization in West Germany, where he now lives, although the NF does not consider him a bona fide nationalist. He has been reported to be in contact with the Tudeh (Communist) Party in East Germany, and has urged the NF to cooperate with the Tudeh against their common enemy, the Shah. He is also rumored to be in contact with UAR President Nasir. In 1963 negotiations were being held between the Qashqais and the Government to permit two of the brothers to return; Khosro, however, was not considered.

Khosro Qashqai was born in 1921 in Firuzabad in southern Iran, the main city of the Qashqais. His father, Ismail Khan Qashqai (Solat-ed-Dowleh), was poisoned by order of the Shah in the early years of the Pahlavi dynasty. The hatred of Ismail's sons for the Shah is said to date from this event. Khosro graduated from the American College of Tehran in 1939 and returned to his tribe to assume his hereditary duties. He served as governor of Firuzabad from 1943 to 1947. In addition to being the tribal war commander, Khosro was responsible for the tribe's foreign relations and politics. In 1947 he was sent by the Qashqais to be their deputy in the Majlis. He served in the three consecutive sessions until 1953. Khosro Qashqai was vice president of the 16th Majlis (1950-52), and was a member of the Majlis Agricultural Commission during that session.

The opposition of the Qashqai Khans to the Government has been almost continual since World War II. In that conflict they supported the Germans, and during the 1940's and 1950's led tribal revolts aimed at

GROUP 1
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Khosro QASHQAI (cont.)

displacing the Pahlavi dynasty. From 1951 to 1953 they were strong supporters of then Prime Minister Mohammad Mosadeq. Khosro delivered a speech in the Majlis in 1952 denouncing the US for its opposition to the Mosadeq regime, although he continued to express his friendship for US officials in Tehran. When Mosadeq was overthrown in 1953, Khosro returned to Firuzabad, where he talked with Tudeh representatives and weighed the possibilities of revolt. Finally in 1954 he agreed to leave the country. He spent some time in Geneva and then settled down in Munich.

Khosro Qashqai is an exciteable man, inclined to slight exaggerations. He is of medium height and stocky build. His courage, organizational ability and fighting nature are highly respected by his people. A bachelor, he lives with his mother. In 1948 he was reported to be courting Princess Fatemeh, the Shah's sister, and in 1958 an American girl claimed to be his wife. Khosro has rather handsome, heavy Turkish features, thick black hair and a pleasant smile. One report states that he is addicted to drugs. Khosro Qashqai has three brothers and one sister: Naser and Malek Mansur, the two oldest, were exiled with Khosro in 1954; Mohammad Hosein, the other brother, is restricted to the Tehran area; the sister, Bibi, is not involved in politics and still lives in Shiraz. He has traveled widely in Europe and the US periodically since 1947. He speaks good English, Turkish and Farsi.

AB:ljc

11 May 1964

20 August 1964
Attachment to P-426/64

Ayatollah Seyed Kazem Shariat-Madari

Ayatollah Seyed Kazem Shariat-Madari is about 64 to 70 years old, resides in Qom, and is one of the four religious authorities of Qom. He was born in Tabriz and has considerable influence in Tabriz and Azerbaijan and has probably over 500,000 followers in this area. Although he does not actually like Ayatollah Khomeini's action, out of necessity he is working in favor of Khomeini without making any demonstrations. He receives about one million tomans of legal religious funds from people and lately he has begun construction of a building in Qom in the name of "House of Islamic Propagation" and another building as a branch of this in Tehran on Shah Reza Avenue across from Tehran University. For the construction of these buildings he has obtained a credit of five million tomans and he plans for a number of religious students to attend these two schools. In addition to religious studies, they will be taught modern sciences and a foreign language and successful students will be sent to foreign countries to propagate Islam. Prior to the June 1963 riots he used to receive 300,000 tomans monthly as legal religious funds and in the last few months he has been receiving 500,000 tomans monthly. He has published religious books and has written and published sentences on a point of religious jurisprudence. He is a bit of a coward, but he is self-possessed, intelligent and has sufficient knowledge and education.

Form FS 405 (revised)
NOV. 1951

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Foreign Service of the United States of America

BIOGRAPHIC DATA FORM

CLASSIFICATION	POST	DATE
CONFIDENTIAL NO/FORN	Tehran	Sept. 9, 196
	REPORTING OFFICER: Victor Wolf, Jr.	
INSTRUCTIONS: For full instructions on submission of biographic data and use of this form see 4 FSM 500.	COPIES TO: GTI, Tehran Bio files	

NAME: SHARIAT-MADARI, Seyed Kazem

NATIONALITY: Iranian

PRESENT POSITION: Prominent Shia Senior Cleric

DATA AND REMARKS

Personal: Born about 1894 at Tabriz of a clerical family. Presently has one wife. In the Past he had a number of siqeh (temporary contract wives), especially during his travels to holy cities in Iraq and Iran. Nothing is known about his children, although he undoubtedly has some.

Education: Began his religious education in Tabriz and later studied in Qom. He has also studied at Meshed for a number of years and for short periods of time at Najaf and Kerbala.

Teaching: He is presently one of the four most important Shia clergyman at Qom and is a prominent teacher, specializing in religious jurisprudence. He is presently using some of the tithes which are available to him to construct a "House of Islamic Propagation" in Qom with a branch in Tehran across Avenue Shah Reza from Tehran University. He has also obtained a credit of Rials 50 milli ($667,000) for this project. Students at these "Houses" will be taught modern science and foreign languages as well as regular religious studies. The graduates of this school will reportedly be used as missionaries to proselyte Islam in foreign countries. Some years ago, Shariat-Madari was promoted to the rank of mujtahid and is considered one of the marjeh (most senior Shia clergyman and one of those contending for the Shia paramountcy). As such, he is considered a pre-eminent clergyman whose religious instructions should be followed and who has the right to command the faithful. He can also legitimately use the title of Ayatollah.

Travels: Iraq

Languages: Persian and Arabic

Political Activities: Shariat-Madari has considerable religious followers in Tabriz and Azerbaijan and his political base is in the Tabriz bazaar. Reports have estimated that he has perhaps as many as 500,000 followers in Northwestern Iran. He has a secondary base in Qom where he has a particular following among Azerbaijanis studying in that shrine city. Shariat-Madari is considered to be extremely cautious and conservative when it comes to tactics but he is self-possessed, intelligent, and somewhat modernist in his religious outlook (see Political and Social Attitudes).

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★U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953—876421

Shariat-Madari probably is not too happy about the relative prominence of Mr. KHOMEINI. However, because of the present political importance and following which Mr. Khomeini possesses, Shariat-Madari must demonstrate a certain minimum of support for him. Shariat-Madari probably does not wish Mr. Khomeini to become the Shia paramount leader. It is probable that Shariat-Madari will withdraw or reduce support of Mr. Khomeini if he should become aware of a general weakening of that cleric's position.

Shariat-Madari has, in the past, expressed concern that the clerical position in the recent dispute with the Government has not been reflected in the mass communications media. He generally sided with the clerical opposition to the Government's reform policy. It should be noted, however, that Shariat-Madari has some connections with and sympathy for the National Front. As such, he probably does not reject the concept of reform, as do some of his colleagues among the senior clerics. For tactical reasons, he has found it expeditious to ally himself with the general clerical opposition to maintain his hold on his political base. However, it is probable that he would prefer that some mild reforms were instituted and that the Government would make some small concessions toward permitting a modest degree of participation by the opposition, especially the National Front, in political affairs in Iran.

Political and Social Attitudes: Shariat-Madari believes that the clergy are not really concerned about land reform and indeed would like to see some of the wealthy landlords deprived of their wealth. He claims that the shrine lands do not presently constitute an important source of income for the clergy.

He is bitterly opposed to the basic Government position that the clergy should get out of politics. Shariat-Madari really is in favor of a kind of theocracy in Iran. He repatedly points to Article 5 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907 which provides for the examination of all legislation by five important clergymen for conformity with Islamic law.

Shariat-Madari is one of those senior clergymen who has modified his position on women's rights since the Moharam riots of 1963. Since that time, Shariat-Madari has not claimed that the extension of political and social rights to women was anti-religious. He has merely insisted that it be done in a "proper" fashion -- this means, under clerical supervision. Indeed, Shariat-Madari is one of those who do not oppose any of the reforms for their own sake but rather is concerned that the reforms as envisaged by the Government will destroy the basic political and social power of the clergy in Iranian life.

Attitudes Toward the US and Other Foreign Countries: Shariat-Madari avoids, as do all of his colleagues, contact with foreigners. He fears that such contacts will ruin his reputation and that he will be considered by the religious masses as "an agent of the foreigners." Shariat-Madari has also occasionally expressed bitterness that the regime is supported by foreign governments, i.e., the United States. To this extent, he is probably cool to the United States. Yet, it must be realized that Shariat-Madari, as a solid conservative clergyman, loathes communism. In his moments of introspection, he undoubtedly recognizes that Iran's relationship with the United States is extremely important to the preservation of Iran's freedom and to the effective limitation of communist influence in Iran.

COMMENT:

Shariat-Madari is one of the seven or eight senior Shia clergymen competing for the position of paramount Shia leader. As such, he has the loyalty of perhaps as many as one-half million Shia Moslems here and an unknown additional number who would support him as their second choice. An unknown number of Moslems in the Shia world have not yet made up their mind who they would want for their paramount leader. Shariat-Madari is an important competitor for their loyalties. He is additionally important because he represents a mild reformist sentiment inside the clerical establishment here. A handicap in his race for the paramountcy is the fact that his religious qualities are superior but not outstanding. Nevertheless, he must be viewed as one of the few very important people in the Shia world.

POL:VWolfJr/lf

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

[illegible] SOURCE: A: Completely reliable. B: Usually reliable. C: Fairly reliable. D: Not usually reliable. E: Not reliable. (Applied to sources of doubtful honesty or loyalty, regardless of their competence). F: Reliability cannot be judged. (Applied to untested or inadequately tested sources).

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 1: Confirmed by other independent and reliable sources. 2: Probably true. 3: Possibly true. 4: Doubtful. 5: Probably false. 6: Cannot be judged.

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COUNTRY: IRAN

REPORT NO.:

SUBJECT: RECENT ANTI-IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND ANTI-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES WITHIN RELIGIOUS CIRCLES IN QOM

DATE OF REPORT: 5 APRIL 1966

NO. PAGES:

REFERENCES:

DATE OF INFO.: MARCH 1966

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: IRAN, TEHRAN 30 MARCH 1966

NIT-7966

[illegible] EVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE RELIABILITY AND CONTENT. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A SENIOR MULLAH WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN COURT AND RELIGIOUS CIRCLES. HE HAS PROVIDED OCCASIONAL BUT ACCURATE INFORMATION ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES SINCE 1963.

1. ON 17 MARCH 1966 IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICERS ARRESTED SHEIKH FNU MONTAZERI AND AT LEAST THREE OTHER MULLAHS IN QOM AFTER AN ANTI-IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TALK AT WHICH A LEAFLET CRITICIZING THE GOVERNMENT ON THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS WAS DISTRIBUTED

A. THE FAILURE OF THE GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH MUSAVI KHOMEINI TO RETURN TO QOM FOR THE NO RUZ HOLIDAYS.

B. THE ATTEMPTS OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO ESTABLISH THE SAME CONTROLS OVER THE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS THAT IT MAINTAINS OVER THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

C. AN ALLEGED GOVERNMENT PROPOSAL TO GIVE STUDENTS DOLES FROM THE GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ENDOWMENTS OFFICE IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRIBE THE STUDENTS TO REFRAIN FROM ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES.

AS OF 30 MARCH, THE LEARNED SOCIETY OF QOM FORMED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE MAJOR RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN QOM, WAS ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT AYATOLLAH SEYED AHMAD KHONSARI IN TEHRAN TO REQUEST THAT HE ASK SECURITY AND COURT OFFICIALS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE ARRESTED MULLAHS.

2. THE ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAVE ALSO ATTACKED AYATOLLAH SEYED KAZEM SHARIAT-MADARI OF QOM. THEY CLAIM THAT THE RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA CENTER, FOUNDED BY SHARIAT-MADARI IN QOM IN 1965, MUST HAVE A SECRET GOVERNMENT

/CONTINUED/

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[redacted] BECAUSE SHARIAT-MADARI DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH PERSONAL FUNDS TO HAVE PAID FOR THE NEW SCHOOL. /FIELD COMMENT - OTHER SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THE DISTRIBUTION IN QOM OF AT LEAST TWO ANTI-GOVERNMENT LEAFLETS COMMEMORATING THE ''FAWZIEH SEMINARY MARTYRS'' WHO WERE KILLED IN 1963 DURING A RAID ON THE FAWZIEH THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL CONDUCTED, RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION CIRCLES CLAIM, BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS.

3. KHOMEINI'S SUPPORTERS ALSO CLAIM THAT THERE IS AN AMERICAN FLAVOR TO INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AT SHARIAT-MADARI'S SCHOOL. THEY CITE THE EXAMPLE OF SHEIKH MEHDI HAERY, A TEACHER ON THE STAFF WHO HAS STUDIED COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY IN THE U.S., WHO ILLUSTRATES HIS RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY WITH ''IMPORTED AMERICAN IDEAS.'' AS A RESULT OF THESE ATTACKS, SHARIAT-MADARI HAS RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED HAERY'S RESIGNATION FROM THE SCHOOL EFFECTIVE AT THE CLOSE OF THE PRESENT ACADEMIC YEAR.

4. PRO-KHOMEINI ELEMENTS, WHO BELIEVE THAT SHARIAT-MADARI HAS NOT PROMOTED KHOMEINI'S CANDIDACY FOR LEADER OF THE MOSLEM SHIA SECT BECAUSE HE HIMSELF WANTS THE TITLE, HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN STARTING RUMORS THAT SHARIAT-MADARI IS SUPPORTED BY THE U.S. AND BY THE SHAH'S REGIME, WHICH, THEY BELIEVE, IS COMPLETELY SUBSERVIENT TO U.S. INTERESTS.

5. IN MARCH THE LEARNED SOCIETY OF QOM PUBLISHED AND DISTRIBUTED A PAMPHLET TITLED ''THE MENACE OF AMERICA AND ISRAEL TO ISLAM.'' THIS PAMPHLET STATED THAT THE PEOPLE OF IRAN INCREASINGLY HATE AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH ITS CONTROL OF THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT, IS TRYING TO CRUSH ISLAM AND IRAN'S NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

/END/

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Conversation with Iranian dissident

PARTICIPANTS: Rahmatolah Moghadam Maraqheh, the "Radical Movement"
George B. Lambrakis. Counselor for Political Affairs, AmEmbassy Tehran

TIME & PLACE: January 18, 1978, at Mr. Moghadam's home

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, OR, ECON, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B, BIO

Mr. Moghadam Maraqheh had sent the Ambassador a copy of his Radical Movement Proclamation No. 10. Responding to a suggestion in our answer, he called me to invite me to lunch at his home January 18. We had lunch alone, and he talked freely mostly in English. There was no overt indication that his house was being watched or that he was otherwise being harassed by security agencies.

MOGHADAM MARAGHEH, RAHMATOLAH

Personal Background

Mr. Moghadam is a distinguished looking man with white hair who appears over 60 years of age. He is the son of a high officer in the (Qajar) Shah's guard and was a career officer himself until 1955. His education as an engineer appears to have been in France, since French seems to be his first foreign language. He left the army to establish his engineering consultant firm, "Khadamat Iran Zemin." He served in the Majles as deputy from Azerbaijan, where his family settled some 150 years ago, he said. Of Persian stock, his family was among those inserted between the Turkish and Kurdish tribes to help keep the peace in that area. They cultivated the lands which had been lying fallow, he said with pride and some defensiveness, I thought. In 1961, after the Majles had been dissolved, he accepted a leader grant and traveled in the United States for two months. He remembers the trip with joy and has visited the United States on one other recent occasion. His older son is studying regional planning at the University of Southern California. He has another son who is 12 years old and living with him here. Apart from pictures of his father and a painting of a very dignified, remote ancestor on his wife's side (she is from a prominent Shiraz family) the only other picture displayed in his living room is of former Prime Minister Mossadegh, suitably inscribed. Moghadam explained that he had not known Mossadegh personally in 1953, but obtained that picture later, when his admiration for Mossadegh had grown even further.

GBL

POL:GBLambrakis/bjh

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Political Background

Mr. Moghadam made the point several times that Americans had misunderstood Mossadegh, that he was a true patriot and no Communist. He implied it was due to British machinations that the U.S. switched sides from Ambassador Grady's original support of Mossadegh and the National Movement to the subsequent support of the Shah, whom, in Moghadam's and the Iranian peoples' opinion, we Americans placed on the throne from which he rules today. Moghadam gave me the text of a two-hour speechhe had delivered in the Majles a decade and a half ago, two weeks before the Shah dissolved that body. His speech earned him the Shah's disapproval, yet Moghadam insists he has always striven for freedom within the limits of Iran's constitution and never gone behind those limits. He described the early 1970s as a period of extreme repression by security forces responsive to the Shah. There were frequent stories in the press of so-called "terrorists" being killed right and left in and around town, and also many documented cases of torture. He had tried to run for the Majles in the last Majles elections, but his name was stricken from the list when the list was vetted by the Rastakhiz party, and his appeal to the courts has gone unheeded. Moghadam is head of the Iranian Writers' Association on which more below.

The Radical Movement

Moghadam and some others formed the Radical movement three years ago, at the height of the repression. At first they disguised the source of the tracts they were circulating by having the texts mailed from Paris and London. This led the security services to believe they were originating outside the country, whereas the real center was here. He admitted to the group numbering about 30 of whom he is the only former Majles deputy, the others being professors, teachers and other professional men. He said there were young people as well as old but details of the movement should remain secret. Proclamation No 10, which was sent to the Ambassador on the occasion of President Carter's visit and that of SYG Waldheim, was the first signed by a member of the movement, in this case himself. He indicated several times that he was not sure how long he would remain at liberty now that he had drawn attention to himself this way. He explained, incidentally, that the "radical" in the name was inspired by the Radical Party in France, and it was unfortunate that it had a different meaning in English. He described his political leanings as somewhere between the socialists and the center in France. He repeatedly indicated that he was not of the old National Front (he was a member of the Mardom party) and had differences with Foruhar's new group (reported elsewhere) which was created around a constellation of old National Front leaders.

The Writers' Association

Moghadam is also head (or one of the heads) of the Writers' Association, an organization claiming the loyalty of many top writers in Iran which has not managed to be accepted and registered by the police and is, therefore, technically illegal. He recounted a recent incident which took place on Wednesday, January 11. It had been decided several days before that about 90 members of the Writers' Association would meet in Moghadam's office on that Wednesday to elect officers and otherwise attend to organizational business. They informed Prime Minister Amouzegar of their intentions. Moghadam and a few others were then asked to come in to see the police, who relayed the Prime Minister's suggestion that this meeting not take place. When they got to Moghadam's office that Wednesday they found it surrounded by the police and were denied access.

Other Incidents

This was a different incident from the unannounced press conference in Dr. Sanjabi's home which has held Thursday, January 12 (reported elsewhere). On that occasion foreign and local newspapermen had been invited to attend an announcement of the formation of the Iranian human rights committee, and several had come as well as a correspondent from Etelaat. They were specifically told by the latter that he had not come as an individual but on assignment from his newspaper (Comment: Etelaat was the newspaper that carried an article attacking exiled religious leader Khomeini, reaction to which touched off the bloody demonstration at Ghom). Yet nothing has appeared in the press on that meeting or on the letter to Waldheim that was distributed. Moghadam complained that the Iranian human rights committee already in existence, under Princess Ashraf, is an anomaly. Defense of human rights cannot be left to a Princess. Human rights concern not royalty but the common people. Moghadam was familiar with the (dissidents') claim that the toll of dead in the Ghom demonstration reached 70 or more (as against the official version of 5 or 6). He was inclined to believe the numbers though he was sure of only one thing: a doctor he knows had signed 14 death certificates.

Dissident Organization Details

Moghadam provided some information on a variety of organizations that are active in protest to the present regime. Several had been represented at Dr. Sanjabi's human rights press conference January 12. Dr. Sanjabi also had a group of about 30 people of his own. Apart from this group (whose name is something like "the movement for liberty, etc.") there is a group of another 30 prominent dissidents who have selected a central group of seven to represent what is in effect a new National Front. Moghadam is one of the seven as are Bazarghan, Sanjabi, Samii, Sangabadi,

Zanjan and one other whose name I have forgotten. He explained that some of these men represent parties (the Iranian Party, etc.) and some are prominent personalities. They are different from the constellation of former National Fronters put together recently by Foruhar. While one of their number is a religious leader, the group basically has no connection with religious oppositionists such as those who touched off the Ghom demonstration.

Moghadam added that the lawyers are organized under the leadership of Matin-Daftary (reported separately).

Aims and Direction

While disavowing any direct connection with terrorists, Moghadam asserted that he understands why some young people might turn to terrorism in reaction to the regime. He argued this point from several angles including police brutality and the practice of torture. He cited what he said was a well known example of a 14 year girl who had been imprisoned about three years ago when she wrote against the Shah and the White Revolution in a schoolroom composition and was turned in by her teacher. Her brother (who apparently was a terrorist) had earlier been killed by the security police. While trying to catch the brother, the police had arrested the father, mother and then another brother and another sister. The older sister had even given birth to a baby in prison. Moghadam had met the mother and was convinced the story was truthful. He could understand the 14-year-old and thought it inhumane that she should be thrown into prison.

Moreover, Moghadam said, up to a week ago he too had believed torture had been stopped. But just a few days ago he had learned of a case of two young men in prison who had recently undergone torture. He did not make a direct reply when I asked if they had perhaps been suspected terrorists. He said he could provide me the names, but perhaps forgot to do so before I left.

Moghadam was vague, as I expected, on specific aims beyond "freedom." He argued that the Iranian people have been separated from the Shah's regime and government bureauracy over the years. They object to many of the practices of the government and firmly believe America is responsible for keeping this government in power. There is an impression that Americans are supplanting other foreign governments which have had pervasive influence in the past, e.g., Russia and Britain. He made a plea for more consultation ("We need to get together to think about these things"). He quoted from the American Constitutional Convention almost two centuries ago to the effect that the people can be trusted to make the right decisions, and should be allowed more of a voice in their own affairs. He asserted that only the day before

he had been talking with some farmers from Azerbaijan who confirmed to him their belief that agricultural labor is demoralized and the spirit of the peasant has been broken. He replied to my assertions and questions on land reform by downplaying the importance of that measure. Noting the Government's poor price policies on farm products (Comment: a frequently cited example) he said many farmers in the south of the country are living today no better than they did centuries ago.

Overall Impression

On the whole, Moghadam presented the image of a balanced, quite pro-American, reasonably intellectual man who was sincere and spoke frankly. He remembered fondly his contacts with former Embassy officer Larry Semakis, whom he had seen when he went to the U.S. recently. He remembered one or two other Embassy officers from the 1960-1 period as basically unsympathetic to his cause and demonstrating a closed mind in favor of the Shah.

He gave me copies of many publications including two letters to Waldheim, one of which was the letter Khalatbary referred to in his recent remarks (Tehran 649). He seems to represent traditional liberals who keep a distance from the old National Front (he was not at the meeting on the Karaj road) but work in parallel with those and other dissidents. His information on conservative religious and radical student movements seems similarly limited.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Cyrus Elahi, Special Assistant to Educational Minister Ganji
John D. Stempel, U.S. Embassy, Tehran
Barbara Schell, U.S. Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: February 6, 1978 - Chetniks Restaurant

SUBJECT : Frustration in the GOI and the Amouzegar Government

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/M, ECON, OR, USIS, BIO
NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

Elahi, who has known both Emboffs for over two years, was very critical of Prime Minister Amouzegar's handling of basic educational problems in Iran. Elahi speaks from the perspective of one committed to the political career of his Minister, Manuchehr Ganji, and his remarks should be taken in that light. Elahi is a public participation oriented academic who has frequently expressed frustration with bureaucratic slowness and is one of the idea men on Ganji's team.

Elahi believes Amouzegar vetoed the proposed merger of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Science and higher education had been put under Ganji's tutelage about two months ago with the intention that the ministries eventually would be merged--this is not to be the case). In response to questions, Elahi indicated he did not know why the Prime Minister was against the merger, which Elahi and Ganji believe is the only way to cope successfully with the stresses and strains in Iran's higher education. Such strains are directly related to the inadequacies of Iranian secondary education. The Prime Minister reportedly feels both jobs together are too big for one man. (At a dinner several nights earlier Elahi indicated that Ahmad Qoreshi, Chancellor of National University, was the leading candidate to become the new Minister of Science and Higher Education. Elahi said he will stick with Ganji at the Ministry of Education (implying he had received another offer, perhaps from Qoreishi) because he feels the problems of secondary education are more immediate and solving some of them will have beneficial spillover on higher education within a very few years. Elahi may simply be loyal to Ganji, or uncertain of his own priorities.

The New Amouzegar Government: When the discussion broadened to talk of the Amouzegar government in general, Elahi repeated what is becoming a common theme in many circles--the Amouzegar

cabinet is loaded with technicians but has extremely few politicians, and Iran needs politicians today. Elahi characterized his own Minister Ganji as one of the few really politically-minded men in the Cabinet. (His view that Ganji is political, we suspect, would not be unanimously shared elsewhere; in fact Ganji seems to have been outmaneuvered on the Ministry reorganization problem.)

Elahi said a number of people wonder why Labor Minister Moini has been kept around and shares the opinion of others that Resurgence Party Wing Chief Majidi is one of the least competent senior Iranians in public life today. Elahi also fleshed out rumors we had heard elsewhere that there will be cabinet changes before Now Ruz, saying "four or five" ministers will get the ax. He cited as his candidates for most likely departure; Labor, Health, Justice and perhaps Economic Affairs and Finance ministers.

Bio Note

Elahi is celarly feeling the strain of trying to fight against the inertia of the Iranian academic bureaucracy. He continues his activities in the Resurgence Party, but we suspect that he has become a bit of a Party gadfly rather than a serious participant since his appointment as Ganji's aide. He continues to teach at National University and has been happily married for about 8 months. His new wife's name is Feree; she speaks excellent German and good English in addition to Farsi.

An interesting sidelight to Elahi's character is the transformation in his personal behavior since he joined the government. In 1975 and 1976, Elahi was an outspoken, open person unafraid to criticize the GOI in public. Over the past six months, he has lowered his conversational voice and now looks carefully around the room, more concerned about who might be overhearing his conversations. Now he saves his juicy bits for the street corners.

POL:JDStempel:2-9-78

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: John D. Stempel, Kenneth E. Haas, Political Office, American Embassy, Tehran
Professor Touraj Nasseri, Aryamehr Technical College

DATE & PLACE: February 12, 1978 - Tiffany Restaurant

SUBJECT : Student Demonstrations, Iran's Development, and Middle Class Unease

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, ECON, OR, USIS, CONS, BIO
AMCONSULS SHIRAZ, ISFAHAN & TABRIZ, NEA/IRN
INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

Bio Information: Professor Nasseri is extremely articulate and a professor of structural engineering at Aryamehr Technical College. Married with one child, he is from the Isfahan Nasseris (no relation to Savak's chief). His family is well connected and he speaks with authority about some Court and Cabinet matters as if he had heard them from someone who is knowledgable. Dr. Ahmad Minai, RCD Secretary-General, is a close relative. Nasseri is an individual who thinks quite a bit about society and his place in it. He was educated in England for eight years and holds a doctorate in civil engineering. His brother, now studying in the U.S., is a close friend of former Emboff Mathew Ward.

Human Rights and Dissidents: Nasseri said that students have taken advantage of the GOI's liberalized policy on demonstrations to press their political beliefs. He disagreed with many of his academic colleagues, who feel the students have legitimate academic and administrative grievances and said that despite administrative problems, demonstrations at Aryamehr over the past six months have been almost entirely connected with political issues--freedom of speech and desire to have more political activity. Nasseri observed many of the Aryamehr demonstrations this year and has concluded that the police were more restrained in their handling of demonstrations this year than in previous years even though there was more activity this year. Police still moved in to quell the situation, but they were waiting until there was some provocation and generally handled students more gently. The College is quiet now, reflecting the needs of the exam period, now coming to a close.

Nasseri noted that Aryamehr Technical College has traditionally been one of the leaders in political demonstrations. For years the brightest Iranian students have gone into engineering and most of them read much more voraciously about politics than their social science counterparts in Iranian universities.

He laughingly thought this was because many of the brightest students became bored with math in the engineering subjects and sought other ways to express themselves in their spare time. Engineering has drawn the brighter students because it has been the way to get ahead.

Nasseri spoke approvingly of President Carter's Human Rights policies and said that while many of his colleagues were disappointed at what appeared to be the backing off from earlier rhetoric, he understood that this was necessary to be politically effective. He thought American policy on Human Rights had so far been quite good--pressure but not enough to provoke reaction. (Comment: For a university professor, he expressed a more sophisticated understanding of the Communist problem in Iran than any faculty contact Emboff Stempel has dealt with.)

Development in Iran: He believes development has been so rapid that the middle class and emerging modernists are losing their sense of national identity. Eagerness to make money has become a prime value, and this has been accompanied by uneasiness about where Iran's development will lead. From his own perspective, he confirmed the phenomenon noted by a number of American Foreign Service Officers in Iran; individuals who are succeeding are also looking for an escape route--ie, U.S. green card--if things go sour. Nasseri noted that many of his friends had urged him to give up university teaching and "make money". He added that many, if not a majority, of university professors maintain their academic contacts only as an aid to their other, more profitable activities.

Nasseri recounted a conversation he had recently with a visiting Chinese professor to illustrate what he considers the prime weakness of Iran's current development. The Chinese professor noted that Iran preferred to import machinery because it was more efficient to do so and said that in China, priority was given to making new equipment within the country even if it was only 20 percent efficient. After five years, the Chinese professor said, China could make things 80 to 90 percent efficiently while Iran would still be dependent on foreign technology. Nasseri admitted that Iran prefers high speed economic development to developing its own capabilities. Such decisions are taken by very few people and not discussed "in the political system, or lack of it". He cited, without naming them, several Iranian construction engineering companies who are headed by non-engineers. This would be impossible in developed countries Iranian engineers who establish construction companies do not receive contracts--influence (Partibazee) is important; technical competence is strictly secondary. Construction

companies in Iran are simply contracting agents--"Jobbers"--for other non-Iranian construction firms. After 15 years of building dams, one would think Iran would be exporting dam technology and construction capabilities to other countries. Instead, the biggest Iranian firms remain dependent on imported engineers.

He summed up the biggest problem: In Iran, competent technicians are distrusted and trusted confidants are not competent technical men. This may be all right while the money lasts, but what happens when it runs out?

Middle Class Unease: The development policies noted above combined with the increase in religious influences and antagonisms have made a large majority of the rising middle class very uneasy. The unspoken feeling resulting from the Qom riots and other manifestations of religious sentiment is that right wing reactionaries may ultimately take over, and there will be either a bloodbath for the new middle class (Iraq 1958) or a closing down of economic opportunity. This has been reinforced recently among a number of Nasseri's friends who find their wives criticized on the streets for not wearing chadors. This was a small thing, but it serves to reinforce the feeling in those who already are uncertain that the 8th century is just one step away--backward.

POL:JDStempel:2-14-78
POL:KEHaas(draft)

CONFIDENTIAL

B-10

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tehran, Iran

April 27, 1978

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Second Conversation with Iranian Dissident

PARTICIPANTS: Rahmatolah Moghadam Maragheh, the "Radical Movement"
George B. Lambrakis, Counselor for Political Affairs, Amembassy, Tehran

TIME & PLACE: April 24 at Lambrakis' Home

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, OR, ECON, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B, BIO

Mr. Moghadam accepted an invitation to lunch at my home since our last lunch was at his home on January 18. He arrived on foot and did not appear to be followed.

Recent Bombings and Intimidation

Although putting up a brave front, Moghadam was clearly shaken. There was a subtle difference from the last time, three months ago, in that he was more sharp and definitive in his accusations against the Shah while simultaneously vague on his own plans and the future. I interpret this as less hope and more bitterness. Since his house was bombed two weeks ago he has been receiving threatening telephone calls. One had been taken by his 11 year old son the day before and this bothered Moghadam. Another had been taken by what I gather is an old lady family retainer who lives with them and has high blood pressure. She was very ill afterward. Later in the conversation, Moghadam told me he had just applied for a passport partly to see what would happen but mostly because he is seriously considering leaving the country (to Paris) for a month or more. He thinks Iran is no place for his son any more (an older daughter is living in America, I gather). Incidentally, Moghadam indicated he is about 54 years old, considerably less than what he appears. He describes his predicament as follows. He is not in a position

to fight physically against physical attacks and yet does not want to stay here and keep quiet. Thus leaving the country appears to be his only alternative for the near future.

There is no doubt in Moghadam's mind that the bombings are being done by some group under the express instructions of the Shah. Talking with a retired Savak officer (Moghadam himself is retired military), Moghadam was told the group might not even belong to Savak but be a separate sub-group under direct orders of the Shah. It consists of young toughs, such as the four who have taken to hanging around outside his house very obviously, and these are people paid salaries, given cars, and otherwise subsidized by the state for so-called law enforcement but who are themselves breaking the law. Moghadam noted in passing that a police officer investigating the bombing at his house was shocked when Moghadam told him his suspicions of who did it and reportedly told Moghadam, in an outraged voice, that he personally would shoot such people if he caught them in the act. This was mentioned by Moghadam as an indication of the reaction of even law enforcement officers to these events. At the same time, they are powerless and scared to take action.

Philosophy of the Opposition.

Moghadam was anxious to discuss his view of the situation in theoretical as well as practical terms. He said the oil wealth of Iran was in the ground and not created by the Shah, yet the Shah has squandered much of it, he and people around him have become corrupt from it, and this corruption is permeating the Iranian people. Moghadam and others like him responded to the apparent liberalization announced by the Shah, and the inspiring words on human rights spoken by President Jimmy Carter. Moghadam and others like him are not interested in physical terror but in discussing issues with the Shah and his government and, through greater representation, affecting policy. If the Shah's response is to bomb, intimidate, and break the law himself, Moghadam and others like him become irrelevant and have no influence with others in the opposition who are consequently drawn to greater and greater extremism. He opposed my use of the word "terrorist" (as did Matin-Daftari on another occasion), saying these were guerrilla fighters for a cause. They come from good families and are well educated for the most part. While he does not have links to them, he can understand them.

Moghadam returned several times to his theme that the Americans put the Shah in power, support him politically and by selling him arms, and therefore cannot morally shrug off responsibility for the Shah's misdeeds. He suggested anti-American sentiment would grow in this connection. If the Shah suggests that some

of ordinary Iranians because of their links with the Shah.

When I protested that I thought he understood the American desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of friendly countries, Moghadam said he was talking to me as a friend and recognized the limitations of what I could do or say as a representative of the U.S. At the same time, Moghadam kept putting his views to me in a manner which made it obvious he is interested in our doing something. As before, he was vague on specifics of a program beyond talking of the need for a free dialogue and free expression in the country in the context of a Monarchy which limits itself by the Constitution.

Torture, Arrest, Prison Visit.

I asked Moghadam if he knew of any specific cases of torture by the security authorities in recent months, reminding him that he had alleged he knew of two such cases the last time we talked but had never given me the names involved as he had said he would. Moghadam said he had forgotten what might have been involved then; it was some time ago. He had heard of no specific cases, although it is possible torture continues, as one hears. In the same breath, however, he as much as admitted he does not believe torture exists. He said people are afraid of torture, not of imprisonment. All Iran has in a sense become a prison, and being in prison has the advantage at least that one knows one's family is safe. He suggested it was the real belief that torture is no longer practiced which explains the readiness of people such as himself to speak out and sign letters as they have over the past year.

Moghadam had no specifics to contribute regarding the incident a couple of days before near National University when Resistance Corpsmen and riot police battled a group of students, causing many injuries before arresting most of them. He thought the press had underplayed the amount of injuries sustained and knew some were being chased down as late as 4:00 A.M. the next day. However, a few had gotten away. He noted that some of the people present were not necessarily oppositionists but simply people interested in what was happening who had turned up to hear the speeches and discussion. Yet they were beaten up and arrested along with the others as happens in these cases. All this brutality is just another example of the means to which the Shah resorts now that he is out of touch with his people.

Moghadam was aware that a representative of either Amnesty International or ICRC visited Qasr prison in mid-April immediately following the end of the hunger strike there. It was a woman.

He did not know any more.

Religious and Left Wing Opposition.

Moghadam revealed that he and a number of other, like-minded leaders (Bazargan, Sanjabi, Lahiji, etc.) met recently with some religious leaders. The religious leaders were outraged by the bombings and other recent government behavior. One of them even suggested that they plant bombs themselves in the houses of three prominent government leaders. Moghadam said it took some time to talk him out of this as a counter-productive approach. He summed up the results of the meeting by implying that the religious leaders were so worked up they could not agree on strategy or tactics with Moghadam's people.

When I asked about the coordinating committee of seven leaders which he had talked to me about last time, Moghadam indicated there were some disagreements in the group but it was for the most part rocking along. He volunteered that this group did not share the leftish, socialist ideas of the group headed by Foruhar. Foruhar tended to organize old-line National Fronters, while the Moghadam alliance wanted to cast a wider net.

Amouzegar.

Moghadam was very critical of Amouzegar (as are the other dissidents we have talked with). He sees Amouzegar as a technocrat who is not capable of being an effective politician. This makes him essentially irrelevant to the central issues involved.

Comment:

Moghadam is obviously dispirited, more so in my estimation than Matin-Daftari, whom I saw shortly before and shortly after this talk with Moghadam. We have tentatively made plans for a meeting with some of the other leaders who are working closely with Moghadam, which I look forward to as important in gauging the temper of the opposition following the wide variety of measures resorted to by the government.

GBC

POLCOUNS:GBCambone:jm 4/27/78

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayat Eslaminia, Ex-Majles Deputy
Simin Hedayat, Translator
George B. Lambrakis, Political Counselor
John D. Stempel, First Secretary

SUBJECT: Religious Situation

DATE AND PLACE: May 15, Eslaminia's Home

DISTRIBUTION: AMB, DCM, OR, POL, NEA/IRN

Mr. Eslaminia revealed that an emissary from the Shah had been to see Ayatollah Shariatmadari twice in the last few days. He was Deputy Court Minister Behbahanian, who is in charge of the Shah's property, very close to him after 30 years service, and has nothing to do with politics. The fact that these meetings took place is known only by Shariatmadari, Hoveyda and Eslaminia. It is important to keep them quiet for the moment. Eslaminia accompanied Behbahanian on these visits.

Shariatmadari's Requests

On first visit, Friday, May 12, Behbahanian had mainly listened while Shariatmadari spoke for about two hours. Behbahanian went back to Tehran and returned to Qom Saturday evening. Burden of Shariatmadari's message was that the government should leave religious matters alone and stop constantly interfering in them. He objected to government people talking about the Koran, of which they knew little. This included Princess Ashraf. A second request by Shariatmadari was that the government release four high religious leaders who were in prison (for about past two months). The third point was that Shariatmadari's meetings with the Shah's emissary be done

without publicity. If Shariatmadari saw that the Shah was accepting his various requests than he would tell the people.

Eslaminia said he himself had asked Shariatmadari if he agrees with the statements made by Khomeini in the Le Monde interview. Shariatmadari had said he did not. He was told Shariatmadari did not expect the Shah to accept 100% of his requests, but would be happy with sufficient indications to show the Shah is cooperating. Eslaminia expressed the hope out loud that some people around the Shah, such as General Nassiri, might be removed.

Security Meeting

Eslaminia revealed there had been a meeting Saturday, May 13, of all chiefs of security and police services in Iran. This included top Army officers. Savak's Nassiri put forth the view that the way to handle the disturbances was to close the bazaars in cities such as Qom and use all necessary force, including killing people. General Fardousht presented an opposing view. He pointed to difficulty of Nassiri's approach if prominent leaders such as Shariatmadari were to appear at the head of their followers carrying the Koran. Would the soldiers attack, he asked. It would be a disaster if someone shot a leader in that situation, while failure to put down the demonstration might even result in some of the soldiers going over to the other side. As a general principle he thought draftees in the Army were not right people for such work and should not be sent into the city of Qom, for example; only police should. Beyond that, he recommended the government open a dialogue with the people and talk to them rather than simply repressing them. As Fardousht himself told Eslaminia, it may have been Fardousht's known close association with the Shah (he went to school with him, and is present head of the Imperial Inspectorate) but for whatever reason, the meeting accepted Fardousht's views and Fardousht was commissioned to report them as the recommendations of the meeting to the Shah. In a subsequent conversation (being reported separately), Eslaminia told us the Shah had approved this approach and consequently the troops that have been stationed in the city of Qom have been removed.

Eslaminia talked about various abuses of Savak. He gave examples of shakedowns and included the Asnaf organization (price control) as another group which indulges in bribery

and corruption. He noted former communist Ali Farschi is head of the Endowment organization. He should be replaced. Shariatmadari wanted to tell the Shah that Eslaminia should have that job, but Eslaminia told him not to, since he did not wish to appear self-serving. Eslaminia again attacked Nassiri's personal peculations. He said he had proof that Nassiri stole lots of money from Savak. He had given a note to Hoveyda for the Shah in which he listed several transactions, one involving 70 million tomans, another 60 million tomans, and still more.

Eslaminia gave us some more details of what he had been telling Hoveyda. The Shah appears to be very sad with the performance of the Rastakhiz Party. He has publicly stated it is not doing well. The people do not believe Ansary or Majidi. Amouzegar is a very nervous person. The Shah said the right things in his interview of May 13. He spoke of himself as a religious person, which pleased many among the religious, But he can improve his performance in a number of ways. One is to stop lumping together the religious opposition with the communists. He should only attack the communists. Making fun of religious people as "old-fashioned" just makes a lot of people angry at him, since most people are "old-fashioned" in Iran. Religion should be left to the religious people.

Eslaminia then floated an idea of his own with us. He suggested a number of prominent leaders who are popular with the people should be put back into positions of prominence and power, perhaps as a third wing of the Rastakhiz Party. He mentioned Mr. Farhatpour, Dr. Ali Kani (a member of the Mardom Party, close friend of Alam, son of a prominent Ayatollah, and head of the Pahlavi Foundation). People believe in such leaders. 200 people come to see each of them every day. If you put 20 such men in party headquarters, you would have 4,000 people trooping in and out every day,and they would see that the Party is there to help. These leaders would be able to criticize the wings headed by Ansary and Majidi very effectively. As it is, the Rastakhiz is a corpse.

Khomeini Activity

Eslaminia then gave another instance of trouble caused by Khomeini people. A few days ago they went to threaten Ayatollah Khonsari, the most respected Ayatollah in Tehran, and kept him from going to lead the prayers at the mosque. Consequently all mosques in Tehran have been closed since Sunday, May 14.

Hoveyda is worried about it (he called Eslaminia while we were present) and has agreed to Eslaminia's suggestion that other leading mullahs be mobilized to go to Khonsari (who is an elderly, non-political figure) and beg him to come back and lead the prayers as of Wednesday. In a later conversation (being reported separately) Eslaminia told us the religious leadership had successfully brought Khonsari back and the mosques reopened on Wednesday, May 17, staying open into the weekend despite what Khomeini's people wanted.

Eslaminia finished with a brief description of what gives Khomeini his power. His people believe in him and get rewarded for it. Other religious people no longer have any positive loyalty to the government since they have been driven out of positions by people such as Alam, Nassiri, and a variety of former Tudeh Party members whom the Shah has brought in, replacing his old friends. Eslaminia noted his own experience as Counselor to Prime Minister Hoveyda and a Majles member from Shahr Rey. He used to tell Hoveyda to give money and other help to some really poor religious people, which Hoveyda did, and they thereby became his followers, indebted to him. Once Eslaminia left that job, this procedure stopped. People have gradually been alienated.

Comment: There is little doubt that Eslaminia has been very busy and quite effective in restoring a bridge between the Court and the top conservative religious leadership. He makes little secret of his amibition to return to a position of power where he can be even more effective. Both Emboffs meeting with him have been impressed with his abilities. He would be a very effective politician in a country courthouse - or much higher - back in the U.S. His approach seems to work here too.

GBL

POLCOUNS:GBLambrakis:lr:5/24/78

CONFIDENTIAL

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GBL

POLCOUNS:GBLambrakis:lr:5/24/78

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

C
Pol 13-5

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayat Eslaminia, Ex-Majles Deputy
Leila (FNU), Translator
George B. Lambrakis, Political Counselor, Tehran
John D. Stempel, First Secretary, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: May 23, 1978 - Mr. Eslaminia's house

SUBJECT : Internal Politics and Religion

DISTRIBUTION: AMB, DCM, OR, POL, NEA/IRN

Mr. Eslaminia returned to his home to meet us directly from a meeting with Court Minister Hoveyda. In the course of the subsequent three-hour discussion, Eslaminia touched on a number of subjects related to current internal conflicts in Iran. Discussion is summarized below by topic.

Khomeini's Supporters

Eslaminia said he had just advised Hoveyda that GOI security services ought to arrest 8 to 10 key figures in the Khomeini organization who have been fomenting trouble and organizing strikes. This group, the key members of a set of 30 or so individuals who back Khomeini, are not necessarily supporters or even friends of the Qom group headed by Ayatollah Shariatmadari. The have in fact been threatening Tehran religious leaders with bodily harm if they do not agree to certain things. Eslaminia referred to an anti-government petition that was presented at major Tehran mosque on May 18--several local mullahs among the 80 names on the list had not signed at all, and several others had been coerced into letting their names be used. Many of his religious friends didn't know what to do about such threats, and Eslaminia described the eight names he had given Hoveyda as "gangsters". He evaded a direct answer as to whether these Khomeini men were linked with terrorists or other extra-legal groups but said the Khomeini men, even the religious ones, had shown themselves to be fairly unscrupulous in recent activities.

Getting a Few Good Men

Eslaminia moved onto a favorite theme: the need for more good "political" men in Iran. He dismissed the Amouzegar government as not very well in touch with the religious faithful and the bazaaris--there are no members of the present cabinet who are trusted by "the people". (Amouzegar returned the favor on one occasion by describing Eslaminia as "shady" and a womanizer.) Eslaminia had urged Court Minister Hoveyda to keep broad contacts and had taken several groups of moslem clergy and bazaaris to see Hoveyda. No one else was doing this, however.

Asked who would be good for this role, Eslaminia ruminated and suggested the following: Mohammad Taghi Falsafie, who was a very powerful speaker, would be an excellent person to work for the government (see previous memcon). He could rally leaders as

well as people. The government has kept him from speaking in mosques for seven years, but, de facto, he approves all speakers for Tehran mosques from the religious side.

Ayatollah Khonsari of Tehran was not against the GOI, he had in fact worked with other Tehran religious leaders to keep the Tehran bazaar mosques open May 17-18 in defiance of Khomeini supporters' efforts to close them (see previous memcon).

Nasser Goli Farahadpour, a mullah who is head of the Tehran Asnaf, a group which pressures the price control authorities to keep prices down. He would be good for almost any job, is widely respected among the poorer people and a very good speaker.

Rahimi Zahtab-fard, ex-Majles deputy from Tabriz, an Azarbaijani who is highly trusted by Iran's Turkish community, he would be an excellent organizer and a considerable improvement over anyone now in the Resurgence Party's hierarchy.

Dr. Ali Naqhikani, present head of the Reza Pahlavi Foundation. He has a reputation for honesty and his father was a major religious figure. Could handle any high-level position.

Abdul Aziz Qotb, ex-head of the Supreme Court. Older, but a widely respected jurist. Would make an outstanding justice minister or legal leader in any capacity.

Dr. Manouchehr Shahqoli, Minister of Health for ten years under Hoveyda. Remembered well by people for keeping price of medicine in Iran steady and low for his entire tenure.

Eslaminia mentioned favorably two others in passing--Senator Daha and General Safarie--who are being considered for Resurgence Party positions. Empress Farah gets good marks for her concern for people, but stories are being spread about her inviting singers, dancers and others to Kish Island, (which is rapidly taking on the symbolism of Sodom and Gomorrah to the moslem faithful). Eslaminia said Reza Qotbi, who is related to the Queen by marriage, should not be head of National Iranian Radio and Television--all complaints about that organization thus reflect on the Queen.

The Shah, the Government, and the Faithful

The meetings between Deputy Court Minister Bebhanian and Ayatollah Shariatmadari had gone well. They had met twice (see previous memcon) and were going to meet again. The Shah had listened to reports of these meetings and seemed disposed to do some of the things that Shariatmadari wants, but this would take time. Comment: Eslaminia clearly feels that separating the Khomeini hard-liners from the other religious leaders is the key to progress and communication in this area.

The basic problem is that the Shah makes all decisions no matter how small--this will have to change. Eslaminia told two stories to illustrate: In the first, a SAVAK officer had slapped a mullah, then later claimed the mullah had had two bottles of alcohol in his possession, when he had done nothing. Shariatmadari complained to Eslaminia, who went to Hoveyda, and two weeks later the business was straightened out. Similarly, Shariatmadari recently received a telegram from Ayatollah Khomeini. The PTT office refused to handle Khomeini's reply, and again an appeal had to be made to Hoveyda, thence to the Shah. It took almost two weeks to approve outgoing transmission of the Ayatollah's cable!

More frightening, however, are the attitudes of some government leaders. Eslaminia gave additional details on the meeting of 20-30 key Iranian military, and security figures on May 13 (described in May 15 memcon). SAVAK Chief Nassiri got up and said it was his view that all the bazaars in the country should be closed and those who rioted shot. General Fardust, chief of the Imperial Inspectorate, rose and said if Ayatollah Shariatmadari clothed himself in white and led a march in Qom, the Army would refuse to fire on him. A better way would be to use the Army only in extremis against demonstrators. During the meeting the commander of Iranian ground forces, Gen. Oveisi, took Koran in hand and swore to work for betterment of people both as good moslem and soldier completely loyal to Shah.

GOI-Shariatmadari Talks

On Saturday May 20, in the evening after Shariatmadari had spoken to 5-6,000 followers in Qom and others who had tried to cause trouble there had been arrested, BBC carried story that GOI and Shariatmadari were talking. At the Ayatollah's request, Eslaminia called Hoveyda, who denied there had been a leak from the GOI side. Shariatmadari had denied there were talks, since he did not want to discuss the matter with his followers until he was more sure of intentions. Broadcast was easy to deny, since talks had been with personal representative of Shah, not GOI. Eslaminia described state of talks as still "talking about talking", but obviously felt situation was better between Court and religious groups than it had been even two or three weeks previously. Leak of word on talks had obviously created some internal problems for Shariatmadari, however, and Eslaminia said both sides hoped things could be kept quiet in the interests of progress.

Corruption

In course of discussion, several names came up in the category of "bad" guys (from viewpoint of religious faithful): Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi was dismissed as a "cutthroat" whose accession to a senior position in Iran would trigger real trouble for the GOI. NIOC Chief Houshang Ansary was described as a "thief" who is an expert at covering his tracks. A big-time merchant named Yassini was identified as someone who had paid off SAVAK Chief Nassiri often, most recently to avoid paying customs duties on 50 railway carloads of classes the weekend of May 15-19. Corruption

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Rahmatolah Moghadam Maragheh, the "Radical Moveme
George B. Lambrakis, PolCouns, AmEmbassy Tehran,

DATE & PLACE: June 12, 1978, Moghadam's residence

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, OR, ECON, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B,

I visited Moghadam at his request and noticed no open surveillan of his house. He confirmed that the men who had been hanging ar ominously at the time we last met on April 24 have gone. In the course of the conversation he also confirmed that nothing more h been heard from the "Underground Committee for Vengeance" for th past few weeks, nor have any threats been received from them.

Reorganized Opposition and Possible Program

Moghadam said he wished to inform us he was working closely with four other leaders and the five have in effect undertaken politi leadership of the opposition movement. These are Bazargan, Sanj Foruhar and Seyedjabadi. He had approached Bazargan with the id of getting him together with me and my wife of an evening (as we discussed last time) but Bazargan's reaction was to wait and, me while, Moghadam could represent the group to me.

One of the things the group had met the day before (June 11) to discuss was a message from Mohamed Sadeg Kazemi, assistant to th prime minister, who acknowledged receipt of the last letter fro the Executive Committee for Human Rights and Freedom but denied receipt of any previous letters from the group and suggested re sentatives of the group come to discuss the matter with him. M left the impression this would be done.

In the course of the conversation, Moghadam revealed that the g was thinking of trying to put together a positive political pro They felt they had successfully managed to attract attention to opposition movement in international media and should, therefor enter phase two of their action plan. He admitted pulling toge the variety of views would be difficult, but it would be worth trying to do. He visualized the process as involving many more people than the five leaders so that the program could be based what people really want.

POL:GBLambrakis/bjh

Meanwhile, the leadership had been assured through a message from Ayatollah Shariatmadari that Shariatmadari would not talk with the government or reach any agreement with it without including "the political leadership," i.e., Moghadam and his fellow leaders. This message had been given them in a meeting (perhaps the same as mentioned above) the day before with leaders from the bazaar. He confided that the individual who had delivered the message was one Shabestarizadeh. At that meeting, Moghadam and his associates had introduced Majles deputy (from Tabriz) Bani-Ahmad to the bazaaris.

SAVAK and the Opposition

In reply to a question, Moghadam expressed himself positively but in reserved fashion as to the replacement of General Nassiri by General Moghadam as chief of SAVAK. He has known General Moghadam since they were classmates in military school together, though they have never been very close (and are not relatives). General Moghadam started out as an examining magistrate in the court system so he is familiar with the law and should practice it. This was not in the background possessed by Nassiri. Moghadam also remembered an occasion in 1964 when he was trying to put together a group on "water and soil policy," which very frankly was going to go beyond technical subjects and become political. General Moghadam had called him in to warn that the Shah disapproved of such a group, and he had better not form it. Moghadam gave up the idea. Whatever General Moghadam's personal characteristics might be, he still considers himself a "servant of the Shah" and will so express himself. General Moghadam is a friend of General Fardost. The latter, though one of the strong men of the regime, knows little about Iranian society and isolates himself from the internal scene.

Moghadam had the usual criticism of government activity to offer. He noted the police ordered some 700 girls and 1700 boys out of their Tehran University dormitories at mid-night recently. Many of these students had no place to go and were sleeping in Farah Park. He made no comment when I noted that the police action had followed a fair degree of rioting by the students in which they tore up the dormitories, I had heard.

Moghadam talked about how widespread the opposition had become. New recruits had come to it from Aryamehr and Tabriz Universities, as well as a group of former law students just formed. He said factory workers do not express their opposition because they are so closely controlled by SAVAK. Similarly, men in charge of government cooperatives control the farmers, so that they do not dare express their opposition too much. Opposition is expressed by individuals such as small shopkeepers, artisans, etc. Even construction workers will complain if pay [illegible]

In this regard, an AP correspondent had recently called Sanjabi and suggested that the events of June 5 represented a check for t opposition; he was wrong. While north Tehran functioned pretty normally, everything was shut down in south Tehran, Moghadam asserted. Things were very quiet in other cities as well, Mogha added (to a certain degree with accuracy). The few shops that we open around the bazaar in Tehran were people told to open by the government. People such as jewelers depend heavily on the goodwi of the authorities and do everything the authorities want them to

The U.S. and the Constitution

From the beginning, Moghadam expressed his group's basic goodwill towards the U.S. and its desire for friendship with the U.S. rath than accepting assistance from the opposing quarters,i.e., Soviet Union. They reproached the U.S. only for the position it had tak in support of the Shah and against Mossadeq in the past. This position neglects human rights which President Carter talks about

He asked for my assessment of the situation, which I gave him briefly. When I said there appeared benefits to the kind of sta- bility the Shah has brought, Moghadam took exception. He argued there was no stability, only repression of the constitution. He, Moghadam, had worked on his associates such as Bazargan, who did not at first wish to support the present constitution. Moghadam had convinced him that, even/the constitution is not perfect, it sets out the limits of the Shah's powers and reserves others to t parliament and people. Its application was sufficient aim for the opposition. He noted the Election Law presently being dis- cussed in the Majles runs against the constitution. When I asked about the provision of the constitution that a group of five rel leaders wield veto power over everything the parliament does, he dismissed this as a minor provision which had never been applied. His implication was that it never would be applied.....

When I asked about his reaction to the Shah's press conference a couple of weeks ago, he shrugged his shoulders and said the Shah sounded like a man in retreat, unable to concentrate or grasp ho of anything. A dictator should be more confident in his own jud ment. That, after all, is the only benefit of dictatorship. He said an immediate concern of the opposition is to let the press know that they deny recent assertions by Minister of Information Homayoun and others that opposition elements are willing to work with the government. This is not true, he asserted.

Moghadam noted in passing that Nahavandi had wanted the group of intellectuals at present studying the effects of the Shah-People Revolution to offer themselves up as a third wing of the Rastakh Party. Sanjabi had told Moghadam, however, that most members of the [illegible] of the [illegible].

Taking the Popular Pulse

Warming to his subject, Moghadam reiterated the desire of the five leaders to create an organization so as to find out what the people want by way of a positive program. When I asked what concessions the Shah might make that would help reconcile them, he mentioned dissolution of the parliament and a new election without "too much influence" from the government. He expected SAVAK would remain strong and would know what to do to influence these elections, but it should be restrained.

Iran has changed, he asserted. There is television and contact with the outside. People see how other systems work and want the same for Iran. Progress is required beyond economic and social fields and in the political. The Shah could have helped such progress take place but he was selfish and limited himself to building his own power. While the period 1953-60 might be considered "a national emergency," people expected more to happen after 1960. Instead the Shah has acted as a modern Henry IV. Nobody likes him and people want a change. The privileges and luxury of the royal family disgust people. They see how Americans change their president every few years, and yet the system persists. A simple shopkeeper had recently told Moghadam that workers after they have toiled for 20-25 years should be retired and allowed to rest. The Shah has been at it for 36 years. It is time for a change.

As to so-called liberalization, Moghadam said the Shah is "playing." He thinks time is on his side because Carter will leave office in another couple of years. His main concern is to keep the U.S. Government happy and prevent its intervention in Iran. He does not think about his own people.

In another sideline on recent police "terror" Moghadam told of a French woman correspondent Kaniz-Morad, of the "Nouvel Observateur," whowent to see Shariatmadari recently. Shariatmadari sent her to see his brother in Qom, one "Pasandide." A young man who went along as guide was stopped by the police and beaten. They took him to a police station and when she went to inquire about him she was told he was all right but they would just keep him in the station for another day or so. Similarly Moghadam asserted there are 17 mullahs in internal exile (from one city to the other) at present. Most of them are living around the edge of the Kavir desert. He mentioned in passing a local rumor that the bombings carried out by the so-called "Committee for Vengeance" may have been carried out by a loyalist group at the Taj (sports) Club led by retired General Khosravani. He admitted there was no evidence for this speculation.

Changes in Government and Other Miscellany

Another rumor he had picked up was that Amouzegar might be replaced by Sharif-Emami. Moghadam thought this ridiculous. Yet the Shah seems to want somebody who is 100 percent on his side. What is really needed, Moghadam said, was a prime minister who could act as a buffer or middle-man between the Shah and the "people." When asked, he dropped the name of former prime minister Ali Amini. There is a rumor that he has returned from abroad to Tehran. (We have also heard it from a journalistic source.) Moghadam admitted he was very old (he is 72) and did not press that candidacy particularly.

Moghadam confided that he was more relaxed at present than he had been the last time we met. He said his real fear then had been that some "terrorists and Communists" might pick Sanjabi or himself as useful targets and kill them, seeking to lay the blame on the government. Everybody knew that SAVAK was behind the "committee for vengeance," but Moghadam was sure SAVAK did not want to kill them, though they might arrest them or beat them up. When I asked whether he was not in touch with the terrorists and wondered how he could expect them to act that way, Moghadam made it clear he considered the terrorists quite capable of sacrificing persons such as himself if they could score points against the government.

Finally, Moghadam summed up the position of the opposition as "not anarchists, not communists and not anti-American." They wish to regain a constitutional share of power for the people as opposed to the Shah. If the situation loosens up some more so that people can meet and discuss issues freely, it will be possible to see in which direction the people want to go.

Moghadam had in mind making a trip to Europe and the U.S. (to place his 13-year old son in school near Boston) but was being pressed by his fellow leaders to stay in the country this summer. He confirmed there would be religious demonstrations on June 19, but his business was to concentrate on the political tasks. He called me the next day at the office to say he had given up his plans for travel and would stay in town this summer. He would like to remain in touch.

COMMENT: More relaxed and confident, Moghadam's behavior was its own best evidence that life for the opposition has improved in Iran. The efforts to pull together a unified, positive program are so un-Iranian that one must be skeptical. Yet he is clearly counting on being allowed continuing freedom of expression and a degree of freedom to organize politically--again rather interesting admissions in themselves.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Latest Developments on the Religious Front

PARTICIPANTS: Hedayat Eslaminia, Ex-Majles Deputy
Mrs Simin Eslaminia (newly married)
George B. Lambrakis, PolCouns, AmEmbassy Tehran, Iran

TIME & PLACE: June 21, 1978, Eslaminia's home

DISTRIBUTION: CHG, POL, PM, OR, BIO, SHIRAZ, ISFAHAN, TABRIZ, NEA/IRN/ INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

Shariatmadari Breaks with Khomeini

I met with Eslaminia alone although I was originally to meet also with Ayatollah Shariatmadari's son-in-law, Mr. Abbassi, who was visiting in Tehran on a mission for his father-in-law. The message he had brought the Shah via Hoveyda was, first, that Shariatmadari had sent a message to Ayatollah Khomeini telling that he would no longer cooperate with Khomeini, because Khomeini is against the Shah. Shariatmadari thus wished to underline his loyalty to the Shah. At the same time, he posed the demand that some religious people be allowed to run in the Majles elections next year, not just people from Rastakhiz. Shariatmadari said he would oppose the elections if only people approved by the Rastakhiz party were allowed to run. Finally, Shariatmadari repeated an earlier demand that Princess Ashraf stop making speeches about religion. (When I commented I had been unaware she had been making any such speeches recently, Eslaminia replied, with humor, that he would be sure to inform me of them next time, but she had not spoken for about ten days on the subject.) Eslaminia said the Shah sent Behbahanian from the Ministry of Court to Shariatmadari to check into the accuracy of this message. Shariatmadari confirmed it to him. Shariatmadari also let slip that he would like to have a connection with the Americans and talk to them. He assured Behbahanian that he would say nothing against the Shah to them. Behbahanian replied that the Shah does not like such contact with foreigners and counseled Shariatmadari against it. Shariatmadari apparently told Eslaminia later that he was sorry he had mentioned this, but now it was done. Eslaminia confirmed this as the reason why Shariatmadari's son-in-law had broken his appointment to meetwith me.

A little later in the conversation Eslaminia mentioned that he had sent Mullah Managhebi to Najaf to talk to Ayatollah Khoi. Eslaminia

POL:GBLambrakis/bjh

identified Khoi as the most prestigious of all the ayatollahs, more so than Khomeini or even Shariatmadari, or Khonsari in Tehran. Khoi lives in Najaf but does not always see eye-to-eye with Khomeini. Managhebi is bringing the message that the religious people will no longer follow Khomeini because he favors the shedding of blood. Managhebi is then going to Khomeini to tell him the same thing to his face. There are two other prestigious messengers (he gave their names as Alavi, son-in-law of a prestigious, deceased mullah named something like "Broujedi" and Tabatai), who will go to see Khomeini, one after the other, not together, with the same message. Eslaminia said the Shah is aware of this plan. (This suggests the messengers are the ones Shariatmadari referred to in his own message to the Shah.)

Eslaminia and the Government

Eslaminia, as he is wont to do, got off on his favorite theme attacking many of the people around Amouzegar. He said the Shah and Amouzegar have some problems between them at present. People such as Jafarian, Moussavi or Farschi are not good representatives for Amouzegar and needlessly have made enemies of people such as Nahavandi and Pezeshkpour. Eslaminia put forth for the first time forthrightly what he had hinted at before, namely that he would like to be put in charge of the Endowment Organization, one of the portfolios currently handled by Farschi. Eslaminia said Amouzegar believes that he is a Hoveyda man and therefore distrusts him, but he is wrong. Eslaminia assured me he would be loyal to Amouzegar if Amouzegar would have him. He wished this message could be gotten to Amouzegar. In any case, he commented, he was not overly happy with the way Hoveyda had treated him in the recent past, once General Nassiri had spoke to Hoveyda against him. Eslaminia went on at some length about his own fitness for the job, the fact he has known the religious leaders most of his life, and has their respect, and the lack of fitness of others. He noted people such as Governor Azmoun believe Amouzegar is on his way out, and therefore want nothing to do with him. Eslaminia said he could help Amouzegar in the important field of religion. As an example, he suggested that if he were in charge of organizing the pilgrimage to Mecca he would require written permission to be given by the applicant's home mullah. This would put the mullahs back in the way of making extra money (from the necessary bribes) and give them the power that would make them happy.

As if to put a cutting edge on his suggestion, Eslaminia then threw out the thought that he and some of his friends have been discussing possible future plans. They have thought about going to religious people in places such as Tabriz, Mashad and elsewhere and talking to them against people such as Jafarian and the government. They could encourage a kind of demonstration or show of strength. When Simin asked him if this might not lead to violence, Eslaminia shrugged his shoulders and said that might happen. I commented that such

behavior would certainly not endear him to Amouzegar if it is Amouzegar's favor he is seeking. Eslaminia smiled benignly and said no decisions have been taken--it can go either way. He was clearly holding out the threat that he would work against the government if the government would not have him work with it.

Further Official Contacts with Religious Leaders

Eslaminia then gave a full account of his recent activities with emphasis on his importance to a number of people in the present regime. He noted he has gotten Ayatollah Khonsari to visit with Hoveyda and to receive a visit from General Moghadam, new head of SAVAK, who has been told by the Shah he must have good relations with the religious people. Eslaminia has been working on Mullah Falsafi, a noted orator (see previous reports), who has refused to meet either with Hoveyda or General Moghadam. Falsafi is very angry with the Shah and all who work for him because he has not been allowed to speak publicly for seven years. Moghadam has sent a message through Eslaminia saying it was not Moghadam who kept him from speaking. Eslaminia is working on an "accidental" meeting by which he and General Moghadam will be driving by Falsafi's house of an evening as Falsafi is coming out of the house and give him a ride. They will then go to someone else's house, where Hoveyda will happen to be. Eslaminia again stressed the need to establish lines of communication.

Eslaminia revealed that some 80-90 "akhun" religious people are going to be released from jail in 10-15 days. He implied that his own efforts were mainly responsible as he had worked on this with General Fardust (head of the Imperial Commission), Hoveyda and General Moghadam. An additional 60-70 who have not been permitted to speak publicly will be granted permission to speak.

When I asked for examples of the kinds of things religious people might demand from the government in return for their cooperation, Eslaminia suggested a number of things:

--Release of mullahs when they are in prison;

--permission for pilgrimages to Mecca or Iraq to be given to people the religious leaders desire;

--government suppression of anti-religious articles in the newspapers;

--recourse against the objectionable behavior of some SAVAK representatives around the country;

--donations to people who are ill or whose families are in bad shape

--generally paying attention to the religious people.

Finally, Eslaminia mentioned that Shariatmadari had talked to him about the news he had learned of an agreement by the Shah to bury nuclear waste from another country (Austria). He was against it in no uncertain terms but was aware that he did not know the full story. I indicated I had heard this story from a newspaperman who had interviewed Shariatmadari. I suggested some points Eslaminia could use with Shariatmadari. Eslaminia said he had already made the points to Shariatmadari (i.e., that Iran itself will need to bury its nuclear wastes, and that the U.S. regularly buries such wastes safely.) However, Eslaminia said he would avoid reverting to this subject with Shariatmadari. He indicated he would lead Shariatmadari to believe the waste products involved were those Iran itself would generate. This was too complicated a problem involving foreign relations, and according to Eslaminia, Hoveyda had blown up when Eslaminia mentioned Shariatmadari's concern to him.

COMMENT: Eslaminia is continuing to act as an important link. The chances of his being acceptable to Amouzegar seem slim, but on the other hand Eslaminia is getting restless. It may be that he would be driven into flexing some muscles (which I believe he can do) by next fall if he is not taken care of personally or the religious situation vis-a-vis the government does not change significantly.

1978 JUN 21 AM 9 52

TELEGRAM

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☐ CHARGE TO

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FROM	CLASSIFICATION
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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 05944

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PINS, IR
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LAWYERS CAPTURE BAR ASSOCIATION AND PLAN CLOSER SCRUTINY OF POLITICAL COURT CASES

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1. FOR SEVERAL WEEKS NOW IRANIAN LAWYERS' FEDERATION HAS BEEN SCENE OF INTERESTING CONFLICT BETWEEN INCUMBENT LEADERSHIP WHICH IS INTERESTED PRIMARILY IN BREAD AND BUTTER ISSUES AND REBELLIOUS YOUNGER MEMBERS, INTERESTED IN POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, WHO ORGANIZED THEMSELVES INTO A "PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT". THEY PUT UP SEPARATE SLATE FOR ELECTION TO GROUP'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS (WHICH TOOK PLACE JUNE 10). A NOISY POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FOLLOWED, WHICH APPEARED REGULARLY IN THE LOCAL PRESS.

2. COUNTING OF THE BALLOTS HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND WE WERE INFORMED JUNE 15 BY ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE PROGRESSIVE SLATE THAT THE PROGRESSIVES WON FIVE OF THE 12 SEATS ON THE BOARD AS WELL AS TWO OF THE SIX ALTERNATES ALSO ELECTED. THEY WOULD HAVE WON ONE MORE SEAT, BUT A TIE VOTE WAS DECIDED BY CHANCE AND THEY LOST IT. NINE BALLOTS WERE INVALIDATED ~~XXXXXXXXXXX~~

ED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
L:JWMartin/GBLambrakis:lab6-19-78			CHG:CWNaas

RANCES:

BECAUSE THEY WERE SIGNED OR HAD OTHER IMPERMISSIBLE MARKINGS ON THEM. ALL NINE OF THESE WERE VOTES FOR THE PROGRESSIVES AND, HAD THEY BEEN COUNTED, WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN TWO MORE SEATS FOR THE PROGRESSIVES THAN THEY GOT. EXULTANT OVER THE VICTORY, OUR INFORMANT NOTED THAT HIS SLATE HAD SUPPORTED FOUR MORE INDEPENDENTS WHO WON SEATS ON THE BOARD, SO THAT IN EFFECT THEY WILL HAVE A WORKING MAJORITY FOR MOST PURPOSES. HE WAS SARCASTIC IN REGARD TO THE INVALID BALLOTS, COMMENTING THAT MANY YOUNG AND NOT-SO-YOUNG LAWYERS (SOME IN THEIR 40S) HAD BEEN CONFUSED AS TO THE EXACT RULES OF BALLOTING SINCE THIS WAS THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTION OF ANY KIND IN WHICH THEY HAD PARTICIPATED!

3. THE FOLLOWING CANDIDATES WERE ELECTED:

NAME	FACTION	VOTES
HEDAYTOLLAH MATIN-DAFTARI	PROG.	668
HASSAN NAZIH	PROG	665
MOHAMMAD JALALI NA'INI	FORMER BAR	630
MOHSEN PEZESHKPOUR	INDEP	624
SAREMEDDIN SADEGH-VAZIRI	PROG	617
MOHAMMAD TAGHI DAMGHANI	PROG	598
MAHMOOD MO'INI ARAGHI	PROG	566
MASSOUD ETESSAM	FORMER BAR	558
ABDOLMAJID ARDALAN	INDEP	550
ESMAIL ZAHED	FORMER BAR	535

ABDOLKARIM ANVARI	INDEP	532
VALIOLLAH SHAHAB-FERDOWS	INDEP	514

ALTERNATE MEMBERS:

ALI HASHEMIAN	FORMER BAR	494
MOHAMMAD REZA FEIZ-MAHDAVI	FORMER BAR	469
MOHAMMAD JAVAD RAZAVI	PROG	469
JAHANGIR AMIR-HOSSEINI	FORMER BAR	454
ALI SHAHANDEH	PROG	434
ABOLFAZL SAGHER YAGHMAI	FORMER BAR	434

4. PROGRESSIVES HAVE GREATLY IMPROVED THEIR POSITION IN THE FEDERATION; PREVIOUSLY THEY HAD ONLY THREE SEATS ON THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THESE WERE ONLY AS RELATIVELY POWERLESS ALTERNATE MEMBERS. ALTHOUGH ELECTION FOR CHAIRMAN OF THE FEDERATION WILL NOT BE HELD UNTIL JULY 6, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT PROGRESSIVE CANDIDATE HASSAH NAZIEH WILL BE CHOSEN. BY LAW THE CHAIRMAN MUST BE AT LEAST FIFTY YEARS OF AGE, MUST HAVE PRACTICED LAW FOR AT LEAST TWENTY YEARS AND MUST BE ELECTED BY A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY TO HIS POST. AGE AND HAVE TWENTY YEARS PRACTICE BAR TOP VOTE GETTER MATIN-DAFTARI, A PROMINENT FIGURE IN THE INTERNAL OPPOSITIONIST MOVEMENT, AND GRANDSON OF MOSSADEQ, WAS EXCLUDED FROM ELIGIBILITY (HE IS 46/ YEARS OLD AND IN LAW PRACTICE FOR LESS THAN 20 YEARS).

4. THE CAMPAIGN WAS HARD FOUGHT AND EXHILARATING TO MANY OBSERVERS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN ACCUSTOMED TO THE EXPERIENCE;

OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H)a)
January 1975
Dept. of State

THEY ALSO HOPE THAT THE BAR ELECTION IS ONE MORE INDICATION OF THE SHAH'S INTENT TO STICK TO HIS OBJECTIVE OF MOVING TOWARD A MORE OPEN SOCIETY. LAWYERS HAVE BEEN AT THE FORE-FRONT OF THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT IN TEHRAN AND WE CAN EXPECT A RENEWED DETERMINATION OF THIS GROUP TO KEEP PRESSING FOR FURTHER CHANGE. THEY HAVE TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT THEY WILL BE MONITORING COURT CASES CLOSELY FOR EVIDENCE OF IMPROPER PROCEDURE ON THE PART OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INCLUDING PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES.

NAAS
by GBK

Dissidents

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Conversation with Iranian dissident

PARTICIPANTS: Rahmatolah Moghadam Maragheh, the "Radical Movement"
George B. Lambrakis, PolCouns, AmEmbassy Tehran, Iran

DATE & TIME: July 17, 1978, at Mr. Moghadam's home

DISTRIBUTION: CHG, OR, ECON, NEA/IRN, RNA/INR, OIL/B/BIO

Opposition Unity Efforts:

Moghadam has remained in Tehran, putting off a vacation in Europe which his family wants very much, at the express insistence of fellow opposition leaders such as Bazargan and Sanjabi. However, he said ruefully, the quick progress predicted by his colleagues in putting together a united opposition program has not eventuated. He gave me a written series of proposals which he as leader of the radical party submitted that very morning at his regular Monday meeting with the other top opposition leaders--Bazargan, Sanjabi, Foruhar and Sehjavadi. The immediate problem is that Sanjabi and Foruhar want to revive the National Front along its traditional old lines. Moghadam and Bazargan are taking the position that any National Front should be along new lines, to include people such as Moghadam who were not members of the old National Front. They suggest a party political office be established first so that the membership can meet and discuss the issues, arriving that way at some conclusions.

Moghadam repeated to me that he is confiding in me as a friend. He said, frankly, that Mr. Sehjavadi, who is a writer, is not much of an organization man, but he thinks he could start a movement with his writing. Foruhar, who is younger than the rest, is preening himself as a super-nationalist, overdoing it a bid. Sanjabi is physically feeble and also somewhat too much of a liberal, i.e., he cannot make up his mind. The best of his collaborators is Bazargan, who even at age 71-72 (the same as Sanjabi) is strong and continues to make sense. He confirmed that Bazargan is a religious person and not very left wing.

New Prison Strike

In reply to my question, Moghadam confirmed there had been a meeting on the night of July 11 with foreign and Iranian correspondents in Tehran. The meeting was held in the new offices of the Iranian Commission for Human Rights and Freedom, which is on

POL:GBLambrakis/bjh

Hosseini al-Shati Street, opposite the mosque on Old Shemiran Road. There were family members present related to women in Qasr prison. Seventy-two of these prisoners went on a hunger strike for about a week or ten days prior to the press conference. This was to protest the entrance of commandos into the prison who beat up the women. That incident derived from disagreements on procedures for searching women's cells which had resulted in a clash between the prisoners and guards, and the commandos had come in to put it down. The strike is over, but the prisoners still complain that they lack sewing materials and other amenities in their prison. Present at the press conference were eight of the nine members on the executive committee of the Human Rights Commission. Sanjabi was away. The others, Moghadam gave as Bazargan, Dr. Sehjavadi and his brother, Moghadam himself, Dr. Nazieh, the new head of the Bar Association, Lawyer Lahidji, and two others who sounded like "Minadji" and "Tavandi."

Tabrizi Activism:

Moghadam (who is from the Azerbaijan area) said he had been visited the day before by a delegation from Tabriz. These were mainly bazaaris who had been to see AyatolIah Shariatmadari in Qom earlier. They complained that the leadership of the opposition was doing nothing. They threatened to start something on their own if the political and religious leadership did not do something. Moghadam said he counseled them to go slow and not to threaten anyone. He especially counseled them to stay with the rest of the movement in the country, rather than pulling ahead to do their own thing. He thought they would be going to see other people in the opposition with the same request for action.

This brought Moghadam to describe what Shariatmadari had told him when he saw him recently. Shariatmadari said he expects the situation in Iran to get worse in the next two or three months. By this he means growing economic unhappiness and disorganization in the government and Rastakhiz party which will further reduce their prestige. This is a situation the religious people can take advantage of and meanwhile are marking time.

Parliamentary Elections:

One of Moghadam's personal projects in the near future is to revive his annual letter to the Court protesting the illegality of the present parliament. He said he has been writing every year since the parliamentary election in 1975. He expects to write again, a long letter of about 15 pages which he will present in August. It will call for examination of the legality of parliament by Iranian courts. If no court exists which can examine the manner of the

parliamentary election, then the people will see what the problem is. As he sees it, it does not matter if his protest wins or not. The important thing is to continue trying to demonstrate the weakness of the present system and the fact that the constitution exists on paper only.

Moghadam referred several times to the demand, which will be in this letter, that the Shah dismiss this parliamentary election and hold elections to a new parliament forthwith. If this is not done, he fears the next parliament will be very similar to the present one. He partially contradicted himself later on by indicating the opposition has good hopes of being able to field candidates for the next parliament even if this parliament is not dissolved. His argument was that the Shah should welcome the building of a more stable political system in Iran rather than continuing to rule "only by force." A comparable measure would be to change the Amouzegar government and put in a more neutral government. He had heard rumors that someone like Dr. Baghai might be asked to become prime minister (I expressed doubts). Furthermore, press censorship should be raised completely so that others besides the government have a chance to explain their points of view. He welcomed the beginning of some changes in SAVAK procedures but wanted more. Finally, as regards activity by Nasieh, the head of the Bar Association, Moghadam commented that Nasieh talks too much and is constantly trying to promote himself. He revealed that Nasieh had been a member of Moghadam's radical party up to a year ago when he quit to join Bazargan's "Liberty Movement."

Comment: This meeting confirms our early suspicion that, once it came to drawing up a unified program, the opposition would discover its internal disagreements. They still have a long way to go before presenting a serious, unified challenge to the present government. Nevertheless, progress in liberalization continues, as witness the estalishment (and government toleration) of offices for the Commission on Human Rights and Freedom, which is technically an illegal organization since it has never been registered officially by the government.

ORIGIN/ACTION

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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

FOR RM USE ONL

SECRET/LIMDIS — A-105

NO. — HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

E.O.11652: XGDS-4

TAGS : PINS, PGOV, IR

FROM : AMERICAN EMBASSY TEHRAN DATE: AUGUST 1, 1978

SUBJECT: UNCERTAIN POLITICAL MOOD: RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS, TOUGHER ROYAL LINE ON DEMONSTRATORS

REF :

SUMMARY: Source who has been helping broker court contacts with religious groups notes official disappointment with re developments, especially Ayatollah Shariatmadari's refusal publicly break ranks with Ayatollah Khomeini. Shah's mood health concern some court officials. According to this sou Shah has directed much tougher line against demonstrators i wake of July 26-29 rioting. Corruption could become major political issue. Communist and Khomeini forces are staying opposition background for moment. GOI seen as still in dif Source represents pessimistic view current in several circl but probably overstates negative aspects of present situ Support for various elements of his views are found in othe quarters as well, however, and Iranian political mood seem roller coaster for the moment. END SUMMARY.

Hedayat Eslaminia, who has been discussing the religious situation with Embassy Political Officers for the past few months, opened a July 25 meeting with Political Officer St in somewhat low spirits. The religious situation has "com apart". Eslaminia learned from General Fardoust and SAVAK Chief Moghaddam that the Shah was most distressed that Ayatollah Shariatmadari did not publicly oppose Ayatollah Khomeini's call for a subdued, "politicized" celebration o 12th Imam's birthday July 21. Eslaminia says Shariatmadar and his supporters have increased their dislike for Khomei until it borders on hate because pro-Khomeini groups are b mailing Shariatmadari supporters by threatening to shut do or burn their shops in the Bazaar.

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SECRET/LIMDIS — FOR DEPT. USE In

FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: POL:JDStempel:lab

Contents and Classification Approved by: CHARGE:CWNaas

Clearances:

With respect to Ayatollah Shariatmadari, Eslaminia said recent events have increased Shariatmadari's concern for his own position. Khomeini retains an almost mystic respect of mass of illiterate population and Shariatmadari feels he cannot differ to a significant degree with Khomeini in public. (Comment: We are not sure just how independent Shariatmadari actually is.) Eslaminia noted that all senior Ayatollahs in Iran are beginning to jockey for personal position. This could create a situation in which moderate religious figures would have trouble maintaining centrist policy in the face of challenges from more reactionary groups.

In the wake of disturbances in Iran July 21-22, Shah met on July 22 with his aide, General Fardoust and SAVAK Chief Moghaddam to discuss future policy towards demonstrators. Eslaminia, who is close to both Fardoust and Moghaddam, said the Shah was depressed with the outcome of the religious demonstrations and after a somewhat mercurial session in which Moghaddam was heavily criticized, the Shah directed that demonstrations would henceforth be broken up by military force and the army was authorized to fire on demonstrators. In response to a question, Eslaminia said he had been working for three days to reverse or moderate this decision, but the Shah and his principal advisors were now convinced that compromise with religious leaders may not be possible. Eslaminia believes this is an extreme position which will hopefully change, but it is clear that the throne is taking a much tougher line against dissidents in the wake of Shariatmadari's inability or unwillingness to oppose Khomeini publicly. For example, Shah is now against letting Mullah Falsafie speak publicly because it is feared he might ignite a sizable riot.

In passing, Eslaminia noted that Fardoust and Moghaddam, who are good friends of his, expressed some concern at the Shah's health. Political Officer mentioned rumors were prevalent in Tehran that something had happened. Eslaminia quickly replied that Shah was physically all right as of July 22 but somewhat "down" mentally. According to Eslaminia, medical blood tests had been ordered to determine if there was any physical problem. Later in conversation, Eslaminia noted that the U.S. and others should keep an eye on the Shah and if something were wrong, they should urge him to convene the Regency Council and prepare Iran for change, not just depart Iran abruptly as his father had done. When Political Officer expressed thought that this might be premature, Eslaminia merely smiled sadly and noted it pays to think ahead (absence of Shah from visible public eye has given rise to number of rumors. Eslaminia is concerned because those nearest Shah whom he knows well are concerned. This situation has arisen as a result of the Shah's current vacation during which he has made few public appearances. The Embassy has no evidence to indicate there is anything wrong, but the rumors are beginning to take on a life of their own.)

When asked how religious leaders viewed the recent ministerial changes Eslaminia sighed and said "it does not matter how one arranges the garbage cans". The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are doing virtually nothing about religious/political challenges and persist in the view that this is the Shah's and SAVAK's problem. Only the Shah himself and the Court Minister are concerned and time is passing. A bad situation is developing because Tudeh (communist) and radical groups are lining up behind Khomeini very quietly. They plan to let the Khomeini faction discreetly back candidates to parliament who will, after they are elected, reveal true colors and ban together to "wage war" against the present system. Eslaminia believes this tactic may well work because the GOI is currently in political disarray--the resurgence party is confused and the Prime Minister is not moving with sufficient speed to consolidate his forces. Eslaminia reeled off the following names of political figures who might be used as speakers. All are political activists who have the repsect of religious leaders as well as politicians: Saed Vaziri, Rahim Zehtabfard (former East Azarbaijan Resurgence Party Chief who resigned shortly before Tabriz riots in February), Mahmoud Touloui, Abdul Hossen Tabatabaie (presently a judge and former MP), and Dr. Shokraie (an Ex-MP from Qom with excellent ties to the Shariatmadari camp).

These and others like them should begin politicking so that basic lines of administration positions will be public by the time universities open in September. If this is not done, the student movements are likely to be won completely to one or more of dissident groups who are now planning major thrusts on campuses.

Eslaminia sees an even bigger problem with corruption. A number of key Bazaar merchants, including all major leaders, wrote a public letter recently to the Minister of Finance asking for an investigation of certain deals favoring the wealthy importers. Eslaminia ticked off three: A) Ali Rezaie imported two million tons of iron at 20 rials per kilo without paying customs tax and is selling it at 36 rials per kilo. Small iron shops have no or little profit margin and are being driven to the wall while Rezaie is reaping immense profits. B) Fabric maker Yassini, a close confident of Princess Ashraf, has imported two million meters of cloth without paying requisite customs duties. He is selling it at virtually double what he payed for it. C) Textile maker Lajevardi has also imported cheap textiles and sold them at a higher price.

In addition, a number of importers of vehicle spares with known ties to Princess Ashraf have raised their prices to retailers without any apparent justification, thus squeezing profits of this group. The result, says Eslaminia, is the

beginnings of a major new wave of dislike for the royal family as well as the government, raising the question of corruption to a major political issue. Eslaminia said he thought the Shah had better take a hand before small merchants and some manufacturers become convinced their interests lie with the opposition. (COMMENT: While the problem of corruption has been a consistent Eslaminia concern in past, Embassy has heard from a number of sources that financial wheelings and dealings keyed to royal family and friends are beginning to affect a sizable number of people and merchants are getting both smarter and bolder about raising these questions in the public arena.)

COMMENT: This conversation being reported by airgram because it emphasizes several themes which we have heard often elsewhere during the past month relating to confusion in the Iranian political system: A) concern for health of Shah; B) increasing difficulties in getting the regime and religious leaders on compatible tracks; and C) growing concern with corruption and problems of GOI political disorganization.

The actual situation is not, of course, as bad as tableau being painted by pessimists. There is much uncertainty and anxiety in political circles which has increased both suspicions and manic-depressive tendencies of Iranian political figures. Iranian politics are undoubtedly going through a "summer of discontent". New alliances may or may not emerge. Observers should not, however, jump to conclusion that country is going to hell in a hand basket. Situation seems to be one of trying to manage long overdue political growing pains under somewhat less than optimum conditions.

NAAS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

1978 AUG -3 AM 8:17

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07331

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL

O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 07331

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUJBECT: EX-PRIME MINISTER ALI AMINI REENTERS THE POLITIC
LISTS

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BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY: AMINI HAS CALLED FOR A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND CLAIMS HE HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION AND THE GOI. HIS INITIATIVE IS BEING VIEWED WITH SUSPICION IN VIEW OF PAST ALLEGATIONS THAT HE WAS A U.S. PUPPET. END SUMMARY.

1. ON JULY 23, DR. ALI AMINI, FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF IR (1961-62) ISSUED A WRITTEN STATEMENT WHICH WAS WELL COVERE IN THE FARSI PRESS (BUT ONLY MENTIONED IN ENGLISH PAPERS). AMINI CALLED FOR A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND ALSO SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO MODERATE BETWEEN THE GO AND RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION. HE CLAIMED IRAN'S POLITICAL SITUATION AND ECONOMIC DETERIORATION IS SERIOUS ENOUGH THA

AFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPR
POL:JDStempel:lab	8-3-78		CHARGE:GWNaas

EARANCES:
POL:JWMartin

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ACTION MUST BE TAKEN BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR MID-1979. RISING TIDE OF DEMONSTRATIONS CALLS FOR A BROAD POPULAR ALLIANCE RATHER THAN A NEW SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC-SYLE PARTY. HE MADE IT CLEAR HE BACKED THE SHAH, BUT SAW A CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT AS ESSENTIAL.

2. ON AUG. 1, THE RESURGENCE PARTY (RPPI) NEWSPAPER RASTAKHIZ ATTACKED AMINI'S INITIATIVE AND REFERRED TO CHARGES MADE AS RECENTLY AS LAST OCTOBER THAT HE WAS AN AMERICAN AGENT WHO WAS FOISTED ON THE SHAH BY THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION. IT NOTED HIS ADMINISTRATION WAS AN ECONOMIC DISASTER FOR IRAN.

END UNCLASSIFIED

BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

3. ANDREW WHITLEY (PROTECT) WHO INTERVIEWED AMINI FOR THE BRITISH FINANCIAL TIMES, TOLD EMBOFF IN CONFIDENCE THAT AMINI HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT HIS CALL FOR A NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT WAS AN INDIRECT INVITATION FOR PRIME MINISTER AMOUZEGAR TO RESIGN. AMINI TOLD WHITLEY HE WAS CLEARLY PRO-SHAH, IN FACT HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED IN HIS INITIATIVE BY COURT MINISTER HOVEYDA IN MID-JULY. PROBLEM WAS DETERIORATING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN AMOUZEGAR CABINET, AND SOME CHANGE HAD TO BE MADE OR DEMONSTRATIONS WOULD GET OUT OF HAND. WHITLEY DRYLY NOTED IT WAS NOT CLEAR AMINI HAD ANY BACKING ELSEWHERE OR BETWEEN WHOM HE WAS GOING TO INTERMEDIATE.

4. AMINI TOLD WHITLEY HE HAD NO PERSONAL AMBITIONS, AND THOUGHT TALK OF NEW PARTIES WAS UNNECESSARY. A BROADER POLITICAL GROUPING WAS CALLED FOR--HE USED THE FRENCH "RASSEMBLEMENT" SEVERAL TIMES TO INDICATE WHAT HE WAS THINKING OF.

5. PUBLIC STATEMENT BY AMINI WAS IMMEDIATELY GREETED BY CONSTERNATION AND SUSPICION IN MANY QUARTERS, MAIN THEME OF WHICH IS THAT "THE AMERICANS ARE MAKING THEIR MOVE." EMBOFFS, INCLUDING CHARGE, HAVE HAD TO DENY PRIVATELY THAT U.S. IS NOW BACKING AMINI TO QUESTIONERS RANGING FROM LOYAL RPPI MEN TO OPPOSITION FIGURES. RPPI NEWSPAPER ATTACK ON AMINI WAS OBVIOUSLY PRIME MINISTER'S REJOINDER AND EFFORT TO PLACE EX-PM IN CONTEXT AS A QUAINT AND TAINTED FIGURE FROM THE PAST.

6. EMBASSY COMMENT: AMINI INITIATIVE IS NOT RPT NOT BEING TREATED AS MAJOR INITIATIVE HERE, BUT AS SIMPLY ONE OF MANY STATEMENTS. UNFORTUNATELY, FEW PERSIAN POLITICIANS WORTH THEIR SALT WILL AVOID BELIEVING THAT U.S. IS IN SOME WAY BEHIND AMINI EFFORT, BUT THIS SHOULD REMAIN MINOR IRRITANT RATHER THAN MAJOR PROBLEM. AMINI HAS ADDED ANOTHER IMPONDERABLE TO PRESENT TURBULENT IRANIAN POLITICAL CURRENTS AND MADE HIMSELF AVAILABLE FOR FUTURE ROLE. IF OUR READING OF CURRENT OPPOSITIONIST THINKING AND PROBLEMS IS NEAR TARGET, HOWEVER, AMINI WILL PROBABLY NOT RPT NOT PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN EVENTS OF NEXT

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FEW MONTHS (DESPITE HIS CALL FOR PROMPT ACTION), BUT MAY BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE VISIBLE AS ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN APPROACHES.

NAAS

POL
Isfahan

CONFIDENTIAL
CONSULATE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Isfahan, Iran

Aug. 4, 1978

File

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Amir Amanullah SeTurk Darashuie; Kashgai tribal leader and Member of Parliament from Mehrgerd
Malaku Kashefi; Industrialist & Landowner, Isfahan
David C. McCaffey, AmConsul, Isfahan
Family members and retainers of above

Date & Place: Kashefi farm near Mehrgerd, Isfahan Province
Aug. 4 & 5, 1978

Subj: Popular Attitude Toward the Central Government; Reactions to Current Disturbances

Amir Amanullah, eldest son of Ilat Khan, Chief of the Darashuie branch of the Kashgai tribe, and first year representative in the Majles, visited the Kashefi farm while I was spending the weekend with my family. In a series of conversations, Amir Amanullah was repeatedly challenged, in a friendly manner, to explain and defend central government personalities and policies.

While reiterating official statements of government policy, Amir Amanullah agreed that most people he met had lost all faith in the GOI's willingness or ability to implement its policies. Kashefi went farther. He stated that the people had lost all trust and confidence in both the government and the Royal Family, and that unless the current Cabinet is replaced by one headed by a man too as being opposed to the "greed and incompetence" of the Royal Family, the government will cease to have any relevance to the majority of Iranians. He pointed out sadly that seventeen of his twenty four cousins, " the young men who should be providing leadership", had obtained either permanent residence ("Green Card") status in the U.S., or had investments in Europe which gave them the right to live there. (Most are, however, still living in Iran at present.) He stated that new private investment in Iran, despite the statistics, was nil. Anything which looks like new investment was either a (vain?) attempt to protect capital already sunk in existing projects, or was a fraudulent investment made to screen major capital transfers out of Iran. Kashefi was basically pro-Shah, but he emphasized two major failings which make the Shah at present a liability to Iran - (a) inability to recognize his limitations and to delegate, and (b) inability or unwillingness to recognize the venality of his family and Cabinet members. Amir Amanullah said that Kashefi's opinions were widespread, and, while he considered them exaggerated, he recognized the truth in them. He said he expected the Majles to assert itself much more in the next and coming years to correct high level abuses. Both spoke of the possibility of former Prime Minister Ali Amini returning to replace Jamshid Amouzegar, and agreed that Amini was the best of available possibilities, but said he would probably demand too much independent authority to be accept-

able to the Shah. I asked if it was a foregone conclusion that Amouzegar would be replaced, and neither had any doubt this would happen. Their only fear was that he would be replaced by "another man only interested in filling his Swiss bank account." They both assumed that Amouzegar had made millions during his year in office.

Recent Disturbances

I asked their reaction to recent demonstrations in Isfahan. There was a general feeling that the government was afraid to take any action to prevent such violence, as senior officials did not understand the cause and purpose of the demonstrations, and were afraid any action would be counter-productive. The government was just hoping it would all blow over, as it appeared to do in the spring. Nahofi, at least, thought they were wrong, and that the riots would continue and get more violent unless (a) the government took positive action against the "ring-leaders and instigators", and (b) there was at least the appearance of a major change in the government (and in its acceptance of high-level corruption). He believes the demonstrators are drawn from the large masses who are tired of seeing a few growing criminally rich out of Iran's development, while their wages are lost to inflation and shortages. He said the instigators are mere manipulators who will attempt to use the power of mass demonstrations to themselves join the corrupt elite. He included especially in this group the Khalkhalis and religious leaders such as Shariat Madari, whom he characterizes as an "evil man". Others in the discussion, including Amir Amanollah, disagreed with his emphasis and with some details, but agreed with his main points.

Dist: Embassy Tehran: FOL
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AmConsul Tabriz
Dept. of State: NEA/IRN
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

1978 AUG 27 AM 8 0

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08134

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC
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INFO: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON

08134

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: NEW CENTRIST POLITICAL ORGANIZATION UNDER PIRASTEH

1. SAYED MEHDI PIRASTEH ANNOUNCED AUG. 21 HE HAS FORMED "CONSTITUTION DEFENDERS FRONT". CLAIMING SUPPORT OF 300 PROMINENT IRANIANS, PIRASTEH PLEDGED TO WORK FOR PROTECTION OF FREEDOM AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTITUTION. PRESENT CONDITIONS REQUIRE ENTIRE NATION TO BE MOBILIZED TO DEFEND INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF IRAN. "OUR ENDEAVORS WILL BE FIGHT FOR THE CAUSE OF THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN COMPLIANCE WITH TEACHING OF ISLAM. WE ARE O THE CONVICTION THAT EVERY IRANIAN WILL ASSIST US IN THIS MISSION."

2. PIRASTEH IS A FORMER VIGOROUS ADMINISTRATOR WHOSE DIFFER

BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVE
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WITH TOP GOI LEADERS DROVE HIM INTO POLITICAL EXILE (DIPLOMATIC SERVICE) IN 1960s. AFTER CAREER IN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HE JOINED MAJLIS AND WAS BITTER OPPONENT OF MOSADEQ'S NATIONAL FRONT. HE HAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED SHAH'S AUTHORITY. AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF FARS AND THEN KHUZISTAN (1959-62) HE MADE REPUTATION AS FLAMBOYANT BUT EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATOR WITH A "NEW BROOM" IMAGE. HE ENTERED CABINET AS MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN 1963, BUT AFTER DISPUTES WITH PM MANSUR, HE WAS APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ. HE WON PRAISE FOR THREE YEARS SERVICE IN DIFFICULT POST, HAVING SUCCEEDED IN REESTABLISHING TIES BETWEEN GOI AND IRAQI SHIITE COMMUNITY. HE SUBSEQUENTLY SERVED AS AMBASSADOR IN BRUSSELS.

3. PIRASTEH CARRIES REPUTATION AS HEADLINE GRABBER WHO BACKS UP PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN WITH SOLID ACCOMPLISHMENT. HE IS THOUGHT TO BE FAIRLY CLOSE TO SHAH. HE HAS CLAIMED, APPARENTLY WITH JUSTICE, TO ENJOY GOOD RELATIONS WITH RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY, AS SHOWN BY SUCCESS IN IRAQ. HE IS A PAST PRESIDENT OF IRAN-AMERICAN SOCIETY AND LIKES TO DEAL WITH AMERICANS.

4. COMMENT: SEVERAL OPPOSITIONISTS HAVE TOLD EMBOFF THAT PIRASTEH IS CONSIDERED TOO CLOSE TO SHAH TO BE EFFECTIVE IN NEW ROLE. IN ANY CASE, FORMATION OF FRONT WAS ANNOUNCED JUST DAYS BEFORE PROJECTED AUG. 27 CHANGE OF PRIME MINISTER. PIRASTEH IS ONE MAJOR FIGURE QUOTED

APPROVINGLY ON SHARIF-EMAMI APPOINTMENT, AND FRONT'S FUTURE MUST BE RECKONED UNCERTAIN AT THIS POINT.

SULLIVAN

CONFIDENTIAL XGDS 4

CONSULATE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Isfahan, Iran

9/21/78

File NL Front

Memo

To: John Stempel
POL/ Emb. Tehran

Fm: DCMcGaffey
P.O., AmConsul Isfahan

Subj: Meeting with National Front
E.O. 11652: XGDS 4

On Wed.,9/21, I spoke with Raschid Boroumand, and told him that you would be pleased to meet with his friends. He expressed some question about your ability to communicate, as his friends' English, he says, is poor. I explained to him that both your Farsi and your French were good, and that between the two languages there should be no problem. I requested a time during the work day or the early evening on Sunday. After a few hours, he responded saying his friends could meet you at 8:00 p.m. Raschid is still a bit worried about communication, and he may travel to Tehran to join you as an interpreter.

You are requested to meet them at The Iran Sokna Apartments on Vanak Ave., apt. 310 (third floor). Raschid has yet to mention any names.

He also asked whether some future meetings might be arranged in Paris with the Embassy there - it might be easier, he said. I replied that Embassy Paris is primarily interested in French-American relations, but that they could raise the question with you if they wished. I find it interesting that their connections are so French.

Raschid again emphasized that the people you are to meet are not likly to be in full agreement with U.S. policy, but are desirous of having the U.S. understand them and not condemn them out of hand as anti-American and Communist. He mentioned that there were a number of points in the recent Time magazine article which he had questions about. I again pointed out that press publications were not statements of U.S. policy, but I suspect you will be asked about your, or the U.S., position on some of the statements. I suspect, from Raschid's nervousness, that at least one of the people you will meet is likly to be belligerent, and that Raschid is trying to avoid the meeting breaking up on your resentment of this person's remarks. Raschid also congratulated me on the success of the Camp David Summit. Raschid may feel he is the honest broker bringing two antagonists together. If so, there is going to be a lot of feeling each other out. Good luck, and I'd appreciate being kept informed.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Cyrus Elahi, Special Assistant to the Minister of Education
John D. Stempel, Political Officer
Barbara Schell, Commercial Officer
W. Gregory Perett, Political Officer

DATE & PLACE: October 3, 1978-Chetnik's Restaurant, Tehran, Iran

SUBJECT : Desiderata for National Reconciliation

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, OR, USIS, BIO, AMCONSULS SHIRAZ, ISFAHAN, TABRIZ, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

SUMMARY: Elahi said the political center is too disillusioned and disorganized to enter the political arena without proof that a genuinely liberal regime is in the offing. Moderates need a sign from the Shah, such as an indication that he truly means to end corruption and permit open dissent. Prosecution of corrupt elements is an absolute requirement, but it would have to stop short of Hoveyda to avoid implicating the Shah. Religious leaders will lose most political influence if liberalization and corruption questions are solved. In any case, the Shah must remain; Iran cannot function as a democratic republic. Martial law will probably last until just after Ashura in December. Meanwhile, prospects look dim for the fall university term. END SUMMARY.

Dr. Elahi described at length the attitude of the political center, stressing that moderates are still too cynical and timid to organize politically. They have heard of anti-corruption campaigns before and have seen the guilty go unpunished. They have also heard the government talk of "free speech" when they knew they dared not raise their voices. The Sharif-Emami government, in their eyes, includes too many representatives of past abuses. The Prime Minister himself was an active participant during his long tenure as President of the Senate. In its extreme form, this attitude assumes that the highly publicized parliamentary debates were only for show and constituted no new departure. Indeed, the entire liberalization program may be nothing more than a ploy to bring dissenters into the open so they can be destroyed.

Nonetheless, Elahi said, someone must mobilize the center; there is no other way to bring peace. The Resurgence Party could have done it if led by a man like Ganji (present Minister of Education). The technocrat Amouzegar was, in contrast, the worst sort of choice. In any case, some brand new political group must develop which can mobilize the moderates. Otherwise, they are likely to boycott the elections.

The only real solution now lies in Sa'adabad Palace. Moderates are "looking for a sign" from the Shah that political activity is desired. This might take the form of his personal guarantee of free expression of dissent and prosecution of corruption. The Shah must also show that he places the welfare of the nation above that of his family. The promises of the Sharif-Emami government have not convinced oppositonists because these assurances have not come from the lips of the Shah. He must inform the nation in person that he will preside over a liberal system and that he guarantees the safety of those who join the political process.

Prosecution of corruption dominates the thoughts of all Iranians, who have a long list of prominent people whom they "know" to be guilty. When asked whom this included, Elahi mentioned former Agriculture Minister Rouhani and above all Hushang Ansari who "must" be prosecuted. Embassy officers suggested some of the culprits might be innocent whereupon Elahi said it does not matter; the people consider them guilty and will not accept an innocent verdict. The Shah must provide some sacrificial lambs. When asked how high the long arm of prosecution would have to reach to satisfy moderates, he said it has to stop short of Hoveyda. It would be impossible to put Hoveyda on trial without also, in effect, prosecuting the Shah, and only the Shah could preserve stability in Iran. Elahi went so far as to say that if it came to a choice, he would opt for keeping the Shah "even with a military government." He hoped it would not come to that.

Religious leaders have little intrinsic power, according to Elahi, since religion per se has little role in the present unrest. If the political and social needs of the people are met, then men like Shariatmadari, let alone Khomeini, will vanish from prominence. Religion is merely a channel for dissent, because no other has heretofore existed. Embassy officers debated this point with Elahi, but he would not be shaken.

Martial law was an unnecessary step, in his view. Assertive measures to restore security were needed, but this in no way required Martial Law, which can now be used by the opposition against the Sharif-Emami government. Elahi guessed Martial Law would end in December after Ashura.

Regarding universities, Elahi saw dim prospects for the autumn term. Schools will open but then close quickly. The University Independence Bill is a disaster that the government will never get universities to accept. He did not expect any better from Nahavandi, since the latter had spent ten years running universities and had never shown any conviction that universities should be independent. He described the repeated abortive attempts of National University to complete last spring's term and give final examinations. In ironic contrast to Martial Law conditions, the adminstration surrendered to a tiny minority of students and gave up trying to hold exams. Instead, all students received marks of "incomplete".

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COMMENT: Elahi's change in attitude toward the Shah is striking. He repeated more than once his belief that Iran cannot survive without the Shah. This supports other reports that moderate oppositionists, who have assailed the Shah in the past, change their tune when they perceive the alternatives. Elahi, who has stressed the need to mobilize people on many occasions, feels this remains essential. Like most "modernizers", he discounts and grossly underestimates the religious leadership. We believe he is mistaken on this score, but it is just this attitude which makes political compromise difficult between many of the modernizers and religious moderates.

POL:WGPerett:lab:10-8-78

Clearance:
POL:JDStempel (draft)
COM:BSchell (draft)

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE

0990

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN

O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECRET TEHRAN 09904

EXDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PORS, PINS, PINT, IR

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE RELIGIOUS DEAL WITH GOI

REF: TEHRAN 9309 AND PREVIOUS (NOTAL)

CM-2
MB
OL
RU

SUMMARY: REPRESENTATIVE OF AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI (STRONGLY PROTECT) CALLED ON EMBOFF TO ASCERTAIN U.S. POSITION ON PRESENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND TO INDICATE POTENTIAL DEAL IN OFFING BETWEEN MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS HEADED BY SHARIATMADARI AND GOI. DEAL INCLUDES EFFORT TO CONVINCE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN FRANCE TO "GO EASY" IN OPPOSITION. RELIGIOUS LEADERS PREPARED TO BRING NATIONAL FRONT (INF) POLITICIANS ALONG AS PART OF ARRANGEMENT. NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE FOR NEXT FEW DAYS. END SUMMARY.

1. DR. NASSER MINATCHI, TREASURER OF COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF), DURING PHONE CALL ON OTHER MATTER, ASKED TO SEE POLOFF STEMPEL CONCERNING "URGENT"

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
OL:JDStempel:lab	10-11-78		DCM:CWNaas

CLEARANCES:
OL:GBLambrakis

SECRET/EXDIS/NOFORN
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS 413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

10152-101

SITUATION. MINATCHI SAID HE HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY ASKED BY AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI TO ASCERTAIN USG'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SHARIF-EMAMI GOVERNMENT. SHARIATMADARI AND REST OF QOM LEADERSHIP WERE READY TO WORK WITH GOI IF PRESENT GOVERNMENT WAS GOING TO REMAIN. LEADERSHIP HAS RESPECT FOR SHARIF-EMAMI PERSONALLY AND BELIEVES SITUATION IN COUNTRY IS DETERIORATING TO THE POINT WHERE IT ENDANGERS RELIGIOUS LEADERS' GOALS.

2. STEMPEL SAID U.S. POLICY WAS BASED ON BELIEF THAT STABILITY AND CONTINUITY REPRESENTED BY SHAH PROVIDED BEST HOPE FOR SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION PROCESS. WE SUPPORTED THAT LIBERALIZATION PROCESS, BUT WERE NOT RPT NOT INTERVENING IN IRANIAN INTERNAL POLITICS. (MINATCHI INTERJECTED THOUGHT THAT RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP BELIEVED SHAH WAS KEY PROTECTION AGAINST ANARCHY AND COMMUNISM, TOO.) WE THOUGHT NOW WAS TIME FOR VARIOUS GROUPS IN OPPOSITION TO TRY TO WORK WITH A GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD INDICATED IT WAS AIMING FOR MANY OF SAME GOALS WE UNDERSTOOD RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT SOUGHT. MINATCHI ASKED IF EMBOFF THOUGHT SHARIF-EMAMI GOVERNMENT WOULD LAST. WERE AMERICANS BACKING ANYONE ELSE, LIKE ALI AMINI, FOR INSTANCE? EMBOFF REITERATED POINT THAT USG WAS NOT GETTING INVOLVED IN INTERNAL CHOICE OF GOVERNMENT FOR IRAN AND WAS CERTAINLY NOT SUPPORTING ANY INDIVIDUAL, INCLUDING DR. AMINI. THERE WAS NO REASON TO THINK GOI

OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

WOULD CHANGE SOON, AND SOME REASON TO THINK IT MIGHT LAST. SEEMED TO US THERE WERE NUMBER OF REASONS WHY MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP SHOULD WANT TO WORK WITH PRESENT GOI TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL LIBERALIZATION. MINATCHI NODDED AND SAID THAT WAS HIS AND, AS FAR AS HE KNEW, SHARIATMADARI'S VIEW.

3. MINATCHI THEN SAID NEXT STEP WAS TO INFORM EMBOFF THAT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PRIME MINISTER BEGAN MORNING OCT 11 LOOKING TO "ARRANGEMENT" BETWEEN MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND PRESENT GOI. HIS GROUP DID NOT WANT TO CONTINUE IF "PEOPLE" OPPOSED PRESENT GOVERNMENT, BUT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES, DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER WOULD RESUME WITHIN A FEW DAYS. IF SUCCESSFUL, MINATCHI, ENG. MEHDI BAZARGAN AND YADOLLAH SAHABI (BOTH INF LEADERS), AND SHARIATMADARI'S SON, ENG. HASSAN SHARIATMADARI WERE PREPARED TO LEAVE FOR PARIS EARLY NEXT WEEK TO CONVINCE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO MUTE HIS OPPOSITION TO SHAH. MINATCHI SAID INF CONVINCED KHOMEINI DOES NOT RPT NOT UNDERSTAND TRUE SITUATION IN IRAN, AND INF LEADERSHIP IS CONFIDENT THAT IT CAN GET KHOMEINI'S COOPERATION "TO AT LEAST NOT OPPOSE THE SHAH TOO MUCH."

4. EMBOFF SAID HE UNDERSTOOD INF POSITION. RELIGIOUS LEADERS' APPROACH REPRESENTED KIND OF COMING-TOGETHER THAT WOULD BE GOOD FOR IRAN IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, MINATCHI SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT

RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP COULD CONVINCE SECULAR INF MEN TO GO ALONG WITH APPROACH WHICH HAD FULL SUPPORT OF AYATOLLAHS SHARIATMADARI, GOLPAYGANI, AND MARI'ESHI (COMMENT: THE WHOLE "QOM TRIANGLE" SEEMS TO BE ABOARD!). MINATCHI SAID HE WOULD KEEP EMBASSY INFORMED OF SITUATION.

5. EMBASSY COMMENT: MINATCHI'S CONTACTS WITH SHARIATMADARI HAVE ALWAYS BEEN GOOD, AND IF THIS DEVELOPMENT PROCEEDS AS INDICATED, IT COULD BE MAJOR POSITIVE FACTOR IN POLITICAL SITUATION HERE. MORE RADICAL FACTION OF INF WAS GIVEN SAME U.S. POLICY LINE EARLIER IN DAY (BEING REPORTED TO DEPT VIA SEPTEL), AND THIS HOPEFULLY WILL CLEAR UP ANY LINGERING DOUBTS MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE HAD ABOUT U.S. COMMITMENT TO SHAH AND EVOLUTIONARY (AS OPPOSED TO REVOLUTIONARY) POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. MINATCHI CONFIRMED WHAT WE HAD BEEN TOLD PREVIOUSLY BY OTHERS: MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP RESPECTS SHARIF-EMAMI AND APPEARS READY TO WORK WITH HIM DESPITE PROBLEMS ENGENDERED BY MARTIAL LAW. WE HAVE LITTLE DOUBT SHARIF-EMAMI WILL FIND A SUITABLE COMPROMISE IF ONE IS OFFERED AND IF UNEXPECTED ACCIDENTS OVER NEXT WEEK OR TWO DO NOT RPT NOT CHANGE PRESENT POLITICAL CONFIGURATION TOO MUCH. WE HAVE SOMEWHAT MORE DOUBTS ABOUT MODERATE LEADERS'ABILITY TO BRING KHOMEINI FULLY ABOARD, BUT SUSPECT MERELY MUTED OPPOSITION WHICH WOULD GIVE MODERATES A BREATHING SPACE WOULD BE SATISFACTORY. ANY "DEAL" WHICH DOES EMERGE IS

IS LIKELY TO BE TACIT RATHER THAN EXPLICIT. ADDRESSEES SHOULD SEVERELY LIMIT SPECULATION AND AVOID ANY PUBLIC COMMENT ON POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS.

SULLIVAN

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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mehdi PIRASTEH
George B. LAMBRAKIS, American Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: October 11, 1978, Residence of Reza AMINI, ICA Senior Employee

SUBJECT: Internal Situation

DISTRUBUTION: AMB/DCM, OR, ECON, BIO, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA INR/OIL/B

Pirasteh is a reasonably prominent Shah loyalist who, Embassy files indicate, was very active on the Shah's behalf, and Ashraf's, in the Mossadeq period and subsequently rose to Minister of Interior, Governor of Fars, and Khuzistan Provinces, Ambassador to Iraq and then to Brussels. He makes no secret of his loyalty but says he is not a "yes man" and describes his long sojourn in the political wilderness since his appointment to Brussels (in 1967) as due to that characteristic. The meeting was at his request, through Amini, whom he knows from school days. Our files indicate some evidence of corruption in his early years but great energy and effectiveness in carrying out a variety of often opportunistic tasks in his search for a fast rising career. He has frequently put himself forward as Prime Ministerial material. A lawyer by training, he is the son of a prominent Mojtahed from Arak whose family he claims patronized Khomeini in Khomeini's early years.

The first hour and half of our discussion was spent with Pirasteh very long-windedly describing his sterling career. He is obviously polished and subtle. He is also addicted to saying everything in five or six different ways, a quality which I assume helps him with certain types of audiences, perhaps including the Mullahs whom he says he sees frequently.

Pirasteh said he had an audience with the Shah about a week ago lasting an hour and 20 minutes. The Shah was impressed with what Pirasteh had to say about troubles in the religious community, and seems to be shaken out of his previous belief that he is respected by all his people

and everything is right in the land. Pirasteh claims to have one or two very good friends in the Ministry of Court. He also recounted various past incidents when he had told the Shah "the truth" and suffered temporarily in his career because of that.

Pirasteh said he had visited Qom, seen Ayatollahs Golpayegani, Shariatmadari and Najafi. He had lunched with Khomeini's brother, Panandiye, whom he was responsible for getting out of jail about a month ago. He had also gotten about five other people released at the request of Khomeini's brother. He now intended touse the brother's son (Khomeini's nephew) as a messenger to Khomeini.

Pirasteh is working with friends on forming a new party. This will not be big, since enrolling elements of "the mob" will only weaken its base. (COMMENT: Embassy sources indicate he has been making noises about forming such a party for some time.) He has written a long article in booklet form criticizing American policy for its indecisiveness in this part of the world. An excerpt has appeared in the press. (COMMENT: From what he said, Pirasteh seems to believe in the technique of attacking something so as not to be suspected of being for it. He repeatedly mentioned the usefulness of this technique to disguise loyalties and deflect attacks. He implied we should take his criticism of U.S. policy in the same vein.)

He cited the stupidity of the Etelaat article in January 1978 attacking Khomeini. He was incredulous that I did not know who the real author was. He said it was written by Kakhoudeh and revised by Hoveyda in Homayoun's presence. He asserted he had proof Hoveyda really is a Bahai despite disclaimers and criticized Hoveyda as a poor Prime Minister because he has never been tested through "hard times."

Pirasteh made it clear he is working on calming down Khomeini and hopes to gain politically from it. He told me that within about 12 days he hopes to have results from this effort and is 80 percent sure of success. He is taking the line that Khomeini can give up any hopes of the Shah leaving. It therefore behooves him to use the present situation to make some political gains for Islam.

He probed me to see what I "as an informed outside observer" would think the Shah could agree too. He indicated he thought it important that Parliament have a stronger role to play after free elections and that there be a Prime Minister who actually makes government policy so that he rather than the Shah will be responsible for mistakes before the people. After all, the Shah retains the power to dismiss Parliament and governments. He should not be up ahead of them in confrontation with the people.

I took this occasion to express our belief that the Sharif-Emami Government is as good as can be expected under the present circumstances and will remain for some-time. He did not disagree. He had earlier indicated his dislike of Ali Amini. I also expressed our hope that the moderate elements in Iranian political life will prevail and that the current confrontation between the government and the opposition led by religious people could be gotten over so that the country can move on to the next important step, free elections. Pirasteh took all this in as if he agreed.

Earlier Pirasteh had described the three points on his own program for solving today's problems. These were: first, accommodate the religious opposition so as to separate it from the others and see who the others really are. Second, launch a more effective anti-corruption campaign by passing a special law based on the 1959 law which required people to show where their wealth had come from. (This was covered in a newspaper article September 30 which was reported in TEHRAN 8134.) He would apply it to about 400 top civil servants, expecting that their trials would lead to prosecution of top businessmen who have benefited by collusion with these officials. Third, he would go for a reform of bureaucratic procedures so that the little people would get better service from civil servants. He indicated a number of ways this could be done.

COMMENT: Pirasteh is obviously a smooth type with a long past. His religious background, close to Khomeini, may be a helpful element at the moment. The extent of his effectiveness and relevance to the present situation should become more apparent in the weeks ahead. (Incidentally, the word among some embassy officers is that he is a British agent!)

POL:GBLambrakis:hg
10/15/78

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Khosrow EQBAL
George B. LAMBRAKIS, American Embassy Tehran

TIME & PLACE: Embassy, October 11, 1978

SUBJECT: Internal Situation

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/MIN, POL, BIO, OR, ECON, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

Khosrow Eqbal is the half brother of former Prime Minister Manuchehr Eqbal, recently deceased. He returned from Paris, where he spends much of his time, because of the internal "mess." He describes this as worse than 1953. He will remain here until it is resolved. His first point was to ask who would replace the Shah if he dropped dead tomorrow. What would happen? When I noted there was no indication the Shah was in any trouble with his health, he said one could never know. The Shah suffered an infractus three years ago and recently, after hearing the news of the Afghanistan coup d'etat, he suffered a stomach hemorrage and had to be moved from Shiraz to Kish Island for convalescence. Eqbal claims to know all of this from the Shah's physician.

Eqbal lunched two days ago with Ali Amini. Amini said he himself was too old to be Prime Minister for long, but he was willing to take on the job in a transition government until free elections could bring forth younger men. He would not take the job under present conditions, however. The Shah continues to insist on maintaining all power. Amini had asked Court Minister Ardalan just the day before if he could not arrange a meeting with the Shah. Amini had told him it was not to discuss his becoming Prime Minister but simply to give the Shah his ideas. Zahedi too had been approached by Amini but had been unable to arrange a meeting with the Shah.

In course of conversation, Eqbal recalled his brother telling him of a meeting he had had with the Shah shortly before he died. Eqbal had told the Shah he wished to die before

Shah's rule ended because he was afraid what would happen then. People are unhappy in the country. The Shah told him he had lost touch; the Shah knew better. This was partly responsible for his brother's moroseness and death, Eqbal said. Eqbal said the Shah was basically a weak man posing as a strong one. He had an unerring instinct for picking upon weak, bad men to serve him, not realizing they were worthless in times of crisis. Shah had been a very nice fellow before 1953 but events that year made him different. He had felt betrayed by the Iranian people and became mean.

Eqbal claims close friendship with former French Prime Minister Christian Pinet. Pinet lunched with the Shah during his recent visit to Iran (on French business). Eqbal had dinner with him in Paris the day after he returned and claims Pinet was completely converted to Eqbal's views and said he was reporting them to Giscard d'Estaing. Pinet later told Eqbal that Giscard agreed with Eqbal's views and would be contacting the Americans about the situation in Iran. Pinet expected to return to Iran on Giscard's behalf in the near future and would contact Eqbal then.

From a conversation with Fallah, Eqbal had heard that the NIOC calculated Iran's present deficit at 100 billion tomans ($14 billion) and had told the Shah. (COMMENT: This coincides with a figure on the deficit given by the Shah to the Ambassador.)

Eqbal played down the strength of religious feeling in the country, ascribing the current situation to so many economic failures and general dissatisfaction. He did not believe the army could be trusted; the generals are all on the "take" and would not hold up in a succession situation if the Shah went. It is critical that the Shah remain for a time while the situation is prepared for when he departs. Shah should seize the initiative by appearing on TV. He should apologize to his people for his neglect of their needs while he was concentrating on building up the defense of the country over the past years. This should be done concurrently with a new government of people who have not served in government over the past 15 years.

(COMMENT: According to Embassy files, Eqbal has been a frequent contact of Embassy officers in the past. He may have been involved in questionable deals himself and is a self-

promoter (like so many other Iranians we talk to). Embassy officers have expressed puzzlement as to how to evaluate his information, since he has been right and given cogent opinions at times but also misled interlocutors on other occasions. Nevertheless it is a sign of the times that a man with Eqbal's background would speak so openly against the Shah and the Shah's method of governing to an Embassy officer such as me, whom he met for the first time.

POL:GBLambrakis:hg
10/12/78

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. & Mrs. Hedayat Eslaminia
Mr. & Mrs. George B. Lambrakis
Mr. & Mrs. John D. Stempel

DATE & PLACE: October 15, 1978 - Eslaminia's Home

SUBJECT : Observations about Conditions in Iran

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, OR, BIO, NEA/IRN

In the course of dinner for the six participants, Mr. Eslaminia, who had recently returned from the U.S., made the following observations about conditions in Iran as he found them during his initial soundings.

Religious situation - Eslaminia felt that within two weeks the split between Ayatollah Khomeini and those Ayatollahs resident in Iran led by Shariatmadari would become public knowledge (Comment: Some hint began to appear in the press about seven days later). This difference of opinion might eventually become a real public division, but for the moment it would probably remain muted.

Eslaminia recounted a story he had heard that Ali Amini had been rejected for the Prime Ministership because he insisted that the Shah go abroad for six months. In passing, he remarked that Ayatollah Shariatmadari had once thought he could work with Amini but now was disposed to work with the Sharif-Emami government.

Substantial communist presence is appearing in the mosques and religious schools. This comes from sons of ex-Tudeh (communist) party members who have gone into religious training. Eslaminia said moderate ayatollahs are beginning to become concerned about this "infiltration."

The islamic month of Moarram, beginning December 2 will be a difficult time, since religious parades are mandatory and others may try disruptive tactics.

Political Situation in Iran - Students will not be lured back to school easily. In fact, Eslaminia shared the general pessimism that indicates the school year may eventually have to be cancelled. He also mentioned the role of Tudeh sympathizers in the universities and said the religious students were emerging as their only organized challengers. We can expect to see more clashes between "Islamic" student movements and more traditional "leftist" groups. This will not make educational conciliation any easier.

Many of Iran's other strikes have political overtones, and these will be difficult to settle. Eslaminia expressed dismay at the Sharif-Emami government's acquiesence in overgenerous settlements and predicted these would cause more trouble.

Eslaminia planned to visit Mashad and talk with religious leaders there during the week ahead.

POL:JDStempel:lab:11-2-78

Jaleh Square Incident - In a remarkable display of unity, several individuals present with eyewitness accounts or inside knowledge totally refuted the opposition thesis that thousands had been killed. The Prime Minister's special assistant for international affairs said a house to house search had been made seeking families of victims for social help. No more than 122 such victims had been identified. AP correspondent Parvis Raein who was present at Jaleh Square during the firing said he had been sitting next to the military communications gear, and when the events were all over, he heard the radio announce there had been no more than 90 dead (He agreed with the overall figures of 122 noting that others were killed elsewhere, and Raein and others also agreed it was possible that an additional 20 or 30 had been killed elsewhere and not buried in the principal cemetary.).

Embassy Comment: While Raein has not always published figures he believes to be true when they contradicted government announcements, he has never been bashful with Iranians or foreigners about expressing his views when they differ from official government line. Queen's Bureau chief Nasr also described the opposition effort to create a "massacre" as a masterful piece of political propaganda.

POL:JDStempel:lab:10-22-78

DISTRIBUTION:

AMB/DCM	AMCONSUL SHIRAZ
POL	AMCONSUL TABRIZ
POL/M	AMCONSUL ISFAHAN
ECON	NEA/IRN
OR	INR/RNA
USIS	INR/OIL/B
BIO	
DAO	

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

SUBJECT: Dinner conversation at DCM's Residence

DATE: Evening of October 16, 1978

During a dinner hosted by DCM Naas in honor of Congressman Solarz, a number of Iranians spoke more frankly and far-ranging than they normally do about the issues confronting Iran. The following is a precis of the main points of the discussion. Individual speakers are identified only where their identity adds depth to their contribution.

There is general agreement that the massive malaise affecting Iranian public life is due to a combination of factors converging at roughly the same time period. Chief of the Queen's Special Bureau Hossein Nasr and Resurgence Party stalwart Ahmad Qoreishi agreed that much of the middle-class unease has occurred because people are economically much better off but culturally disoriented. The new middle class has economic power but has not yet gotten political power. It has drifted toward links with Shi'ite ulema in an attempt to achieve political influence. Nasr noted there has always been an understanding between the monarchy and the ulema. In fact, "the mullahs need the Shah." The leading Shi'ite ayatollahs inside Iran have turned down the option of rulling themselves. Ayatollah Khomeini's violent attacks could, Nasr said, lead to a break up in the Shia world and a serious heresy within Shia Islam.

All present agreed that until the recent past, most Iranian politicians could talk to the ulema and cooperate with them. As technocratic men moved to positions of power, they lost this ability, and for the modernizers the ulema ceased to exist--modern men were building modern Iran. This left an intellectual vacuum that has been filled by Marxism. Even in religious circles many of the younger mojtaheds are leftists. They have been trained by men who are fully capable of combining mystic Shi'ite doctrine with Marxist politics. The revival of Islamic philosophy has been an effort to offset the inroads Marxism has made in the universities by b o o s t i n g fourth-rate intellectuals, such as Reza Baraheni. The communists have appealed to many Western liberals and have tried to approach the West in fadish leftist terms. The Shah has stood in the middle ground until now and as such has been a target of attack from both directions. Should Khomeini triumph, the Islamic state which would follow would very quickly see the breakup of littoral Iran--Baluchis, Kurds and Turkomans splitting up to form their own mini-states.

REPRESENTATIVE OCT 20 PRODUCED SHORT DISCUSSION OF RECENT RIOTS IN KERMAN (LMI CLAIMS 20 KILLED, 50 INJURED) AND NON-MARTIAL LAW CITIES, PLUS REVIEW OF BASIC U.S. ATTITUDES. IN DISCUSSING POSSIBILITY OF ELECTIONS, HOWEVER, SOURCE WAS LESS NEGATIVE THAN IN PAST, AND WHEN EMBOFF PRESSED HARD FOR REASONS WHY LMI WAS UNWILLING TO PUSH FOR ELECTIONS, REPRESENTATIVE SUGGESTED LMI "MIGHT CONSIDER" WAYS TO INSURE ELECTIONS WERE "FREE." LMI REPRESENTATIVE SAID CONTINUED RIOTS WILL PRODUCE MILITARY REACTION, AND EMBOFF INFORMED HIM U.S. POLICY OPPOSED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN PRINCIPLE AND PRESSED HARD ON THEME THAT LMI AS WELL AS OTHER OPPOSITIONISTS WOULD BEST INSURE THEIR OWN GOALS BY WORKING TO PRODUCE SITUATION WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE GOI'S FEELING NECESSITY TO TAKE ADDITIONAL MILITARY MEASURES. LMI REPRESENTATIVE INDICATED HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK AGAIN ON OCT 31 (BUT DID NOT MENTION PROJECTED BAZARGAN TRIP TO PARIS). LMI REPRESENTATIVE WAS PLEASED THAT U.S. WAS STILL PUSHING FOR ELECTIONS AND AFTER USUAL RECITAL OF INADEQUACIES OF SHARIF-EMAMI GOVERNMENT SUGGESTED LMI FAVORED "NEUTRAL" GOVERNMENT TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS. (COMMENT: OCT 20 MEETING MAY HAVE TAKEN PLACE BEFORE SOURCE KNEW OF IMPENDING BAZARGAN TRIP, BUT HIS MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD FORMS OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY OTHER THAN REPETITION OF DEMONSTRATIONS SEEMS TO SUGGEST MORE FLEXIBILITY IN LMI THAN HERETOFORE SHOWN TO EMBOFF.)

4. PAST FEW DAYS HAVE SEEN SEVERAL STATEMENTS BY NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS WITH COMMON THEMES: A) GOVERNMENT MUST ADMIT PAST MISTAKES; B) ELECTIONS CAN ONLY BE RUN BY THOSE WHO HAVE HAD NO PART IN CORRUPTION OF PAST 25 YEARS; AND C) MILITARY RULE IN IRAN WILL LEAD TO CATASTROPHE. EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER BAKHTIAR TOLD EMBOFF KEY FACTOR IN GETTING INF TO GO ALONG WITH ANY ELECTION SCHEME WAS ASSURANCE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IMMEDIATE PAST WOULD NOT HAVE CONTROL OF PROCESS. OTHER MAJOR ISSUES FACING IRAN WERE TO STOP STRIKES AND TO ROOT OUT CORRUPTION. SHAH OUGHT TO APPEAR BEFORE PARLIAMENT AND ACKNOWLEDGE MISTAKES OF PAST AND PLEDGE RESPECT FOR CONSTITUTION AND SAY HE WOULD ACT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH. ADMITTING IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO DO THIS, BAKHTIAR NOTED THAT SHAH'S SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT OCT 19 (BEING REPORTED SEPTEL) WHICH SPOKE OF TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS GAVE EVIDENCE SHAH WAS MELLOWING IN WHAT OPPOSITION SEES AS HIS STUBBORN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS. BAKHTIAR THOUGHT BIGGEST STUMBLING BLOCK TO FREE ELECTIONS WOULD BE PROBLEM OF MEANS TO ASSURE FREE PARTICIPATION OF OPPOSITION GROUPS. AS ONE POSSIBILITY, HE SUGGESTED PERHAPS TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT HEADED BY RESPECTED JUDGE SHOULD TAKE OVER A MONTH BEFORE ELECTIONS.

5. EMBASSY COMMENT: OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES OF PAST FEW DAYS TAKEN AS A WHOLE SUGGEST THAT MORE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

MEETING WITH COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF)

DATE & PLACE: October 17, 1978, John D. Stempel's Office, Poltical Section, American Embassy, Tehran

Dr. Nasser Minatchi, treasurer of the CDHRF brought two of his colleagues, Haj Sayed Javadi Sadr (representing the Liberation Movement of Iran--LMI) and Rahmatolah Moghadam Maragheh (representing the Radical Movement) to talk about human rights with Congressman Solarz. The Committee presented a group of pictures to the Congressman and enunciated its claim that between three and four thousand people had been killed at Jaleh Square. Minatchi described Khomeini's opposition to the Shah as extremist and indicated Ayatollah Shariatmadari was a moderate. In a discussion of the possibility of elections, the trio expressed extreme suspicion of the Shah, but when asked by Solarz what would satisfy them that elections will be free, Moghadam Maragheh suggested perhaps a board of ministerial level officials with extensive opposition representation could be developed to run the elections. The trio agreed that unless a free press really evolved, elections would be meaningless. Minatchi said it was difficult for any Iranian to perceive the Sharif-Emami government as leading to political freedom since the Prime Minister himself had been a tool of the Shah for so long and corrupt as well. The Shah needed to stop interfering in all spheres and SAVAK needed to be reined in. Secular opposition was concerned about the lack of freedom and the religious opposition was concerned about the departure from Islam.

In response to a question on the opposition's foreign policy, Minatchi and Moghadam Maragheh said this would be nationalistic and would seek good relations with everyone. In response to a direct question they announced "of course, Iran would stop selling oil to Israel." Minatchi described Iran's "flirtation" with Israel as a major source of irritation to the fundamentalist religious community. Haj Sayed Javadi Sadr interjected that the government appeared to be bringing back communist students to fight the religious individuals. All described the religious movement as anti-communist and said the government was not above using communists to discredit it.

The Congressman asked the group to submit English translations of the documents to him through Dr. Stempel at the Embassy. The group readily agreed to do so. (Embassy Comment: Stempel had a chance to observe the 10 to 15 pictures the group presented and noted few, if any, were of Jaleh Square. Most seemed to have been taken during the Thursday, February 7 march on Old

Shemiran Road and Pahlavi Boulevard.) Minatchi indicated he would try to provide copies of the pictures to the Embassy.

The group thanked the Embassy profusely for allowing it to present its case to Congressman Solarz.

POL:JDStempel:lab:10-23-78

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1978 OCT 18 AM 10 37

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
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☐ CHARGE TO

10170

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10170
LIMDIS
DEPT PASS ICA

POL-6

E.O. 11652: GDS

AMB
DCM
P/M
OR
ICA

TAGS: SOPN, IR

CRU-2

SUBJECT: EXPLAINING DEMOCRACY TO IRANIAN PUBLIC

1. DURING AUDIENCE WITH SHAH OCTOBER 17, CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING U.S. COULD DO TO ASSIST IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. AFTER BRIEF REFLECTION, SHAH SAID U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES COULD DO A SERVICE BY EXPLAINING TO IRANIAN PUBLIC WHAT DEMOCRACY REALLY WAS.

2. HE SAID THAT THE IRANIAN MAN IN THE STREET HAD SOME CONFUSED IDEAS ABOUT DEMOCRACY. MANY OF THE MULLAHS WERE INTERPRETING THE QORAN'S SCRIPTURES TO SUGGEST THAT DEMOCRACY MEANT TOTAL EQUALITY IN TERMS OF POSSESSIONS, INCOME, ETC. OTHER MORE DEMAGOGIC LEADERS GAVE AN INTERPRETATION WHICH AMOUNTED TO ANARCHY, EMPHASIZING THE RIGHTS OF ANY MINORITY TO HAVE ITS VIEWS PREVAIL.

TED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
B:WHSullivan:map	10/18/78		AMB

ARANCES:

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

3-101

OPTIONAL FORM 163
(Formerly FS-413)
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3. HE HOPED WE COULD MAKE CLEAR THAT DEMOCRACY RESTS UPON ACCEPTING THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY AND UPON THE RULE OF LAW. HE FELT THIS NEEDED TO BE STATED CLEARLY AS PREPARATION FOR FREE ELECTIONS.

4. I HAVE CONSULTED WITH MY STAFF ABOUT POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN CARRY OUT THIS SUGGESTION. USICA IS EXAMINING VARIOUS PROPOSALS. A GENERAL CONCLUSION, HOWEVER, IS THAT BBC WOULD PROBABLY BE THE BEST VEHICLE TO MAKE THIS POINT. ACCORDINGLY, I HAVE RELAYED THE SUGGESTION TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AS WELL.

5. BRITISH AMBASSADOR IS INTRIGUED BY THE IDEA, BUT BECAUSE OF DELICACY OF BBC RELATIONSHIP FEELS HE HAS TO APPROACH IT WITH CARE. SINCE HE HAS BEEN SAYING THAT HE CANNOT "CONTROL" BBC, HE MUST AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT HE CAN INFLUENCE IT TO CARRY PROGRAMS HE SUGGESTS.

SULLIVAN

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January 1975
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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Khosrow EQBAL
George B. LAMBRAKIS, Political Counselor,
U.S. Embassy, Tehran

DATE & PLACE: October 21, 1978, Eqbal's Residence

SUBJECT: Internal Situation

Eqbal had visited Prime Minister Sharif-Emami the day before at the Prime Minister's request. Eqbal asserts the Prime Minister had asked if he was prepared to collaborate with him i.e., as a member of his cabinet. Eqbal said he turned this down but offered to be helpful in any other way. He said he had told the Prime Minister of how difficult he thought the situation is but also expressed his support for Sharif-Emami's strong efforts. One of Eqbal's brothers is keeper of the shrine in Qom. He is old and sick, and Sharif-Emami wants to replace him with a man who can be a good intermediary between the government and the religious leaders in Qom. The Shah has already turned down one name Sharif-Emami has submitted.

The Shah should help Sharif-Emami, Eqbal asserted. He should get out and address the people. The Shah should made a series of television appearances in which he says he is sorry for some mistakes but he is trying hard and pleads for unity in the future. Iranians will easily forgive somebody who asks their forgiveness. I expressed doubt that this was the Shah's style. Eqbal insisted a warm image by the Shah projected in TV appearances was necessary. He even had a former editor of Etelaat in the wings ready to provide the scenario for such appearances. The Prime Minister could alternate with TV appearances also.

Another way the Shah could help is to tell Ardeshir ZAHEDI and his people "from 1953" to stop what they started with the attack on the mosque in Kerman. He mentioned the similar incident in Rey and said plans

are afoot for the same thing to happen in Mazandaran, Isfahan and then Tehran. The Prime Minister was unhappy about it, and this is a very stupid course of action.

Eqbal also suggested that a type of "think tank" of five or six unofficial advisers be attached to the Prime Minister to help him and the Shah in rebuilding their public images. (It is clear he visualizes himself as one of them.)

He also claims Sharif-Emami's "chef de cabinet," who is an old friend, told him 50 soldiers are being held under arrest for having failed to shoot at the mob in Jaleh Square on September 8. (This is a sensationalist report similar to some we have heard before. We have no basis for believing it.)

Finally, Eqbal expressed general disenchantment about everything. The army is run by corrupt generals (many of them have shared in nationalized forest lands which were "sold" to them under various schemes) and cannot stand up under pressure. The Shah folds under pressure. He is indispensable for the moment, but he can never regain his previous position, and he would do best to prepare the succession of his son in the next couple of years. A succession under the queen would never work. Iranians are cynical about elections, and can never believe any are really "free." They know money will buy voters. In fact, if the government wants to spend money today it could win a great many supporters. Iranians long ago learned to bend with the wind on political matters.

Incidentally, he is not a half brother but a full brother of Manuchehr Eqbal. His father had 14 children with the same mother.

COMMENT: Eqbal runs true to form as a wheeler-dealer and rumor monger. At the same time it is clear he has access to many parts of the Iranian establishment as well as a number of European ambassadors (the French, Italian, etc.) whom he sees frequently. His information must be taken with many grains of salt.

DIST: AMB/DCM, POL, BIO, OR, ECON, NEA/IRN, NEA/RA, INR/RNA, INR/OIL/B

POL:GBLambrakis:hg

1978 OCT 22 PM 12-5

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
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10281

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	SECRET/LIMDIS

11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:
ACTION:

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

INFO: USINT BAGHDAD

SECRET TEHRAN 10281
LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PINT, PINS, IR

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: OPPOSITION ON THE MOVE: DEAL IN THE WIND?

REF: A. TEHRAN 9904 (NOTAL), B. TEHRAN 9892 (NOTAL)

-3

SUMMARY: JOINT DELEGATION LEAVES IRAN FOR PARIS OCT 21 TO SEE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. NATIONAL FRONT (INF) SPOKESMEN EMPHASIZE POSSIBILITY OF COALITION, ATTACK GOI FOR CORRUPTION AND CALL FOR "NEUTRAL" GOVERNMENT TO SUPERVISE ELECTIONS. END SUMMARY.

N2

1. PRESS MORNING OCT 22 REPORTS DEPARTURE OF ENG MEHDI BAZARGAN AND DR. NASSER MINATCHI FROM IRAN FOR PARIS TO "DISCUSS CRITICAL MATTERS" WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. BAZARGAN, WHO IS HEAD OF COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF) AS WELL AS LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI); AND MINATCHI, WHO IS CDHRF TREASURER AND CLOSE FRIEND OF AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI, APPEAR TO BE ON POLITICAL CONCILIATION MISSION (SEE

TED BY	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
:JDSampel:lab	10-22-78		DCM:CWNaas

RANCES:
:GBLambrakis
(info)

SECRET/LIMDIS
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H
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REF A). EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER TOLD POLOFF STEMPEL MORNING OCT 22 THAT INF HAS HAD REGULAR CONTACT WITH KHOMEINI EVER SINCE HE CAME TO PARIS AND HAS NOTED SOFTENING OF HIS POSITION OVER PAST WEEK. INF SOURCE SAYS KHOMEINI ATTACK ON TUDEH PARTY IN PARIS LAST WEEK WAS SHARP DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS POSITION. KHOMEINI HAS ALSO MODIFIED HIS CALL FOR AN "ISLAMIC STATE" AND IS NOW CALLING FOR RULE BASED ON "ISLAMIC JUSTICE" OR "ISLAMIC PRINCIPLES." SOURCE SAID THESE CHANGES IN POSITION, IF CONFIRMED, WOULD CLEAR WAY FOR BAZARGAN/MINATCHI MISSION TO DISCUSS SOME FORM OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN INTERNAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND KHOMEINI. SOURCE THOUGHT TEAM MUST WIN AT LEAST TACIT COOPERATION OF KHOMEINI IN ORDER TO PERMIT AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI TO COOPERATE WITH GOI.

2. COMMENT: MINATCHI HAD EARLIER TOLD EMBOFF THAT MISSION TO PARIS WOULD GO ONLY IF SHARIATMADARI GROUP FELT IT HAD SOMETHING TO OFFER. THIS, PLUS INFERENCE FROM OCT 20 DISCUSSION WITH LMI REPRESENTATIVE (DESCRIBED BELOW), SUGGESTS THAT AT LEAST THE BEGINNINGS OF A DEAL SEEM TO BE IN THE WORKS. ON THE OTHER HAND, OUR READING OF THE KHOMEINI PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS OUT OF PARIS DOES NOT LEAD US TO FULLY SHARE INF SOURCE'S OPTIMISM THAT KHOMEINI MAY BE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH LOCAL LEADERS. WOULD APPRECIATE CONTINUED REPORTING FROM PARIS ON ANY KHOMEINI STATEMENTS.

3. EARLIER SCHEDULED MEETING BETWEEN EMBOFF AND LMI

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BEING GIVEN TO SOME FORM OF "COOPERATION" WITH GOI BY INF-RELATED FORCES. WHILE THIS GOES DOWN HARD WITH OLDER OPPOSITION LEADERS, THEY ARE ALSO AMONG FIRST TO REALIZE CONSTANT STRIKES AND VIOLENCE ARE NOT DOING COUNTRY ANY GOOD. BOTH LMI AND REGULAR INF SOURCES HAVE STRESSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMMUNISTS INHERENT IN PRESENT SITUATION. BOTH ALSO CLAIM TO HAVE EVIDENCE THAT TUDEH (COMMUNIST) SUPPORTERS ARE WORKING BEHIND SCENES IN UNIVERSITIES AND ELSEWHERE, PARTICULARLY LABOR FRONT--MANY STRIKES HAVE AT LEAST ONE OR TWO "POLITICAL" DEMANDS INCLUDED AMONG ECONOMIC DEMANDS. RESULTS OF MEETINGS IN PARIS BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND OPPOSITION VISITORS, IF SUFFICIENTLY FAVORABLE TO SOME FORM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN IN-COUNTRY RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND GOI, COULD HELP START TENSION-REDUCING PROCESS.

SULLIVAN

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TELEGRAM

1978 OCT 24 AM 11: 39

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10377

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION:

POL:

AMB
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ECON-3
P/M
ICA
OR
CRU

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

7.

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10377

LIMDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJ: GOI CONCILIATION EFFORTS WITH [redacted] BAZAARIS

1. SENATOR WHO IS BEHIND-THE-SCENES CONFIDANT OF PM SHARIF-EMAMI BRIEFED POLITICAL COUNSELOR OCT 23 ON ONGOING EFFORTS TO WEAN BAZAAR MERCHANTS FROM OPPOSITION TO GOI SIDE.

2. FIRST, THERE IS THE GUILDS/("ASNAF") ORGANIZATION WHOSE LEADERSHIP SENATOR KNOWS WELL AND CAN VOUCH FOR. HE BROUGHT LEADERSHIP TO SEE PM FRIDAY OCT 20, AND THEY LEFT HAPPY. A SPECIAL COMMISSION HAS BEEN APPOINTED WHICH IS TO REPORT BACK IN 20 DAYS WITH A DRAFT LAW FOR SUBMISSION TO PARLIAMENT WHICH WILL GIVE GUILDS SUBSTANTIAL CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN AFFAIRS, AS THEY WANT. ON THE OTHER HAND, FIXING OF PRICES, PRICE CONTROL, AND ANTI-PROFITEERING EFFORTS WILL BE GOI RESPONSIBILITY, NOT THAT OF THE GUILDS AS IN RECENT PAST. IN EFFECT GUILDS WILL BECOME INDEPENDENT SYNDICATE.

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POL:GBLambrakis	10/24/78	1110	MIN:CWNaas

CLEARANCES:
ORI:

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CLASSIFICATION

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50152-101

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SINCE FORMER PRESIDENT HAS BEEN REMOVED (FOR CORRUPTION) NEW ELECTIONS WERE SCHEDULED FOR SEPT 19. INSTALLATION OF MARTIAL LAW FORCED THEIR POSTPONEMENT, BUT THEY WILL EVENTUALLY TAKE PLACE. MEANWHILE, AN HONEST, RESPECTED CIVIL SERVANT IN MINISTRY OF COMMERCE HAS BEEN ACTING AS "SUPERVISOR" ADMINISTERING THE GUILD'S AFFAIRS WITH THE HELP OF FIVE GUILD MEMBERS. SENATOR (WHO IS PROMINENT OLD-TIMER IN TEHRAN POLITICS) SAID THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH THEM; THEY WILL WORK WITH THE GOI.

3. A VERY DIFFERENT GROUP ARE SOME PROMINENT BAZAARI MERCHANTS WHO HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING (AND FOLLOWING) AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. HE PROVIDED POL COUNS A LIST OF THEM, WHICH IS BEING TRANSLATED. HE HAS NOT GIVEN UP ON THIS GROUP AND WILL KEEP WORKING ON THEM.

4. REAL TARGET NOW IS THIRD GROUP -- BAZAARIS WHO GENERALLY FOLLOW MODERATE COURSE OF AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI. THEY ARE AFRAID OF KHOMEINI'S PEOPLE BUT ARE GETTING FED UP WITH THE SITUATION AND ARE LOSING MONEY. SENATOR HAS APPOINTMENT TO LUNCH WITH THEM IN THE BAZAAR IN TWO WEEKS.

5. MEANWHILE, SENATOR IS CONTINUING TO WORK HARD ON A NUMBER OF OTHERS WHO OPPOSE GOI. HE MENTIONED A PROMINENT POLITICAL LEADER, SEHJAVADI, ON WHOM HE IS WORKING NEXT.

6. HE AGAIN CAUTIONED THAT ALL THIS INFORMATION MUST BE HELD VERY CLOSELY FOR TIME BEING. SULLIVAN

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TELEGRAM

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10378

FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION:

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AMB
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ECON-
P/M
ICA
OR
CRU

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10378

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJ: ELEMENTS OF GOI AGREEMENT WITH RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION

SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER'S CONFIDANT HAS PROVIDED DETAILS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN PM AND MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADER AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI AS WELL AS MEHDI BAZARGAN, LEADER OF ONE FACTION IN OPPOSITION NATIONAL FRONT. HE SAID HE HAD NOT RPT NOT INFORMED PM HE WAS GIVING POL COUNS THIS INFORMATION AND ASKED IT BE KEPT EXTREMELY CONFIDENTIAL. ITS SENSITIVITY COULD ACCOUNT FOR FACT OUR INFORMATION FROM SEVERAL OTHER SOURCES TENDS TO CONTRADICT IT. END SUMMARY

1. SENATOR WHO IS CLOSE BEHIND-the-SCENES COLLABORATOR OF PM SHARIF-EMAMI SOUGHT OUT POLITICAL COUNSELOR OCT 23 TO BRIEF HIM ON RECENTLY CONCLUDED AGREEMENT BETWEEN SHARIF-

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EMAMI AND REPRESENTATIVES OF SHARIATMADARI'S MODERATE RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION. P.M. AGREED TO 9 OF 12 OPPOSITION DEMANDS IN RETURN FOR WHICH HE WAS PROMISED QUIET COOPERATION BY THAT (IMPORTANT) SECTION OF THE OPPOSITION.

2. IN ADDITION, OPPOSITION LEADERS BAZARGAN AND MINATCHI HAVE GONE TO FRANCE TO TALK TO KHOMEINI. CONTRARY TO COVER STORY THEY GAVE PRESS, THEIR REAL MISSION IS TO SEE IF KHOMEINI WILL AGREE TO RETURN TO IRAN IN 9-10 MONTHS ON THE BASIS OF HIS RESPECTING THE CONSTITUTION, I.E., CEASING HIS DEMANDS FOR OVERTHROW OF THE MONARCHY, ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, ETC. IF KHOMEINI AGREES, CHANGE IN HIS PUBLIC POSTURE WILL BE GRADUAL. BAZARGAN AND MINATCHI HAVE ALLOWED THEMSELVES 10 DAYS IN FRANCE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK, XXXRRRRRR.

3. DEMANDS WERE PRESENTED IN SECRET MEETING WITH PM BY BAZARGAN, MINATCHI, AND SHARIATMADARI'S SON, WITH OUR SOURCE, WHO ARRANGED THE WHOLE THING, PRESENT. (NATIONAL FRONT LEFT-WINGER SAHABI WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED TO COME TOO, BUT HE DID NOT SHOW, OUR SOURCE ADDS.) WE HAVE BEEN PROMISED COPY OF WRITTEN DEMANDS. MEANWHILE FOLLOWING ARE A REPRODUCED FROM SENATOR'S MEMORY. NINE DEMANDS ACCEPTED ARE:

A) BAZARGAN, MINATCHI AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS WANT TO FORM THEIR OWN PARTY. THEY REQUESTED NON-INTERFERENCE FROM GOI AND POSITIVE SUPPORT IF POSSIBLE. PM PROMISED

SUPPORT.

(B) REQUEST THAT RELIGIOUS MEETING PLACE ("HOSSEINIYE") NEAR OLD SHEMIRAN ROAD BE ALLOWED TO REOPEN. GRANTED.

(C) BAZARGAN-MINATCHI HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION BE FORMALLY ALLOWED TO REGISTER. GRANTED.

(D) COMPLETE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. GRANTED. (THIS PREDATED RECENT JOURNALISTS' STRIKE WHICH RESULTED IN GOI CEDING TO JOURNALISTS' DEMANDS.)

(E) ROYAL FAMILY TO STAY OUT OF ALL BUSINESS AND GENERALLY BE KEPT IN TIGHT REIN. PM SAID HE ENTHUSIASTICALLY AGREED AND WOULD PRESS FOR THIS.

(F) NEXT SUMMER'S FREE ELECTIONS NOT BE POSTPONED. GRANTED.

(G) SPECIAL LAW TO SPEED TRIALS FOR CORRUPTION. PM AGREED TO ASK THAT MAJLIS PASS SUCH A LAW BUT POINTED OUT IT MUST BE MODERATE, NOT SO DRASTIC AS TO UNDER-MINE GOI.

(H) SHAH TO REIGN, NOT RULE, AND THUS NOT INTERFERE IN DAILY GOI BUSINESS. PM AGREED, NOTING HOWEVER THAT SHAH WOULD ALWAYS REMAIN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES. HE INDICATED HE IS HAVING HIS OWN PROBLEMS WITH SHAH AND THE ARMY AT PRESENT AND SAID HE COULD GO NO FURTHER UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS.

(I) MORE RELIGIOUS MATERIALS IN SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS. PM AGREED TO INSERTION OF THINGS PEOPLE LIKE BAZARGAN,

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MINATCHI, AND SHARIATMADARI BELIEVE IN, NOT A LOT OF THE JUNK PREACHED BY SOME MULLAHS.

4. THREE DEMANDS NOT ACCEPTED BY PM ARE:

A) IMMEDIATE END TO MARTIAL LAW. PM SAID HE WOULD TRY TO END IT BEFORE SIX MONTHS IF POSSIBLE.

B) IMMEDIATE DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT. PM SAID HE MIGHT LATER CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF DISSOLVING PARLIAMENT ONE OR TWO MONTHS EARLIER THAN NEXT JUNE AND GOING INTO ELECTORAL PERIOD THEN.

C) RELEASE OF ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS. PM POINTED OUT UPCOMING (SHAH'S BIRTHDAY) RELEASE OF ALL EXCEPT THOSE CONVICTED OF SPECIFIC CRIMES OF MURDER, TERRORISM, ETC.

5. GROUP EXPRESSED INTEREST IN CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON BEHALF OF AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI. HOWEVER, MANY PEOPLE ARE CLAIMING TO SPEAK FOR HIM THESE DAYS. PM SHOULD KNOW THAT SHARIATMADARI'S ONLY LEGITIMATE REPS WOULD BE EITHER MINATCHI OR ABBASSI (A CLOSE CONFIDANT OF SHARIATMADARI'S). THEY WOULD GO EITHER DIRECTLY TO THE PM HIMSELF OR TO THE SENATOR INTERMEDIARY, NO ONE ELSE.

6. COMMENT: NOT CLEAR TO US WHY SENATOR CHOSE THIS MOMENT TO REVEAL DETAILS TO EMBASSY EXCEPT THAT HE SEEKS LONG-TERM GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH US (HE SAID HE WAS DOING THIS "FOR MY COUNTRY") AND MIGHT PREFER TO TELL US FIRST

IN CASE WE WERE TO LEARN OF IT FROM THE OPPOSITION. TRUST OF THIS REPORT RUNS CONTRARY TO INFORMATION FROM VARIOUS OTHER SOURCES WHICH DENY THAT ANY AGREEMENT HAS YET BEEN CONCLUDED, THOUGH CONFIRMING AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI IS ANXIOUS FOR ONE. EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF INFORMATION AT THIS TIME COULD ACCOUNT FOR CONFLICTING STORIES.

SULLIVAN

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OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H)a)
January 1975
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TELEGRAM

1978 OCT 29 PM 12

INDICATE
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10510

FROM: AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10510

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJ: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
REF: A) TEHRAN 10378; B) TEHRAN 10377

1. SENATOR CLOSE TO PM SHARIF-EMAMI (REFTELS) GOT BACK IN TOUCH WITH POLITICAL COUNSELOR ~~MOX~~ OCT 29, THROUGH INTERMEDIARY, TO SAY HE HAD JUST SEEN PM, WHO WAS HOLDING FIRM DESPITE RUMORS AROUND TOWN THAT HIS GOVT IS ABOUT TO FOLD. PM HAD TALKED WITH SHARIATMADARI. LATTER IS SENDING HIS SON AND SON-in-LAW ABBASSI TO PARIS (PRESUMABLY TO DISCUSS FURTHER WITH KHOMEINI).

2. HE ALSO SAID THAT MINISTER FOR EXECUTIVE AFFAIRS AZMOUN HAS RESIGNED AND HIS RESIGNATION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED. (RESIGNATION WAS DENIED IN PRESS TODAY.) HE IS OCCUPYING HIS OFFICE UNTIL REPLACEMENT IS FOUND. REPLACEMENT HAS NOW BEEN FOUND AND RESIGNATION WILL BE ANNOUNCED SOON. (THIS SEEMS TO FIT IN WITH REPORT FROM ANOTHER

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SHARIF-EMAMI CONFIDANT WHO TOLD US THAT PM WAS UNHAPPY TO HAVE 11 of HIS ORIGINAL MINISTERS DICTATED BY SHAH, INCLUDING THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AND THAT HE WOULD WORK AT REMOVING THEM. AZMOUN WAS THE ONE PM IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE OBJECTED TO THE MOST, AMIN (INDUSTRY AND MINES) AND KANI (ENDOWMENT FUND) AT THE LEAST.)

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CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Shahriar Ahy, Bank Omeran
Majid Tehranian, Iranian Communications and Development Institute(ICDI)
Carl Clement, Iranian Desk Officer
Stephen Cohen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, H/A
George Lambrakis, Political Counselor
John Stempel, Political Officer

DATE & PLACE: November 6 - Iranian Communications and Development Institute(ICDI)

SUBJECT : Iranian Political Situation

DISTRIBUTION: AMB/DCM, POL, POL/M, ECON, OR, USIS, BIO, AMCONSULS SHIRAZ, ISFAHAN, TABRIZ, NEA/IRN, INR/[illegible]

In the course of discussion over two and a half hours Ahy and Tehranian provided some interesting observations on the political/sociological aspects of the present Iranian crisis. Cohen discussed U.S. human rights policy, in terms of its impact on Iran and the group debated whether Tehran's political crisis would have emerged without the stimulus of U.S. human rights' policy.

Roots of Present Situation - Ahy suggested that the Carter Administration's advocation of human rights coupled with the Iranian government's desire for political liberation, produced a situation in which the government of Iran eased off on political controls at the time that economic discontent was building up. As a result of some 10 to 15 years repression of political opposition movements such as the National Front and the religious movement had gone underground. The opposition had to turn to religion, and over the past few years religious influence in Iranian life had grown stronger. Tehranian said an ICDI study showed that 60 percent of university students were in the most dogmatic range on an ideological measure taken two to three years ago. Those who opposed the present regime found themselves drawn to religious opposition, even the guerrilla movements which began in 1971.

Present Developments - Clement suggested that the U.S. human rights policy was perhaps a minor factor; that the removal via political liberalization of the fear of SAVAK coupled with the fact that the initial guerrilla movements had shown the system was vulnerable; that SAVAK came to be viewed as less than perfect. The group agreed that liberalization had led immediately to the fight against corruption and rooting it out. Ahy said a better way to have handled liberalization would have been a sequential process. The Shah could have made many moves from a position of strength rather than being forced into concessions under pressure.

The Party Structure - Discussion turned to the evolution of political parties. Tehranian and Ahy agreed that the Resurgence Party (RPPI) was a disaster. It simply could not be built or formed properly. RPPI offered no career incentives, and in its later stages there was no hope of influencing government policy. Ahy thought the Shah had been caught between the two concepts of the Party. The Party, as an organization (a group of office workers motivated by self interest) and as a critic of government which would offer its members a chance to criticize and influence government policy, failed.

Clement said the Iranian parliament probably would not lend itself to party building in the Western sense. He suggested that Iranians are basically authoritarian, alternating between extremes of passivism and brutality. The brutality had been evident in the controlled activities of SAVAK in the early 1970's. The passivism was probably reflected in the competition for the favor of the monarch or the leader which was the hallmark of court politics. Even in the era of Mardom and Iran Novin parties, it was useful to picture the parties as competing for the favor of the Shah.

Evolution of the Shah in Iran - Tehranian and Ahy made the interesting point that there had been real affection for the Shah when he was a weak Monarch beset by internal and external disturbances. Clement suggested Iranians saw power as coming from essentially a powerless man. The group agreed Ayatollah Khomeini used this tactic and that the Shah's speech announcing military government was a return to this form which he had not used since 1949. For the first time in many years, the Shah spoke in a subdued voice with a more humble tone. His use of the Iranian "I" rather than "we" in when he committed himself to constitutional rule strongly implied his intention to be a constitutional monarch. In response to a question, Tehranian readily agreed that crying might have helped the Shah's case further, but in any event his public attitude during the speech definitely gave Persians the impression that he had taken the lesson of the past here to heart.

While some of the participants might disagree with some of the views outlined above, all the Americans felt this was an interesting insight to the Iranian political mind. Ahy and Tehranian are mid-30s, Iranian intellectuals who have given considerable thought to the political process.

POL:JDStempel:lab:11-9-78

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

SECRET TEHRAN 10883

LIMDIS

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION SPLIT ON REACTION TO SHAH'S SPEECH
REF: STATE 10835

SUMMARY: IN COMPANY OF WASHINGTON VISITORS EMBOFFS SPOKE WITH DR. MINATCHI AS WELL AS LIBER[redacted]ATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) LEADERS. THEIR REACTIONS TO MILITARY TAKEOVER ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT. MINATCHI BELIEVES STEP MAY WORK IF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS SUCCEEDED BY NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHIN SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE. LMI LEADERSHIP MAINTAINS ABSOLUTELY RIGID VERBAL ADHERENCE TO KHOMEINI LINE AND INSISTS SHAH MUST GO. LMI WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN COALITION GOVERNMENT UNLESS KHOMEINI APPROVED IT AND CLAIMS "PEOPLE" WILL NEVER ACCEPT MILITARY GOVERNMENT. LMI CLAIMS NO ONE WILL PARTICIPATE IN COALITION GOVERNMENT IF KHOMEINI CONTINUES TO OPPOSE IT. END SUMMARY.

1. VISITING H.A. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY COHEN, IRAN DESK OFFIC

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CLEMENT AND EMBOFF STEMPEL SPOKE WITH DR. NASSER MINATCHI NOV 6 IN WAKE OF ANNOUNCEMENT BY SHAH THAT TEMPORARY MILITARY GOVERNMENT WAS TAKING OVER (REFTEL). MINATCHI SAID MOVE MIGHT WORK AS LONG AS MILITARY GOVERNMENT REMAINS IN OFFICE A SHORT TIME AND DOES NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD PROHIBIT RAPID EMERGENCE OF A NEW NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT AS THE SHAH PROMISED. MINATCHI MADE SUGGESTION THAT SHAH MIGHT EVEN INTRODUCE A DEPUTY TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A GOVERNMENT OR DEVELOP SOME FORM OF A REGENCY COUNCIL OR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO SET FORTH OR RATIFY A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BRING ALONG THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS (HE MEANT THE MODERATES) IN SOME SORT OF ARRANGEMENT. MOST SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF HIS DISCUSSION WAS HIS PERCEPTION THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR MANEUVER. MINATCHI WILL BE SEEING AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI IN QOM NOV 7. HE IS STILL LOOKING FOR USG ENDORSEMENT OF HIS EFFORTS AND PROPOSALS.

2. OF EQUAL INTEREST WAS MINATCHI'S DESCRIPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND ENG. MEHDI BAZARGAN OF LMI AND HIMSELF. MINATCHI SAID KHOMEINI MAINTAINED A VERY HARD AND FIRM POSITION (HE SPOKE OF THIS WITH OBVIOUS PERSONAL DISAPPOINTMENT). KHOMEINI INSISTS ON THREE POINTS: 1) SHAH MUST ABDICATE AND LEAVE COUNTRY; 2) MONARCHIAL DYNASTIES SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED; 3) THE REGIME MUST BE A REPUBLIC WITH THE CHIEF OF STATE ALWAYS ELECTED. KHOMEINI

SAID HE HAD A PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE. MINATCHI SAID AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI'S SON AND SON-IN-LAW HAD GONE TO PARIS TO GIVE KHOMEINI A LETTER FROM SHARIATMADARI REQUESTING KHOMEINI'S PROGRAM IN WRITTEN FORM. [redacted] SHARIATMADARI EXPECTS TO RECEIVE AN ANSWER AT THE END OF THIS [redacted] OR EARLY NEXT WEEK. HE WILL POSTPONE DECISION UNTIL [redacted] TIME.

3. FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY MINATCHI AND IMPLIED BY OTHER NATIONAL FRONT LEADER BAKHTIAR A DAY EARLIER IS IN SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST TO SHARP HARDLINE ATTITUDE SHOWN BY NATIONAL FRONT LEADERSHIP GROUP COMPOSED OF ENG. BAZARGAN, PROFESSOR SAHABI AND MOHAMMAD TAVAKOLI, WHICH MET WITH COHEN, CLEMENT, STEMPEL AND POLCOUNS LAMBRAKIS EVENING NOV 6. INTRODUCTORY MEETING INCLUDED INFORMATION THAT BAZARGAN HAD GONE TO PARIS VIA LONDON WHERE HE VISITED AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL WHICH IS EXPECTED TO SEND A TEAM TO IRAN BY NEXT WEEK TO WORK ON THE PRISONER SITUATION. THE LMI TEAM THOUGHT THERE WERE MORE THAN 600 POLITICAL PRISONERS REMAINING.

4. THE LMI TEAM THEN NOTED THAT THERE WERE TWO UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE PRESENT CASE: A DISTINCT MAJORITY OF IRANIANS DO NOT WANT THE SHAH AND HIS REGIME, AND A CRUCIAL MAJORITY OF THOSE IN OPPOSITION CONSIDER KHOMEINI AS THEIR LEADER AND ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT. THE

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SHAH IS OVERWHELMINGLY HATED. THOSE, INCLUDING SOME COUNTRIES WHO SEEK STABILITY IN IRAN, ARE NOT CORRECT IN THINKING THE SHAH CAN MAINTAIN IT. THEY SHOULD CONSIDER THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. CLEMENT DISPUTED LMI FIGURES ON MAJORITY OPPOSING SHAH, BUT GROUP REMAINED ADAMANT AND BAZARGAN INSISTED KHOMEINI IS THE LEADER OF IRANIANS BECAUSE OF HIS CLEAR POSITION AGAINST THE SHAH. HE SAID EVEN SHARIATMADARI'S FOLLOWERS DEFER TO KHOMEINI ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS. IN RESPONSE TO LAMBRAKIS ON WHETHER PEOPLE FAVOR AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, SAHABI SAID PEOPLE WANT ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT NOT NECESSARILY AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.

[redacted]. THE LMI THOUGHT A COMMITTEE SELECTED BY THE PEOPLE SHOULD REPLACE THE DYNASTY TEMPORARILY AND SHOULD RULE UNTIL AFTER FREE ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD. WITH REFERENCE TO PRESENT EVENTS, BAZARGAN SAID THE ISSUE WAS CLEAR: EITHER THE SHAH GOES OR A MAJORITY OF IRANIANS WILL HAVE TO BE KILLED. THE LMI EXPECTS NOTHING BUT KILLING FROM THE MILITARY GOVT. BAZARGAN SHARPLY CHALLENGED THE SHAH'S STATEMENT THAT HE HAD BEEN SEEKING A COALITION GOVT. BAZARGAN SAID THE SHAH WISHED TO MAINTAIN MILITARY AND POLICE UNDER HIS CONTROL TO INTERFERE WITH GOVT. THIS IS WHY THE DEAL WITH AMINI FELL THROUGH. HE ADDED AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT THAT EVEN SHARIF-EMAMI WOULD HAVE HAD MORE LUCK IF HE HAD SOME CONTROL OVER THE ARMY.

5. LAMBRAKIS PROBED THE LMI'S INSISTANCE THAT THE SHAH LEAVE AS THE FIRST STAGE OF ANY AGREEMENT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE SHAH COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO GIVE EVERYTHING UP AT ONCE, AND [redacted] THE SHAH WAS VALUABLE IN GUARANTEEING DELIVERY OF ANY POTENTIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE OPPOSITION. BAZARGAN REITERATED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY OUT OF DEADLOCK UNLESS THE SHAH LEFT. HE SAW A STAGE BY STAGE PROCESS WITH THE SHAH LEAVING AND WITH OTHERS TAKING OVER TO WORK OUT A GOVT ACCEPTABLE TO KHOMEINI. (WHEN ASKED WHAT THIS MEANT, BAZARGAN SAID THAT KHOMEINI WAS JUST NOW BEGINNING TO WORK OUT SOME SORT OF PRESCRIPTION ON WHAT SORT OF GOVT IRAN WANTS TO HAVE)

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SAHABI SAID THE FIRST STAGE CLEARLY MUST BE THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE. THE SECOND STAGE WOULD BE FREE ELECTIONS OF PEOPLE TO PARLIAMENT AND THE EVENTUAL EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC GOVT. LAMBRAKIS ASKED WHAT WOULD PREVENT SOME COLONEL FROM TAKING OVER AFTER THE SHAH LEFT AND SHOOTING ALL THE OPPOSITIONISTS. BAZARGAN REMAINED STEADFAST AND IN EFFECT DENIED THE SITUATION COULD COME ABOUT. THE SUGGESTION, HOWEVER, APPEARED TO MAKE HIM SOMEWHAT UNEASY.

7. IN RESPONSE TO COHEN'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING HOPEFUL IN THE SHAH'S SPEECH TO THE NATION, BAZARGAN (SOMEWHAT CONTRADICTORILY) SAID THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS WELL ORGANIZED AND WELL PREPARED AND WOULD HAVE BEEN "EXACTLY WHAT WE WANTED" WITHOUT THE MILITARY GOVT. IT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IF THERE WAS GOOD WILL, BUT THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT BELIEVE THE SHAH'S PROMISES, EVEN HIS COMMITMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. [redacted] CLEMENT THEN ASKED WHETHER THE LMI WOULD PARTICIPATE IN A COALITION GOVT THAT MIGHT EMERGE. BAZARGAN REPLIED THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE MILITARY GOVT AND THAT A COALITION GOVT WOULD NOT EMERGE; IN FACT NO GOVT COULD EMERGE IF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI OPPOSED IT, AND THE SHAH WOULD FIND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVINCE ANY OTHER OPPOSITIONISTS TO FORM A COALITION GOVT.

8. EMBASSY COMMENT: BOTH EMBOFFS AND VISITORS WERE STRUCK BY EXTREME HARDLINE TAKEN BY LMI LEADERSHIP.

CLEARLY BAZARGAN'S REACTION TO KHOMEINI'S DEMANDS WAS TO GO DOWN THE LINE, WHILE MINATCHI'S WAS TO LOOK AROUND FOR A WAY AROUND THEM. NONE OF THE LMI LEADERS DISPLAYED ANY OF THE LIMITED FLEXIBILITY PRESENT IN PAST CONVERSATIONS WITH EMBOFF. IN FACT, AS ONE VISITOR NOTED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THIS GROUP OF LMI LEADERS BEING ABLE TO GOVERN A LARGE, MODERN NATION LIKE IRAN. CONVERSATION TOOK ON TRAPPINGS OF IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE RATHER THAN POLITICAL DISCUSSION.

9. ABOVE CLEARED BY ALL USG PARTICIPANTS.

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TELEGRAM

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FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	SECRET

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
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AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: KHOMEINI'S REACTIONS

1. AS OF THIS MOMENT, ALL IRAN IS WAITING TO HEAR HOW AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL REACT TO THE SHAH'S SPEECH AND THE INSTALLATION OF A MILITARY GOVT. WE HAVE SEEN NOTHING AS YET ON THE TICKERS FROM PARIS.

2. HOWEVER, BRITISH EMBASSY SAYS IT HAS TWO CONFLICTING REPORTS FROM PARIS. REUTERS SAYS KHOMEINI HAS CALLED ON HIS FOLLOWERS TO "CONTINUE RESISTANCE." BBC WORLD SERVICE SAYS HE HAS CALLED FOR "ARMED REBELLION." BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAS CALLED FCO TO TRY TO GET BBC TO AVOID IRRESPONSIBILITY ON ITS PERSIAN LANGUAGE SERVICE, WHICH WILL NEXT BROADCAST AT 1530. IT WOULD

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BE PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE FOR BBC TO REPORT "ARMED REBELLION" IF THAT INDEED IS INCORRECT.

3. KHOMEINI'S CALLS FOR RESISTANCE WILL POSE A CRITICAL SITUATION HERE. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE LOCAL CLERGY WILL BREAK WITH HIM AND URGE MODERATION OR WHETHER THEY WILL ENDORSE HIS RADICAL CALLS. THAT DECISION WILL DETERMINE NATURE OF POLITICAL FUTURE HERE.

4. IN ANY EVENT, IF KHOMEINI'S CALLS ARE LOCALLY HEEDED, WE CAN EXPECT ANTI-FOREIGN QUOTIENT TO ITS CONTENT. LARGE U.S. COMMUNITY HERE WOULD BE VULNERABLE. THEREFORE, WE STRONGLY SUGGEST ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR MILITARY GOVT WHICH U.S. OFFICIALS FEEL THEY MUST ~~ARTICULATE~~ ARTICULATE IN WASHINGTON BE CLEARED WITH THIS EMBASSY IN ADVANCE, IF THAT IS AT ALL POSSIBLE.

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: EGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, IR
SUBJ: OPPOSITION'S PLAN FOR SHAH'S ABDICATION

SUMMARY: BRITISH EMBASSY AND WE HAVE BEEN PRESENTED WITH LATEST OPPOSITION PROPOSAL FOR SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. IT ENVISAGES SHAH'S ABDICATION, REGENCY COUNCIL, FREE ELECTIONS, AND CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO CONSIDER CONTINUATION OF MONARCHY OR CHANGE TO OTHER FORM OF GOVT. BRITISH AND WE HAVE BEEN ASKED TO PRESENT THIS TO THE SHAH. END SUMMARY

1. CIVIL RIGHTS-RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION LEADER MINATCHI APPROACHED BRITISH AMBASSADOR NOV 4 AND HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH BRITISH HEAD OF CHANCERY YESTERDAY, NOV 8, TO PRESENT PLAN FOR CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION OF PRESENT SITUATION. MINATCHI REPEATED ELEMENTS OF HIS PLAN TO POL COUNS NOV 9 AFTER BRITISH BRIEFED US ON THE APPROACH.

2. SOLUTION VISUALIZES ABDICATION AND DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH.

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REGENCY COUNCIL HEADED BY QUEEN OR SOMEONE ELSE THE SHAH MIGHT APPOINT WOULD BE FLASHED OUT WITH ~~THE~~ AT LEAST FOUR CIVILIAN AND THREE MILITARY. AMONG THE CIVILIANS WOULD BE REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AS WELL AS, POSSIBLY, PRIME MINISTER AND CHIEF OF PARLIAMENT. THREE MILITARY WOULD INCLUDE RETIRED GENERALS SUCH AS JAM, GARZAN, MADANI, OR AKHAVI. THEIR PRESENCE IS INTENDED TO MAINTAIN COOPERATION OF THE MILITARY IN THIS PROCESS. ELECTIONS WOULD FOLLOW SHORTLY, AND ~~CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY~~ IT WOULD MEET TO DECIDE ~~XXXXXXX~~ IF ANY, ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION NEEDED AMENDMENT.

3. MINATCHI NOTED THERE HAS BEEN TALK OF REFERENDUM ON CONTINUATION OF MONARCHY, BUT OPPOSITION DID NOT LIKE THE IDEA GIVEN PAST EXPERIENCE IN IRAN. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WOULD BEGIN WITH 1906 CONSTITUTION AND SEE WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ADD OR CHANGE.

4. HAVING JUST RETURNED FROM QOM, MINATCHI SAID HE HAS OBTAINED AGREEMENT OF SHARIAT-MADARI AND HIS FELLOW AYATOLLAHS GOLPAYEGANI AND MARASCHI TO THESE PROPOSALS. HE HAS ALSO OBTAINED AGREEMENT OF BAZARGAN (WITH WHOM MINATCHI IS VERY CLOSE) AND EXPECTED OTHERS SUCH AS SANJABI TO ~~XXXXXX~~ FALL QUICKLY INTO LINE, AS THIS REPRESENTED WHAT THEY WANTED. WHEN POL COUNS SUGGESTED THIS REPRESENTS CONSIDERABLE HARDENING IN THE POSITION OF THE MODERATE OPPOSITION (KHOMEINI ASIDE), MINATCHI ONLY PARTIALLY

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ADMITTED IT DID. HE SAID SHARIAT-MADARI AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT APPLYING 1906 CONSTITUTION. TECHNICALLY, THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE 1907 AMENDMENTS. IT IS 1925 THOSE AMENDMENTS WHICH SPEAK OF PERPETUAL REIGN BY PAHLAVI DYNASTY. HE ALSO ADMITTED IT WAS THOSE AMENDMENTS THAT INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR FIVE MULLAHS TO APPROVE ALL ACTS OF PARLIAMENT. THUS, MINATCHI IMPLIED THAT SHARIAT-MADARI HAS BEEN TALKING ABOUT AN END TO THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY ALL ALONG.

5. MINATCHI WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT HE WAS PRESENTING THIS PLAN TO BRITISH AND US, SO THAT THE TWO AMBASSADORS COULD PRESENT IT TO THE SHAH AND URGE THAT HE ACCEPT IT. OPPOSITION WAS PREPARED TO PUT PROPOSAL TO THE SHAH DIRECTLY, BUT ONLY AFTER BRITISH AND AMERICANS HAD PREPARED HIM FOR IT. HE IS A STRONG DICTATOR, MINATCHI SAID, AND WOULD CERTAINLY DISMISS PLAN OUT OF HAND IF OPPOSITION PRESENTED IT TO HIM FIRST. SINCE SHAH RELIES HEAVILY ON CONTINUING SUPPORT FROM USG AND BRITISH, HIS CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL WOULD BE GREATLY FACILITATED IF THOSE GOVTS SHOWED SUPPORT FOR IT. OPPOSITION WISHED REASSURE USG AND UK THAT IT CONSIDERS THEM ITS FRIENDS TOO, AND RECOGNIZES THEY HAVE BASIC INTERESTS TO PROTECT IN IRAN.

6. POL COUNS SAID HE WAS HAPPY TO HAVE PLANS SPELLED OUT IN THIS DETAIL AND WOULD OF COURSE REPORT IT TO AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON. HE THOUGHT BRITISH HEAD OF

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CHANCERY HAD GIVEN PRELIMINARY NEGATIVE REACTION, WHICH IN ALL HONESTY POL COUNS THOUGHT WOULD BE USG REACTION TOO. MINATCHI ~~XX~~ AWARE THAT HE ~~XX~~ ASKING US AND UK TO INTERVENE IN INTERNAL POLITICAL PROCESS IN IRAN. HE DOUBTED ~~XXXXXXXXXXX~~ US AND UK GOVTS WOULD WISH TO DO SO, OR TO UNDERTAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY SUCH A STEP WOULD ENTAIL IN GUARANTEEING A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME FROM THE POINT OF VIEW FROM ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, AND THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. BEYOND THAT HE ONLY VENTURED TO SAY, IN A PERSONAL WAY, THAT THE PROPOSAL SEEMED TO HIM ILL-TIMED. WITH THE SHAH HAVING BEEN UNABLE TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A COALITION GOVT ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO, AND HAVING AUTHORIZED INSTALLATION OF A MILITARY GOVT, PROPOSAL SEEMS TO BE EITHER TOO EARLY OR TOO LATE. MINATCHI SMILED HIS UNDERSTANDING AND DID NOT TAKE ISSUE.

7. COMMENT: PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS AMOUNTS OF COURSE TO POLITE INVITATION THAT SHAH SURRENDER. IT INCORPORATES ALL ELEMENTS OF BEST POSSIBLE RESULT FROM OPPOSITION'S POINT OF VIEW. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION OPPOSITION IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE BACK FROM THIS PROPOSAL VERY MUCH. WE ~~CAN~~ CANNOT FORESEE SHAH GIVING IT SERIOUS CONSIDERATION UNLESS MILITARY GOVT FAILS TO RE-ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER AND HE IS LEFT WITHOUT ANY OTHER VIABLE OPTIONS IN HIS DESIRE TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN IRAN.

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January 1975
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

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

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FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL

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TAGS:
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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONGEN DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
USCINEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11060

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: POLITICAL SECURITY SITUATION: NATIONAL FRONT LE
ARRESTED

1. SHORTLY BEFORE SCHEDULED PRESS CONFERENCE NATIONAL FRO
LEADERS SANJABI AND FOROULAR WERE ARRESTED PERSONALLY BY
GENERAL OVEISI. NATIONAL FRONTER BAKHTIAR AND LEADING
BAZAARIS WHO WERE PRESENT, WERE NOT ARRESTED. ACCORDING T

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LOCAL NEWSMAN, BAKHTIAR TOLD THOSE PRESSMEN WHO WERE ASSEMBLED THAT PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO ANNOUNCE ALLIANCE WITH KHOMEINI AND DEMAND FOR REFERENDUM WHETHER IRAN WILL BE A MONARCH/OR REPUBLIC. WE EXPECT BBC TO CARRY ALL OF THIS SHORTLY.

2. MRS. SANJABI TOLD PRESS PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO CALL FOR GENERAL STRIKE ON SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 12.

3. IMI MEMBERS, WHO MET WITH POL OFFICER THIS EVENING, TOOK HARD LINE, DEMANDING THAT SHAH ABDICATE AND THAT AN ADVISORY (REGENCY) COUNCIL BE ESTABLISHED.

4. MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES HAVE ISSUED PUBLIC DIRECTIVE THAT MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS WILL BE STRICTLY ENFORCED NOVEMBER 12. SECURITY AUTHORITIES EARLIER IN DAY MADE SIMILAR STATEMENTS TO US.

5. COMMENT: OPPOSITION AND GOVERNMENT AS OF MOMENT APPEAR HEADED FOR CONFRONTATION TOMORROW OR NEAR FUTURE.

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FROM	CLASSIFICATION
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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

11228

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, IR
SUBJ: KARIM SANJABI
REF: STATE 289279

DEPUTY MINISTER OF COURT BAHADORI MADE INQUIRIES AT OUR REQUEST YESTERDAY AND INFORMS US SANJABI IS IN COMFORTABLE CIRCUMSTANCES WHILE UNDER ARREST. HEAD OF SAVAK GENERAL MOGHADAM, WHO WAS SANJABI'S LAW STUDENT, HAS PERSONALLY INDICATED TO US THE SAME THING. WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS ARREST UNDER MARTIAL LAW REGULATION SECTION 5 ON NOV 11 WHEN HE WAS ILLEGALLY TRYING TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE.

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11227

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, SOPN, IR
SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON IRAN
REF: A) STATE 289846; B) TEHRAN 11165

1. BBC PERSIAN LANGUAGE RENDITION OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON IRAN AS HEARD BY SEVERAL EMBASSY SOURCES TRANSLATE "VILLAINS" AS, ROUGHLY,"SCUM". THIS HAS RAISED HACKLES AMONG THE OPPOSITION, WE HEAR. PROMINENT RELIGIOUS LEADER SHARIAT-MADARI IN QOM REPORTEDLY CALLED SAVAK CHIEF GENERAL MOGHADAM ABOUT THIS MATTER. WE ARE THEREFORE HASTENING TO DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF PRESIDENTIAL TEXT (USING THE CORRECT WORD "VIOLENCE" IN PLACE OF "VILLAINS") TO PEOPLE, INCLUDING GENERAL MOGHADAM, WHO WILL SEE THAT OPPOSITION LEADERS KNOW WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID.

2. THIS AGAIN POINTS OUT URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW OF WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPTS BEFORE RPT BEFORE THEY ARE RELEASED.

SULLIVAN

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PINS, SHUM, IR
SUBJECT: KARIM SANJABI

LIMDIS

REF: A. STATE 289279, B. TEHRAN 11228

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SUMMARY: SANJABI IN MILITARY PRISON UNDER MARTIAL LAW CHARGE, IN GOOD HEALTH AND HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH GOI. END SUMMARY.

1. WE HAVE REPORTED THAT COURT MINISTRY SOURCE CONFIRMED TO POLCOUNS MORNING NOV 12 SANJABI IS BEING HELD UNDER ARTICLE FIVE OF MARTIAL LAW.

2. DR. MINATCHI, TREASURER OF IRANIAN COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHRF) TOLD EMBOFF STEMPEL LATER ON NOV 16, IN CONFIDENCE, THAT SANJABI IS IN TEHRAN'S JAMSHID-ABAD MILITARY PRISON "ALONG WITH ALL THE OTHER EX-MINISTERS WHO WERE ARRESTED." HIS WIFE VISITS HIM REGULARLY. MINATCHI DESCRIBED CONDITIONS AS "VERY GOOD." IN FACT, MINATCHI SAID SANJABI HAD BEEN HAVING CONVERSATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND DESCRIBED SITUATION AS "VERY SATISFACTORY." HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT FURTHER TO EMBOFF ON SATURDAY, NOV 25.

3. EMBASSY WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO PASSING ABOVE TO

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SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN WITHOUT REFERENCE TO SOURCE AND OMITTING FACT THAT SANJABI IS TALKING WITH GOVERNMENT. PERHAPS DEPARTMENT ITSELF COULD REASSURE SANJABI'S SON THAT HIS FATHER APPEARS IN GOOD CONDITION AND IS BEING SEEN REGULARLY BY THE FAMILY, THEN PERHAPS ALLUDE TO FACT THAT INCARCERATION DOES NOT AT THE MOMENT SEEM TO BE MAJOR PROBLEM FOR HIMSELF AND HIS POLITICAL ASSOCIATES. MINATCHI GAVE EMBOFF IMPRESSION, THOUGH HE WOULD NOT SAY SO DIRECTLY, THAT SITUATION IS NOT ENTIRELY UNWELCOME TO SANJABI AND NATIONAL FRONT.

4. RUMOR THAT SHAH ALSO MET WITH SANJABI HAS BEEN MAKING THE ROUNDS HERE. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION, THOUGH THAT WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT THAN HIS MEETING JUST WITH GOVERNMENT. DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL SHAH WAS INTERESTED IN TALKING WITH SANJABI JUST AS SANJABI LEFT FOR PARIS TO SEE KHOMEINI--AND CAME BACK, PUBLICLY AT LEAST, CONVERTED TO KHOMEINI'S HARD LINE.

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 11241

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, IR
SUBJ: DISCUSSIONS WITH OPPOSITION MODERATES AND LOYALISTS

1. ON SUCCESSIVE NIGHTS RECENTLY POL COUNSELOR MET WITH MOHAMAD DERAKHSHESH, HEAD OF TEACHERS UNION, AND SENATOR MOHAMAD ALI MASSOUDI, PROMINENT SUPPORTER OF SHARIF-EMAMI AND SHAH LOYALISTS. CONVERSATION WITH DERAKHSHESH COVERED A LOT OF GROUND OVER PAST 17 YEARS HE HAS BEEN INACTIVE IN GOVERNMENT AFTER HAVING SERVED AS MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND REFUSED OFFER FOR THAT JOB IN ALAM CABINET OF THOSE DAYS. HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ABOUT A WEEK AGO AFTER SPENDING TWO WEEKS, MAINLY IN A MILITARY HOSPITAL DUE TO BLOOD PRESSURE PROBLEM, HAVING BEEN ARRESTED BY MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES FOR OPPOSITION STATEMENTS. As leader OF A UNION WHICH CONSISTS OF FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ~~XXXXX~~ TEACHERS THROUGH-

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(Formerly FS-413)
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OUT IRAN, DERAKHSHESH IS ONE OF RELATIVELY FEW PEOPLE IN IRAN WHO CAN MOBILIZE SOME SORT OF ORGANIZATION. HE INDICATED HE WOULD DEARLY LOVE TO FOLLOW CONCILIATORY COURSE WHICH WOULD PERMIT SHAH TO REMAIN AND REIGN, NOT RULE, BUT GOVERNMENT HAS CLOSED DOWN ALL EFFORTS HE AND HIS GROUP HAVE MADE TO PUBLISH OR BE POLITICALLY ACTIVE.

2. DERAKHSHESH DESCRIBES GROUP THAT FOLLOWS HIM AS MAJORITY OF TEACHERS. SMALL MINORITY FOLLOW CRYPTO COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION ACCORDING TO HIM WHILE LARGER MINORITY ARE RELIGIOUS SUPPORTERS DOMINATED BY KHOMEINI. HE CONSIDERS PEOPLE WHO HAVE POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT OVER PAST 17 YEARS AS "CORRUPT" MORALLY EVEN IF NOT IN EVERY CASE FINANCIALLY. HE CITES HIS OWN EXPERIENCE WHEN HIS SALARY WAS CUT OFF FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND HE HAD TO SURVIVE ON HIS WIFE'S EARNINGS. ALL THIS APPEARS TO LEAVE HIM NOT TOO EMBITTERED, AND POL COUNSELOR AS WELL AS VISITING INR DEPARTMENT OFFICER GRIFFIN WERE IMPRESSED BY HIS READINESS TO FOLLOW A MIDDLE COURSE THAT MIGHT SAVE HIS COUNTRY FROM THE POLARIZED EXTREMES INTO WHICH SITUATION IS SLIPPING. HE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN REMAINING IN TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY.

CORRECT PINK COPIES.

3. MASSOUDI, WHO WAS ACTIVE BEHIND THE SCENES IN SUPPORT OF SHARIF-EMAMI AS PRIME MINISTER, AND CONTINUES ACTIVE WITH MANY OPPOSITION AS WELL AS LOYALIST ELEMENTS, REPRESENTED CONTINUING LOYALTY MANY IRANIANS FEEL FOR THE

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KING, DESPITE THEIR RECOGNITION OF HIS HAVING MADE MANY ERRORS. MASSOUDI AND HIS DAUGHTERS WENT ~~ON AT SOME~~ LENGTH ABOUT THE SINS OF PEOPLE WHO SURROUNDED THE KING OVER PAST DECADE AND PROFITED BY THEIR ROLE AS INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN THE KING AND HIS PEOPLE. HOVEYDA IN PARTICULAR CAME IN FOR HEAVY CRITICISM.

4. WE REPORT THESE TWO MEETINGS TO INDICATE COMPLEXITY IN DOMESTIC IRANIAN SITUATION. THERE ARE A VARIETY OF ELEMENTS IN THE POPULATION WHO WOULD DEARLY LIKE TO SEE SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD KEEP THE SHAH AND AVOID A TOTAL VICTORY FOR KHOMEINI FORCES. MANY OF THESE PEOPLE ARE CONVINCED COMMUNISTS WILL EVENTUALLY MANAGE TO TAKE OVER ANY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT DESPITE THEIR RELATIVELY LOW POSTURE IN PRESENT OPPOSITION. OTHERS WANT TO AVOID WHAT THEY SEE AS RELIGIOUS FANATICISM. ALL RECOGNIZE KEY ROLE TO BE PLAYED BY THE ARMED FORCES WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF PRESENT SITUATION MIGHT BE.

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(Formerly FS-413(H)a)
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FROM: AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/LIMDIS

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECRET TEHRAN 11296

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, IR,
SUBJ: MEETING WITH ALI AMINI

1. FORMER PRIME MINISTER ALI AMINI ASKED ME TO MEET HIM DISCREETLY AT HOME OF MUTUAL FRIEND EVENING NOVEMBER 16. DISCUSSION BEGAN WITH MUTUAL EXPRESSIONS OF PREVIOUS RELUCTANCE TO MEET BECAUSE OF TEHRAN GOSSIP THAT AMINI WAS "AMERICAN PUPPET" OR "CIA AGENT". AMINI SAID THAT ASPECT CONCERNED HIM AS LONG AS HE HAD HARBORED AMBITIONS TO BE PRIME MINISTER. HE HAD FINALLY DECIDED FORESWEAR SUCH AMBITIONS AND THEREFORE SOUGHT OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VI WITH ME.

2. AMINI SAID HE HAD DECIDED HE COULD BEST SERVE HIS COUNTRY BY ACTING AS AN INTERMEDIARY AND CATALYST FOR COMPROMISE. HE AND ENTEZAM HAD BEEN MEETING RATHER REGULARLY WITH SHAH AND ALSO WITH OPPOSITION GROUPS. HE SAID HE FELT SOME PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE, BUT HE HAD YET

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TO BRIDGE THE GREAT GAP OF DISTRUST. HE ASKED HOW I SAW THE SITUATION, SINCE HE KNEW WE HAD ALSO HAD CONTINUING CONTACTS BOTH WITH SHAH AND WITH OPPOSITION GROUPS.

3. I SAID IT WAS MY IMPRESSION SHAH WAS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO FORM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PROCEED WITH FREE ELECTIONS. THE DEPTH AND THE SCOPE OF POPULAR OPPOSITION TO HIM AND HIS REGIME HAD SHOCKED HIM. HOWEVER, WE FOUND THE OPPOSITION GROUPS INTRANSIGENT AND UNWILLING TO COMPROMISE. THEY DEEPLY DISTRUSTED THE SHAH AND FELT THAT ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM WOULD SOMEHOW LEAD TO ENTRAPMENT. THEY WANTED THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND ME TO BE THEIR INTERMEDIARIES WITH THE SHAH, BUT THEIR TERMS INVOLVED SURRENDER BY THE SHAH. WE FLATLY REFUSED TO MEDIATE. THE U.S. POSITION HAD BEEN CATEGORICALLY STATED SEVERAL TIMES BY PRESIDENT CARTER. WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT INVOLVE OURSELVES IN ATTEMPTING TO STRUCTURE THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF IRAN. THAT HAD TO BE AN IRANIAN EFFORT.

4. AMINI SAID HE AGREED WITH THAT POSITION AND WAS ATTEMPTING TO BE THE INTERMEDIARY. HIS IDEA WAS TO BRING SMALL GROUPS OF INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE FROM VARIOUS SECTORS OF IRANIAN PUBLIC LIFE INTO INTIMATE MEETINGS WITH THE SHAH. HE FELT THIS WOULD GIVE WIDER CURRENCY TO OUR IMPRESSION THAT SHAH WAS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO HOLD FREE ELECTIONS. IF THIS IMPRESSION COULD BE WIDESPREAD, IT WOULD BREAK DOWN THE WALL OF DISTRUST. HE INTENDED TO START WITH A

SMALL NUMBER OF UNIVERSITY TYPES AND EVENTUALLY LEAD TOWARDS THE NATIONAL FRONT POLITICIANS. HE ASKED WHAT I THOUGHT.

5. I SAID ONE GROUP WHICH OUGHT TO BE INCLUDED WAS THE LEADERS OF THE BAZAAR. I THOUGHT THEY HAD GREAT INFLUENCE AND ALSO GREAT DISTRUST. AMINI READILY AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD GATHER FOUR OR FIVE LEADERS TOGETHER IF THE SHAH AGREED.

6. I SAID THERE WERE RUMORS IN TOWN THAT SHAH HAD ALREADY SEEN SANJABI. ALI AMINI SAID HE HAD HEARD THEM, BUT HE DOUBTED THEM. HOWEVER, HE WOULD SEE SHAH SATURDAY AND FIND OUT. I SAID I WOULD ALSO SEE SHAH SATURDAY AND WE AGREED WE WOULD BOTH INFORM HIM OF FACT OF OUR MEETING.

7. WE THEN TURNED TO DISCUSSION OF TIME FRAME ENTAILED IN THE POLITICAL DISCUSSION PROCESS AMINI HAD OUTLINED. HE SAID IT HAD TO BE RAPID AND BE COMPLETED BEFORE MOHARRAM. HE FELT THAT MODERATE AYATOLLAHS COULD KEEP THE PUBLIC CALM UNTIL THAT TIME; BUT, IF SOME RAPPORT BETWEEN MODERATES AND SHAH NOT ESTABLISHED PRIOR THAT TIME, KHOMEINI COULD USE THE FERVOR OF THE MOHARRAM PERIOD TO PRODUCE CHAOS.

8. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THE KHOMEINI INFLUENCE WAS SLIPPING. I SAID HE WAS ONE OF MANY POLITICAL FIGURES WHO HAD TOLD ME THAT, BUT I WONDERED WHETHER IT REFLECTED SITUATION AMONG STUDENTS AND BAZAARI. HE FELT COMMON LINK BETWEEN THOSE TWO GROUPS AND KHOMEINI WAS INTENSE HATRED FOR THE SHAH, BUT HE DOUBTED THEY WERE ORGANICALLY LINKED

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TO KHOMEINI.

9. I ASKED AMINI FOR HIS VIEWS ON HOW GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS HELD IN A RELATIVELY CALM ATMOSPHERE WOULD TURN OUT. HE SAID, MUCH AS OTHER POLITICAL FIGURES HAVE SAID THAT THEY WOULD RETURN A "BALANCED" PARLIAMENT WHICH WOULD RESPECT THE CONSTITUTION AND PREFER A MONARCHY WHICH REIGNED BUT DID NOT RULE. THEY WOULD ALSO RESPECT THE SHAH'S ROLE AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES. HE BASED THIS PREDICTION ON THE FACT THAT MOST POLITICAL LEADERS HAD THEIR OWN LOCAL CONSTITUENCIES. HOWEVER, HE SAID THE ELECTION LISTS WOULD HAVE TO GET THE BLESSINGS OF THE MULLAHS AND THIS WAS WHY IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH THE RAPPORT BETWEEN THEM AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WITH THE SHAH.

10. IN PARTING, WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH, BUT ALSO AGREED THAT U.S. ROLE WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE, RATHER THAN CENTRAL, TO ANY PROCESS OF RESTORING IRANIAN CONFIDENCE IN THE SHAH.

SULLIVAN

OPTIONAL FORM 152a(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H)a)
January 1975
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CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY
Tehran, Iran

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Senator Mohammad-Reza Jalali-Naini
PAO, Jack H. Shellenberger

DATE & PLACE: PAO's Residence - November 19, 1978

DISTRIBUTION: AMB, DCM, POL, POL/MIL, ECON, CONS, OR, ICA/NEA

CIRCULATE

The Senator requested the get together. He has just returned from Paris where he met with some expatriate members of the old National Front. He did not see Khomeini. The Senator believes every day that passes tends to increase the military appetite to maintain itself in power. Even with the addition of civilians to the cabinet, the military make the decisions. He does not accept the idea that nothing should be done pending the passing of Moharram. He believes that after Ashura there will be another excuse to keep the status quo.

The Senator believes a civilian government could be fashioned which would be acceptable to Shariat-Madari whose influence he believes would survive a test with that of Khomeini. Such a government would best be drawn from National Fronters, a number of whom have had substantive experience in government.

He is an admirer of Sanjabi and Bazargan either of whom he thinks could be entrusted to form a government acceptable to varied interest groups, one that would resist radicalism. He believes the Shah must be more explicit than up to now in declaring his intention to reign rather than rule. He believes the Shah's control of events is slipping and that awaiting the outcome of Moharram will only further weld the military to its positions of power. What should be done now, he argues, is to treat with Khomeini in the person of someone acceptable to both Shah and Ayatollah. Such individuals exist.

The Senator expects he will continue to be the only Senator who publicly will speak against the Azhari government.

COMMENT: The Senator is clearly an idealist in the sense that he considers the 1906 constitution fully implementable without a gradual transition period. A widely known and respected scholar and lawyer, present-day political realities, complexities and practicalities, seem not to especially vex him.

JHShellenberger:mh

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TO AMEMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL KHORRAMSHAHR IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY STUTTGART IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC

DIRECTOR BRAZZAL FOR SECRETARY KLOSSON

EO 12065: GDS

TAGS: PINT, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO. 13, NOVEMBER 19, 1978

1. IRAN WAS AGAIN QUIET, BUT THERE WAS A SURGE IN TENSION AND SPIRITS. MOST OBSERVERS EXPECT AN OPPOSITION REPLYING TO FURTHER DECISIVE EFFORTS TO CALM DISTURBANCES DURING MUHARRAM, BEGINNING DECEMBER 2. OIL PRODUCTION AGAIN SLIGHTLY INCREASED ABOVE 1.5 MILLION BARRELS.

2. PRO-KHOMEINI FORCES [illegible] TO MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION [illegible] IRAN'S OIL SHOPS [illegible] HAVE BEEN DAMAGED IN THE PAST [illegible] IN THE [illegible] TO PREVENT [illegible] INTO STRATEGIC GENERAL [illegible]

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JEDDAH
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
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STUTTGART FOR ELA, KUWAIT PASS BRAZEAL PASS BLUMENTHAL

E.O. 11652: GDS
ALL ADDEES TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION, ZFF4 FOR SECRETARY ONLY
TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO. 21, 11/21/78

1. RELATIVE QUIET CONTINUES IN IRAN BROKEN BY CONTINUING, SPORADIC DISTURBANCES IN SEVERAL PROVINCIAL CITIES. (ONE FOREIGN EMBASSY BELIEVES 200 PERSONS KILLED IN PAST TWO WEEKS). EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT CURRENT CALM, WITH ITS VARIOUS ENCOURAGING SIGNS, IS MERELY PRELUDE TO MOHARRAM WHEN OPPOSITION WILL TRY TO MOUNT SERIOUS DISTURBANCES TO ACHIEVE AIM OF TOPPLING SHAH BEFORE END OF DECEMBER.

2. CURRENT ENCOURAGING SIGNS INCLUDE: PRIMARY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IS VIRTUALLY BACK TO NORMAL IN TEHRAN, ALBEIT MANY STILL DISRUPTED IN PROVINCES; TEHRAN BAZAAR HAS BEEN OPEN FOR PAST TWO DAYS, WITH KHOMEINI AND MULLAHS ORDERING SHOPS OPEN UP TO DECEMBER 2 TO ENABLE PEOPLE TO STOCK UP; OIL PRODUCTION FOR NOVEMBER 21 IS EXPECTED TO TOTAL 4.3 MILLION BARRELS, WITH 3.65 OF THAT AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT.

3. AIRPORT TELEX SERVICE HAS REOPENED, LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION REMAINS DIFFICULT. THERE WERE TRANSPORT POWER OUTAGES IN TEHRAN BUT POWER WAS RESTORED BY MIDDAY. AN AMERICAN OWNED HOTEL WAS FIRE-BOMBED IN MOHARRAM END SHEDIN OF NOVEMBER 20.

4. IRAN'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS BUREAUCRATIC SNAFU HAVE CAUSED A SLOWDOWN IN THE REPAYMENT OF DEBTS OWED TO PRIVATE AND PUBLIC FOREIGN CREDITORS. FIRMS ALSO REPORT SOME DIFFICULTIES IN PROCESSING AND GETTING PAID FOR GOODS SHIPMENTS. THERE IS A GOOD LIKELIHOOD THAT MOST NON-CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PROJECTS WILL UNDERGO CHOICE

CUTBACK DURING OUTLAYS.

5. FRANCE'S PRESIDENT GISCARD STATED AT HIS TELEVISED NEWS CONFERENCE NOVEMBER 21 THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD INDICATED TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MOST RECENTLY ON A RECENT DATE, THAT "THE SOIL OF FRANCE IS NOT A TERRITORY FROM WHICH CAN BE LAUNCHED CALLS TO VIOLENCE." CLEAR IMPLICATION IS THAT FRENCH WILL SOMEHOW SEEK TO RESTRAIN KHOMEINI'S ACTIVITIES WHILE HE REMAINS IN FRANCE. HIS 3-MONTH VISA EXPIRES IN EARLY JANUARY.

6. THE FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF AN EMBASSY EVALUATION OF THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT:

"AFTER LITTLE MORE THAN TWO WEEKS ON THE JOB THE AZHARI GOVERNMENT HAS RE[illegible] SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF SECURITY IN TEHRAN AND KEY [illegible], ALTHOUGH MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE BEFORE LAW AND ORDER CAN BE SAID TO BE RESTORED COMPLETELY. ALTHOUGH SOME FAIR MEASURE OF SUCCESS HAS ALSO BEEN ACHIEVED IN GETTING KEY STRIKERS BACK TO WORK, THAT IS ANOTHER AREA WHERE THE JOB IS BY NO MEANS COMPLETE. THE GOVERNMENT HAS FIELDED A STRONG TEAM -- 18 CIVILIANS AND 6 MILITARY -- WHO ARE FOR THE MOST PART TECHNICALLY COMPETENT AND GENERALLY DO NOT BEAR THE STIGMA OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE SHAH'S PERSONAL REGIME OF THE PAST 15 YEARS.

"IF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO BLUNT THE EXPECTATION OF VICTORY HELD BY THE KHOMEINI OPPOSITION TO TOPPLE THE SHAH DURING DECEMBER THAT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN EVENTUAL WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE OPPOSITION TO SETTLE FOR LESS. THAT IN TURN WOULD OPEN THE SHAH TO GREATER EFFORT TO FIND A SUCCESSOR CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS OF A COALITION NATURE WITH ELEMENTS OF THE OPPOSITION. SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD PRESUMABLY SEEK TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW ONCE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE SUBSIDED, PERHAPS BEFORE THE END OF JANUARY, AND MOVE TO ELECTIONS.

"SOME OPPOSITIONISTS SEEK OUR HELP IN FACILITATING AN ORDERLY EVOLUTION OF POWER FROM THE SHAH TO THEMSELVES. THIS LAST ATTITUDE CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AS LONG AS THERE ARE REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS OF A MOVE TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND ELECTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IF MILITARY GOVERNMENT SHOULD CONTINUE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS OR MORE, HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEE A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF GREATER DESPERATION ON THE PART OF THE OPPOSITION, LEADING TO A MORE[illegible] ATTITUDE TOWARD THE U.S." CHRISTOPHER

[illegible]

SECRET

TELEGRAM

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FROM	CLASSIFICATION
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN	CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

ACTION:

POL:3

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL THHRAN 11499

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E.O: 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, SHUM, IR
SUBJ: BAZAARI VIEWS ON CURRENT SITUATION
REF: TEHRAN 10928

SUMMARY: IN SECOND MEETING WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS, GROUP OF BAZAAR LEADERS SHOWED DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE FROM KHOMEINI AND WILLINGNESS AT LEAST TO PRESENT THEIR CASE TO HIM IF GOVT GIVES THEM EVIDENCE IN ITS DEEDS THAT IT IS PREPARED TO MEET A MAJOR PART OF THEIR DEMANDS. IT WOULD APPEAR THEY AND OTHER BAZAARIS REOPENED TEHRAN BAZAAR NOV 20 ON THEIR OWN, RISKING THE DISPLEASURE OF KHOMEINI. THEY EXPRESSED FRIENDSHIP FOR U.S., GRATITUDE FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, AND A DESIRE TO COOPERATE IN TRYING FOR A MODERATE SOLUTION TO IRAN'S CURRENT PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED
POL:GBLambrakis	11/22/78	1110	MIN:CWNaas

CLEARANCES:

137

CLASSIFICATION

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1. EMBOFFS HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH BAZAARIS AT INTERMEDIARY'S HOUSE NOV 21. THIS TIME HAJ KARIM HOSSEINI AND HAJ MOHAMMED TAGHIE ETTEFAH BROUGHT A DIFFERENT THIRD MEMBER OF THE GROUP, HAJ AHMAD POURGHADIRI ESFAHANI. ETTEFAH DID MOST OF THE TALKING FOR THE GROUP.

2. AFTER INITIAL WARMUP, IT BECAME EVIDENT THESE BAZAARIS ARE ACTIVELY TRYING TO MODERATE EVENTS/SO AS TO PREVENT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LASTING POLARIZATION BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE SHAH AND SUPPORTERS OF KHOMEINI. KNOWING VARIETY OF COMPLAINTS PEOPLE HAVE AGAINST THE SHAH AND HIS GOVERNMENTS OF RECENT YEARS ETTEFAH NEVERTHELESS CONFIDED HE IS PREPARED TO TRAVEL TO PARIS AND PLEAD WITH KHOMEINI IF HE IS GIVEN SOME CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S READINESS TO MODIFY VARIOUS POLICIES AND RIGHT VARIOUS WRONGS. HE ALSO CONFIDED TO US THAT THIS GROUP OF BAZAARIS HAD RECENTLY MET WITH AN UNNAMED MEMBER OF THE AZHARI GOVT WHO PROMISED TO HELP THEM. ETTEFAH IS PREPARED TO TRAVEL AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK, SECRETLY, IF HE IS GIVEN SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION.

3. ASKED WHAT KINDS OF THINGS THESE BAZAARIS WANTED FROM THE GOVERNMENT AT THIS TIME (SOMETHING ON WHICH CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION HAD TAKEN PLACE AT THE FIRST MEETING, SEE REFTEL), ETTEFAH LISTED SEVERAL.

4. FIRST, GOVERNMENT SHOULD "STOP KILLING PEOPLE." WHEN WE NOTED SUCH KILLING TAKES PLACE IN REACTION TO MASS

DEMONSTRATIONS, HE, AND THE INTERMEDIARY, NOTED HOW OFTEN NOTHING IS DONE BY POLICE OR TROOPS WHEN PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO GATHER FOR A DEMONSTRATION, BUT THE GROUP IS ALLOWED TO GROW TO PROPORTIONS WHERE CLASH OCCURS AND PEOPLE ARE KILLED. BAZAARIS SUSPECT THIS IS A CONSCIOUS GOVERNMENT POLICY. IF IT IS NOT, GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR SUCH GROUPS EARLY ON AND BREAK THEM UP WITH WATER OR TEAR GAS RATHER THAN SHOOTING.

5. SECOND, SOME OF THESE PROMINENT PEOPLE SUCH AS SAVAK'S GENERAL NASSIRI AND FORMER MINISTER OF INFORMATION HOMAYOUN SHOULD BE QUESTIONED AND BROUGHT SPEEDILY TO TRIAL NOW THAT THEY ARE ARRESTED. GROUP THOUGHT SUFFICIENT LAWS NOT EXIST AND SPECIAL NEW COURTS ARE/NECESSARY. GOVERNMENT MOVES WITH GREAT SPEED IN QUESTIONING ITS OPPONENTS. SLOWNESS IN THIS CASE IS JUST AN EXCUSE. AFTER ALL, EVERYBODY KNOWS IT WAS HOMAYOUN'S ARTICLE IN ETELAAT ATTACKING KHOMEINI [redacted] IN JANUARY WHICH SET OFF THE SPARK OF THE RELIGIOUS REACTION. HOMAYOUN IS THEREBY RESPONSIBLE FOR A LOT OF DEATHS AND SHOULD ANSWER FOR THEM.

6. THIRD, LAND REFORM WAS NOT CARRIED OUT PROPERLY AND HAS KILLED AGRICULTURE. SOME CHANGES IN THESE LAWS ARE NECESSARY. BAZAARIS CONFIDED THAT A GROUP IN THE BAZAAR IS WORKING ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO THESE LAWS AND TO OTHERS.

7. FOURTH, A WIDE VARIETY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS HAVE

BEEN IMPOSED WHICH IMPEDE BUSINESS AND HAND WINDFALL PROFITS TO THE FEW WHO HAVE BEEN GRANTED MONOPOLIES BY THE GOVERNMENT. EVEN RELIGIOUS LAWS ARE OVERLOOKED. BUTCHERS ARE FORCED TO BUY FROZEN MEAT FROM ABROAD WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SLAUGHTERED IN THE PRESCRIBED MOSLEM WAY. IT WOULD ACTUALLY COST NO MORE, EVEN LESS, TO IMPORT SHEEP ON THE HOOF FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SUCH AS TURKEY, WHICH HAS A SURPLUS FOR EXPORT, AND SLAUGHTER THE SHEEP HERE, BUT THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT ALLOW IT. SUCH REGULATIONS SHOULD BE ABOLISHED.

8. FIFTH, THE GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY SAVAK, MUST STOP ACTING SO BADLY WITH THE ULEMA. THEY PULL IN RELIGIOUS LEADERS FOR QUESTIONING ON THE SLIGHTEST PRETEXT AND TREAT THEM BADLY. JUST THE OTHER DAY, A RELIGIOUS LEADER WHO WAS RETURNING FROM A VISIT WITH KHOMEINI IN PARIS WAS ARRESTED AS HE GOT OFF THE PLANE. HE HAS NOW BEEN FREED, AFTER MUCH INTERVENTION ON HIS BEHALF, BUT HE NEVER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ARRESTED.

9. SIXTH, THE NEWSPAPERS WHICH HAVE BEEN REAPPEARING RECENTLY (AFTER A FIVE-YEAR ABSENCE) SUCH AS "ATESH" AND OTHERS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PUBLISH. THEY WRITE ANYTHING PEOPLE PAY THEM TO WRITE AND THEY AGGRAVATE THE MASSES. THIS IS NOT HELPFUL AT THE PRESENT TIME.

10. AT THAT POINT HOSSEINI AND ETTEFAH TOGETHER SAID THEY WISHED TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THEY LIKE AMERICANS

AND THANK AMERICANS FOR THE HELP THEY HAVE GIVEN TO IRAN. THEY THANKED PRESIDENT CARTER FOR HIS EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THEY WONDERED IF THEY COULD COUNT ON COOPERATION WITH AMERICANS. POL COUNS EXPRESSED GRATITUDE AND SAID COOPERATION WAS EXACTLY WHAT WE ALSO HAD IN MIND AND WHAT WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF DOING IN THIS CONVERSATION. HE THEN ASKED THE GROUP ABOUT REPORTS THAT BEGINNING OF MOHARRAM WILL BRING SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS TO THE COUNTRY. ETTEFAH AND HOSSEINI IMMEDIATELY DENIED THIS. THEY SAID OPPOSITION EXTREMISTS ARE THREATENING AN EXPLOSIVE SITUATION IN DECEMBER IN REACTION TO GOVERNMENT THREATS TO CLOSE THE MOSQUES. GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT CLOSE THE MOSQUES AND SHOULD KEEP COOL. BAZAARIS HAVE SENT A MESSAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT IT SHOULD APPROACH LEADERS OF VARIOUS SECTORS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY (BAZAARIS, STUDENTS, ETC.) AND ASK THAT THEY KEEP THEIR FOLLOWERS UNDER CONTROL. BAZAARIS CAN DO THIS FOR THEIR OWN FOLLOWERS. THEY PLAN TO KEEP BAZAAR OPEN DURING MOHARRAM -- IF GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PROVOKE TROUBLE -- EXCEPT FOR SIX DAYS DECEMBER 8-13, AROUND ASHURA. THEY DESCRIBED AS "LIES" THREATS OF TROUBLE MADE BY OPPOSITION SPOKESMEN SUCH AS THE YOUNGER SANJABI IN THE U.S.

11. ETTEFAH THEN SAID HE WOULD CONFIDE ANOTHER SECRET TO US. IF GOVERNMENT GIVES HIM SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF MOVING ON BAZAARIS' DEMANDS, HE IS READY TO LEAVE FOR KERBELA

WITHIN A FEW DAYS AND GO ON TO PARIS TO TALK TO KHOMEINI. POL COUNS ASKED IF HE THOUGHT HE WOULD SUCCEED WITH KHOMEINI WHEN SO MANY OTHERS FAILED. POL COUNS NOTED THERE ARE OTHER BAZAARIS WHO APPEAR TO REPRESENT KHOMEINI AND ARE TAKING A HARD LINE. ETTEFAH, HOSSEINI, AND ESFAHANI REPEATED THAT THEY CONSIDERED GOING TO KHOMEINI TO BE THEIR DUTY. BAZAARIS' MONEY IS GONE. THEY WILL PRESS KHOMEINI TO ACCEPT A SHAH WHO IS OPERATING WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION AND STOP SENDING HIS INFLAMMATORY MESSAGES TO IRAN.

12. IN A SEPARATE SMALL MEETING AFTERWARD, HOSSEINI, ETTEFAH, AND THE INTERMEDIARY SAID THEY WOULD LIKE TO CALL ON THE SHAH, AND ASKED OUR ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING THIS. POL COUNS SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO REFER THIS REQUEST TO THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER DOING SO THE NEXT DAY, HE IS PASSING MESSAGE BACK THAT WE KNOW ALI AMINI (WHOM THESE BAZAARIS THINK WELL OF) IS PLANNING TO MEET WITH BAZAARI REPRESENTATIVES IN NEXT DAYS AND HAS BEEN ENTRUSTED BY THE SHAH WITH AN INTERMEDIARY ROLE.

13. INCIDENTALLY, EMBASSY TRANSLATIONS OF FLYERS IN FARSI ISSUED IN TEHRAN NOV 15 INDICATE THAT REOPENING OF BAZAAR NOV 20 WAS CALLED FOR BY OVER 80 LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS RATHER THAN BY KHOMEINI. FLYER SAYS OPENING IS TO BE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. THIS SUPPORTS POSITION TAKEN BY BAZAARIS WITH US AND SUGGESTS A GROWING WILLINGNESS BY BAZAAR AND

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RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO PROTECT THEIR OWN INTERESTS EVEN AT THE RISK OF DISPLEASING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. THIS PROCESS HAS NOT GONE VERY FAR YET, HOWEVER, AND THERE IS DOUBT IN OUR MINDS AS TO HOW FAR IT CAN GO BEFORE THE ONSET OF MOHARRAM.

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